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In 1968 outside private investment was allowed to enter the 
bantustans after a long period of prohibition. Though the terms 
of the "agency system" were restrictive, not allowing outside 
parties ownership of buildi~gs or land in the bantustans, invest-
ments slowly began to trickle in. As the incentives offered by 
the state to private investors were improved in the early seventies, __, 
' the development of manufacturing industry in the bantustans 
became a notable factor· in the South African economy, though it 
was still very small. 
.\ 
Previously practically no industrial 
undertakings had existed in the bantustans at all. 
Critical studies of decentralisation have tended in the pastl 
to regard bantustan industrialisation as a category of industrial 
decentralisation distinguished only by its location and, noting . 
the distance between the intentions and achievements of the \ 
policy as a whole, dwell on their collective failure. 
job creation targets · have been com2rehensi vely missed. This \ 
~een es_tg.Qli~h.ed, the studies seldom pause to analyse the~ 
political, social and economic implications of the development~ 
that have taken place. 
This is a mistake, for two reasons. Firstly, though goals 
are undershot, industrial development has for the first time 
begun to emerge in the bantustans. Its effects are already 
measurable and its imQl~c9ti_?ns must be examined. Secondly, the 
incentives structure ushered in by the Regional Development 
Programme in 1982 undoubtedly means more rapid industrial growth, 
at least in some bantustans. It could be argued that the tendency 
to locate suitable types of industry in the bantustans will be 
further strengthened by the upward pressure on labour costs 
forced by the independent trade union movement in o?outh ·Africa, 
as wage rates are much lower in the bantustans. In addition, 
stringent factory regulations are not enforced in some bantustans 
and trade unions are totally banned in several. Bantus tan 
industrialisation is rapidly becoming more than an academic 
curiosity. 
2. 
The study of the development of industry in the bantustans 
has tended to follow one of two lines, regardless of the methodo-
logical persuasion of the writer. The subject is either approached 
through the analytical prism of a study of industrial decentrali-
sation policy in South Africa or it is mentioned, usually too 
briefly, in studies of the development of bantustan policy, or of 
·. 
a particular bantustan. For different reasons both roads usually 
fail to provide a detailed or accurate analysis of the subject. 
The central problem of the first approach, or, at least of writers 
who have travelled it thusfar, is that it fails to distinguish, 
sufficiently, bantustan industrialisation from industrial decentra-
lisation as a general programme. This problem is discussed in 
some detail in Chapter two. The latter approach, along the path 
of bantustan analysis, generally fails to analyse bantustan 
industrialisation in any depth and fails to situate it and thus 
analyse it as a programme. 
It is not intended here to berate studies for failing to do 
what they did not in fact set out to do. That would naturally 
be misplaced criticism. What is being suggested is that in 
order to do the subject justice it must be approached along both 
roads at the same time. Bantustan industrialisation presents an 
an';llytical problem in that it lies at the point of intersection 
of two distinct series of state initiatives - decentralisation 
policy and bantustan policy. Though clearly very closely relate , 
the two sets of ini tia ti ves do not always have identical policy 
objectives, which, of course, change over time, and neither are 
they implemented by identical sets of state apparatuses. It 
, will be argued that not only do these factors give rise to difficul-
ties in analysis, but they are also responsible for apparently 
impenetrable contradictions within the policy itself. 
This brings us to a problem that confronts writers of history. 
If one seeks to explain an event or a series of events, it is 
necessary to comprehend both the structure of society and particu-
larly of those social institutions implicated in the events, 
while at the same time it is necessary to understand the conjunc-
ture - the historical moment which is made up of many interconnected 
parts. Pierre Vilar writes: 
"Those contemporary historians who admit (and sometimes 
believe they have discovered) the need to consider both 
(sic) the structure of a society, the temporal conjunc-
tures and the events of the period, show a tendency to 
expound these three aspects of world history successively 
and separately. 
( 1 ) 
It is logical, therefore legitimate. " 
3. 
This is hazardous, he argues, because focussing separately 
on these components of history risks misunderstanding what links 
them together. Marx and Engels instead focus upon the links, 
avoiding a rigid pedagogical and conventional approach. So 
"Marx's history . . . neither separates nor 'fuses' the various 
aspects It combines them." 
Ideally history should be written that way. Unfortunately 
such an approach demands the tremendous confidence to sweep 
fearlessly across the face of society and down the corridors of 
history without a backward glance. In this dissertation I am 
afraid I err on the side of schematicism. 
In the first three chapters I attempt to prepare an understan-
ding of some of the structures and conjunctures pertinent to the 
more detailed history that follows in the subsequent chapters. 
The problems associated with the analysis of bantustan industriali-
sation have led me to structure my dissertation as follows: 
In Chapter one I sketch a brief history of industrial decentra-
lisation policy and practice in South Africa. The policy is 
first formally ad~pte_~ -~12.. 1960_ l?t.!t ~g_me antecedent P.l'.QROsals and© 
~es, which make up its pre-history are also examined. 
Policy does not develop in a vacuum and the chapter refers to 
aspects of other instances of state intervention in the economy, 
but only where it is directly relevant. 
Chapter two is concerned with appraising previous studies of 
i~dustrial decentralisation, with an eye to the capacities of the 
f-arious approaches to deal with the questions raised by a study 
(!)/of bantustan industrialisation. It focusses on the ability of 
the various approaches to distinguish between the various phases 
of decentralisation policy. 
Lj • 
In Chapter three I examine the reasons behind the development 
of particular forms of economic intervention in the bantustans in 
the post-World War Two period. The first part of the chapter 
centres on the crisis in the bantustans, a crisis which began in 
the 1950s and was demographic in form. It is argued that the· 
nature and effects of the crisis, which became endemic, need to 
be analysed in order to understand the state's policies towards 
the bantus tans since the early 1950s. The second part of the 
chapter surveys significant instances of state intervention in 
the agricultural, commercial and industrial spheres and links the 
last back to decentralisation policy. 
In a sense the three chapters involve set ting off from two 
points to arrive at the same object. The first two chapterj 
traverse the terrain of industrial decentralisation policy while 
the third follows the development of bantustan economic policy. 
Because the issues are closely related, the chapters cannot stick 
rigidly to their central subjects. The purpose of the structure 
is to illustrate and explain the necessity to analyse the bantustan 
industrialisation programme as the product of complex interrelation-
ships of factors and to explain contradictions within the policy 
in terms of this approach. The method adopted should not be 
seen as positivist or empiricist. A single thread ties the 
analysis together - the form of development of capitalism in 
post-Second World War South Africa, and the struggles it entails 
and grows out of. 
The remaining three chapters focus upon the Ciskei as a case 
study of bantustan industrialisation. 
Chapter four is a very brief historical sketch of the politi-
cal economy of the Ciskei. It focusses upon the relationship 
between changing economic conditions and changing forms of politics 
and administrative control. 
Chapter five deals with the demographic circumstances of the 
Ciskei over the past three decades. It examines the causes of 
the demographic crisis (relating back to Chapter three), particular-
ly resettlement, and explores implications. It is particularly 
concerned with the effects of deteriorating economic conditions 
on existing forms of political and social control. 
5. 
Chapter six, after looking at state intervention in the agricultu-
ral and commercial spheres since the Second World War and examining 
the Ciskei National Development Corpora ti on, explores in detail 
ind us trial development in the Ciskei between 197 4 and 1981 . 
Central issues discussed are the incentives structure and its 
effects, the origin and types of capital involved, forms of 
production and exploitation of labour and their political and 
social implications. 
In the Conclusion the main findings of the study are drawn 
together and, as a form of epilogue, recent developments in 
bantustan industrialisation are discussed. Most importantly the 
new Regional Development Programme and the recently established 
Development Bank of Southern Africa and their quite considerable 
implications for the future of industrial development in the 
bantustans are discussed. 
One obvious question remains: why was the Ciskei chosen as 
a case study? To be honest, one important reason was the fact 
that I was. contracted to do some research on resettlement in the 
Ciskei and was able to do some research for this thesis at the 
same time. In fact, the question of industrial development in 
the bantustans had never struck me as particularly interesting 
until· I was sent to the Ciskei in 1981. There, I discovered, a 
good deal of the limited time and effort being put into bantustan 
economic development was directed towards industrial development . • 
It did not seem feasible that the development agencies saw 
bantustan industrialisation as an answer to bantustan unemployment, 
and thus this study began. 
In the event, the Ciskei is quite a suitable case study. 
It is neither the most nor the least successful instance of 
bantustan industrialisation. It is not a very large bantustan 
like the Transkei or Bophutha.tswana, but neither is it as tiny as 
Qwa Qwa or Kwandebele. In a number of ways it is an average 
bantustan. However, at the same tim€ the economic, social and 
political conditions have reached a more advanced state of decline 
than many of the homelands. Overcrowding and agricultural collapse 
are very far advanced in the Ciskei. It can be argued that with 
the continuing tightening of influx control in terms of the 
6. 
recommendations of the Riekert Commission, this state of affairs 
is likely to apply increasingly throughout the bantustans. As 
Macmillan wrote in 1930, 
" the Ciskei suggests what other parts of the Union 
are fast drifting to." (2) 
7. 
INTRODUCTION FOOTNOTES. 
( 1) Pierre Vilar "Marx and the Concept of History" in E.H. 
Hobsbawrn (ed) The History of Marxism, The Harvester Press, 
Sussex, 1982, pp 71, 72. 
(2) William Miller Macmillan Complex South Africa - An Economic 
Footnote to History, Faber & Faber, London, 1930, p 138. 
8. 
CHAPTER 1 
INDUSTRIAL DECENTRALISATION PLANS AND POLICIES 
1955 - 1982 
It is customary to introduce studies of contemporary industrial 
decentralisation in South Africa by way of a potted history of 
decentralisation proposals since the 1930s. Both those which 
were taken up and those passed over are included. This study 
will not differ in that respect. An obscure report from the 
1930s will ·be reported, as will be the Regional Development 
programme launched in 1982. 
The approach adopted in this chapter differs in one important 
respect from most other historical introductions to the subject. 
Too frequently there is a tendency, in official publications and 
in academic works on the subject, to _yresent j;[_i_e_~-d~~el2pmei:it o_f , 
j,Qdµ.str~a-1~cl-~G~nti:aJi;>--9t_i9H ... P-9licy . in South Afric~ _<?-S a linear ,:~ 
~Jmlutionary.p.rp_c~.;;-~.- ( 1) In terms of this approach c.hs.nges a~ V 
~rded as shifts of emphasis, or quantitative. The possibility 
of significant qualitative shifts is not . seriously considered. 
Such an approach, which is regarded as mistaken and misleading, 
is particularly evident in analyses applicable to the past 30 
years - the period since the report of the Tomlinson Commission 
and the establishment of the first decentralisation cornmi ttee in 
1960. ( 2) 
Though there is clearly an element of continuity, symbolised 
by the more or less consistent use of the term industrial decentra~ 
lisation, this study will attempt to show that yery di,st..in.c_t • 
,-
<°"' 
( Q.E;centraJ,.is,,.a,ii.2!'L.P~Q..lj.Q_t~~-~P£,~QQ!Jl..inat_e .at .. _di_fferent times within_ ~, 
-~ - - - -- -~ --,- -_ -·-.:::- - -·_- --
the periQQ~_gt;h~~~_dis~~~~~on. Studies which underplay this tend 
to conflate significantly different periods of state policy; 
periods subject to different sets of pressures and governed by 
different sets of priorities. The concept of industrial decentra-
lisation is treated as an object of immanent character, merely 
differentially managed in different eras. It is argued here 
that the content behind the form must be studied. If this is 
done it will become clear that the g_bjectiv~~a.1'19~ n§Jg[~= 0£. t.h~ 
policies fal,li_ng___yri.~c!~!'.'.-_!:,~~ _ruJ2ri_c __ !ndust,r~~_l ____ d_~centralisation 
9. 
~ differ marked]y over ti!Jle., 
To support this, an outline history of industrial decentrali-
sation will be presented. Within it. the, not always, implicit ../ 
emphasis · will be on the periodisa ti on. lD~·· other words .. the (~~ 
ROints at wh;Lch changes in policy occur will be stressec}. In 
~-"-:::..~ ~,,:::_--,,_-:-_:_----< --- ---- __: - . __ ---- - ·_ .·:- .. -~ ~ - - -: - -
this and the following chapter the relationship between the 
periodisation of industrial decentralisation policy and broader 
developments in South African society will be drawn out. 
1. Background and Early History 19'36 - 1954 
The possibilities of encouraging the decentralisation of industry 
. I 
in South Africa are discussed in two government reports that~ 
appeared towards the end of the 1930s; a Board of Trade and 
Industries report in 1936 and the Report of the Rural Industries 
Commission in 1940. ( 3) Both expressed concern about the con-
cen tra ti on of ind us try and, tncrea§,_iQgJ,y:_,_ of. ~P~PU±9.tio~, on. the '?J 
- - - - - - -- - .,.______. - ·~ -~-- - -- .,;,_ ----, .. -~ ..' 
Witwatersrand. A wave of urbanisation of Africans followed an 
earlier wave of urbanisation of poor whites, itself continuing in 
the 1930s. The industrial boom following South Africa's departure 
from the gold standard and, more importantly, that which accompa-
nied the Second World War, absorbed much of the newly urbanised 
population. 
" 
The early suggestions to decentralise, also motivated by 
concern about the "white depopulation of the platteland", carried 
little weight. Industry had barely begun to benefit from the 
advantages of agglomeration economics in the towns. Urban 
~ industrial interests prevailed, allowing not only a rapid expansion "-! 
of industry on the Witwatersrand (Table 2. 1), but also the 
increased immigration of Africans to the urban areas through t~ 
relaxation of influx control. (4) 
In the post-war recession anxiety about the influx of Africans 
from the Reserves grew. The Social and Economic Planning Council, 
a state advisory body, ~xpressed concern at the influx of Africans, 
~md, in addition to recommending agricultural reforms in the~(f:) 
~eserves, suggested some industrial development for the Reserves.•·' 
(5) The ~l Native Pass Laws Commission, while accepting the~ 
permanence of some African urbanisation, recommended the decentra-
lisation of industry to the Reserves in its report published in 
1948. ( 6) In spite of these recommendations po decentralisation 
10. 
®programme was implemented at the time. Instead the National 
~JParty, which came to power in 1948, began to use increasingly 
lstringent legal controls to enforce influx control. 
One parastatal body, the Industrial Development Corporation, 
had begun to undertake projects which would decentralise industry. 
The I.D.C. was established in 1940 to promote industrial develop-
-tent in South Africa "by assisting the private sector in the 
(b inancing of new industries or schemes for the expansion or 
ationalisation of industries ... 11 (7) Mostly this was achieved 
through partnership arrangements, often with foreign capital. 
©One mE;!an~_ 9f _attract_iI?g capital _was providing cheap labour. The 
I.D.C. was able to obtain exemption from wage regulating mechanisms 
Aruch as Industrial Council agreements by locating Qutside of thel 
t:betropoli tan regions. During the late 1940s and early 1950s 
several large factories were established in what became known as j / 
the Border Areas, underdeveloped regions adjacent t0 African [ 
Reserves. A notable example was the Good Hope Textiles factory) 
established near King Williams town in the late 1940s. ( 8) No 
systematic decentralisation policy existed and the I.D.C's contri-
bution to decentralisation was intermittent and arbitrary. 
2. The Tomlinson Commission and its Aftermath 1955 - 1959 
In the course of the 1950s the idea of a programme of industrial 
decentralisation was considered seriously, in a more concerted 
manner than before. The Tomlinson Commission (for the Socio-
Economic Development of the Bantu areas within the Union of South 
Africa) was mandated to e~lore how th~~Qom~es ~t:_ ~J:le~~serves~ 
could develop in accordance with the National Party's desire to (!) 
stem th~_Dm,r_oLJmRQy_~rtshed Afripans_to_t_bE:;_t.Q\:fil.S. The Commis-
sion attempted to design a programme through which the economies 
of the Reserves would absorb their growing population. As is 
discussed in more detail in Chapter Three (Section 1), the decade 
of the 1950s was that which saw the catastrophic collapse of the 
Reserves (measured in terms of productivity per head) begin, 
though some Reserves, notably the Ciskei, had by then already 
seen many years of dire poverty. Central amongst the recommenda- ftJJYI 
tions of the Commission was that decentralised industries be/ ~P'?­
located within the Reserves themselves as well as on their borders .. 
11 . 
Fears of the effects of black urbanisation were, not surpri-
singly, widely expressed at a time when the militant populist 
Congress Alliance was at its peak. The Tomlinson Commission 
described the effects of urbanisation in these terms in .. its 
report in 1955: 
"For the Bantu, urbanisation has the following implica-
tions: (i) that a relatively primitive population 
group is transferred to what,. to them, is a highly 
developed environment with a completely strange social, 
economic, political and linguistic milieu; and (ii) 
that, owing to racial differences, the Bantu entering 
the towns are adopted into the existing Bantu community 
only with the result that the uncertain and unstable 
character of the urban Bantu community is thereby 
intensified." ( 9) 
This "unstable character" was seen to be a cause of the increa-
sing African political activity: 
"At the moment the number of Bantu who advocate equality 
forms a small minority but their numbers and the scope 
of their endeavours are on the increase. It would be 
unwise to disregard this development. The plain fact 
is that the European population will have to face up 
to the effects· of the developments of the past fifty 
years, the detribalisation of the Bantu and the breaking 
up of their organic tribal units, their urbanisation, 
)their contact with western culture and ways of life, 
CJ> and the integration of a large portion of the Bantu in 
the economic and thus also the political and social 
life of the European." (10) 
The (Viljoen) Commission (on the protection of industry) directly 
related African urbanisation to the location of industry in its 
report published in 1958: 
"The effect of massing large numbers of people who are 
inadequately housed and fed, whose social and family 
life are disintegrated, who are forced to travel long 
distances to and from their work, and who consequently 
fall an easy prey to immorality and political subversion, 
represents the social cost of industrialisation in 
this country." (11) 
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In its zeal the Tomlinson Commission either misunderstood or 
deliberately exceeded its mandate. It had been instructed to 
"conduct an exhaustive enquiry into and to report on a 
comprehensive scheme for the rehabilitation of the 
Na ti ve Areas with a view to developing them within a 
social structure in keeping with the culture of the 
Native and based on effective socio-economic planning." 
( 12) (My emphasis) 
Instead of restricting itself to following the coyly stated 
directive to tread warily on the existing social relations of 
production in the bantustans, the majority report of the Commis-
sion proposed massive capital injections from private and public 
sectors to transform the agricultural sector and_set ~nto mqtion 
' ' 
a rapidly growing industrial _sector. 
regard to agriculture was that al 
The basic proposal with i 
icultural land in the 
Reserves be divi-ded __ in_to "economic farm units" wbich should::' 
- ----- -- - - -- -· --- ----
sustain a familY _ _£~?dl!.Q.~_ng ~11 income ~er year. 
Those people left over after all the land was distributed, would 
,..., 
move into towns on land demarcated for residential use and would ':ti 
be employed in industry in the Reserves and border areas. 





year, stimulating a further 30 000 jobs a year in the tertiary 
sector. ( 13) While accepting the government's policy that the 
i 
Reserves should exclude "white economic activity" in the interests ! 
of allowing the autonomous development of "Bantu enterprise", the 
commission felt that externally financed industries could eventu-
ally revert to "Bantu control". (14) 
Mr Strijdom's government rejected some of the commission's 




t.aoure entailed in the agricultural proposals and it refused to 
~- -- - ·----o------ --------· - ---- --·· - -- ·- - ,---: 
qlJ ow .QJi.tsjde whi~rivate investment in the Reserves in any / 
form. (15) Dr Verwoerd, Minister of Native Affairs, explained 
the government's rejection of white financed industrialisation 
in the Reserves as follows: Firstly, the 
whites would be followed by settlement, 
government's policy of extrusion of whites 
13. 
economic influx of/ 
contrary to the /~ 
from the Reserves; 
secondly the government did not accept that industrial investments 
cculd realistically be temporary; and, thirdly, he argued: 
®\ 
"The Bantu must start on a small scale. Psychological-
ly he is not adapted to industrial life and certainly I 
not to private enterprise to be able to start on a big (?) 
scale." (16) 
The argument was encapsulated in an ideological shell which 
proclaimed the desire for fairness and justice within apartheid. 
That whites could not invest and reside in "Bantu areas" was the 
quid pro quo for Africans not being allowed to do the same in 
"white areas". 
Presented in this way the government's arguments do not 
adequately explain the rejection of the Reserve industrialisation 
strategy embodied in the Tomlinson Report. Martin Legassick 
sought a reason for the rejection in the ruling alliance's ----
desire to protect white labour which was potentially threatened 
in 
by the raising of the_j.Qb co_lour bar in Reserve factories. 
~\Cheap African labour would usurp the position of whites 
't}kkilled and supervisory positions. ( 17) The in corpora ti on of 
job reservation into the Industrial Conciliation Act in 1956 
would certainly lend some weight to Legassick's argument. 
William Beinart has drawn attention to the fact that the 
·government recognised that "Tomlinson had underestimated the 
amount of capital necessary for the decentralisation of industries 
to areas which lacked any industrial infrastructure." (18) 
The government's financial inability to carry through such 
a programme not . only blocked the Reserve industrialisation 
programme, argues Beinart, but concomitantly prevented the 
associated rural reform programme which called for a restructured 
land tenure system. 
What Beinart does not explore, however, are the political 
implications of Tomlinson's restructuring programme. In explain-
ing why freehold tenure could not be contemplated for the Reserves, 
Verwoerd had pointed out that it "would undermine the whole tribal 
14. 
structure." (19) Since the Bantu Authorities Act (No 68) had been 
passed in 1951, the reconstitution of "tribal" structures of poli-
tical control had become central to the State's Reserve policy. 
J-1/r.;;c,k 
\Abolishing communal and trust tenure would remove the material 
£,;basis of the chiefs' power, the, at least, theoretical ability to 
allocate land. This is discussed further in Chapter Three. 
Indus trialisaJjQ~~q9==Q,Onc_eived ___ J?y_ __ IomJ_in~on,_ -~ coul~ ~}:_so 
potentiall~en~tbe c_biefly- sys tern insofar as it could shiftb,, 
the locus of economic power in the Reserves to the wage andrj 
·- ".: -::::~ -
salary earners. Although the maintenance of pre-capitalist 
ideological relations had proved compatible with a certain level 
of migrant labour (20), the concentration of capitalist production 
relations in the Reserves could prove too much for them. 
In addition, the interests of some of the classes comprising 
the ruling alliance could be threatened by Tomlinson's proposals. 
The concerns of the white workers, a supportive class to the 
government, have been discussed. 
thrE;at~ned .. too. Not. only could restructured agriculture in the f 
Reserv_e~ Jl_O_tentially threaten their markets, but both such agricul-'". 
.) 
)/ ture and bantustan industry could compete in the labour market 
· \with white farmers. As Mike Morris has argued, white farmers 
had only recently sealed off a labour supply for themselves in 
the Reserves through the implementation of the labour bureau 
system. (21) 
In spite of rejecting the full proposals of the Tomlinson 
Commission, the government did not reject the general drift of 
the argument embodied in both the Tomlinson and Viljoen Commissions. 
J.A. Lombard has summarised the general direction of the Reserve 
policy in the late 1950s in these terms: 
"the major goal was to accomplish a regional distribution 
of economic activity so that the 9 or 10 million Bantu 
expected to be born during the half century up to the 
year 2000 should settle in their own areas, rather than 
in or around the concentrations of white communities in 
the Republic." (22) 
However, economic development on a large scale within the 
Reserves was not seen to be the answer. I_nstead the stabilisation 
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«?f Reserve agriculture combined with the creation of industry on 
tb@~l?~Qt::9i::,r.;; _of'. the B.eserves was thE: chosen strategy. In addition 
the transfer of rural trading stores within the Reserves from 
white to black ownership was undertaken in the 1960s. Financing 
the purchase of enterprises by Africans, and buying up many 
itself for later transfer, was the Bantu Investment Corporation, 
set up under its own Act in 1959. Its stated purpose was to: 
"promote and encourage industrial and other concerns among Bantu 
persons in the Bantu territories and to act as a development 
financial and investment institution". ( 23) "Other concerns" 
took precedence and no significant industrial development occurred 
within the Bantustans until the late 1960s. 
3. The Border Areas Programme 1960 - 1968 
In June 1960 Dr Verwoerd, as Prime Minister, presented the first 
,_ ..... -- - ; 
comprehensive statement of government policy on decentralisation. 
In it he stressed the importance of ind us trial decentralisation'.' 
c;i.s. ?:~_gi_e_~l)s_ of halting a~d. ev~~ -reversing/ the drift of Africans, ,.)_ 
into the "white cities" which he admitted was caused by increasing~v 
u,.n~!QRloyn:ient in the Bantustans. Decentralisation, he said, was: 
II directed towards finding gainful employment for 
the Bantu population with the least disruption of their 
home and communal life on the principle of taking the 
employment opportunities to the areas where labour was 
readily available, housing, water and power and transport 
were available instead of bringing labour to the existing 
agglomerations where all these facilities had to be 
created or considerably increased at very high cost." 
(24) 
Thus, decentralised industry was to be located just outside 
:j)(the borders of the Bantustans. A permanent commit tee for the 
location of industry was established and a number of growth 
r ~ 
', points where industry would be assisted were identified. (The 
eastern Cape towns amongst them were East London and King Williams-
town). The range of assistance offered was quite wide, including 
!~x ~ompensation for moving, ~he construction and lease of factory 
~ui_ldings to order, _railway tarriff concessions, the provision of 
infrastructure and of housing for whites and 
"the maintenance of the principle of wage differentiation 
in respect of border areas insofar as this is justified 
(O\by factors such as the lower productivity of labour and 
the lower cost of living in these areas." (25) 
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This, of course, indicated that the government would waive wage 
regulation measures for firms establishing in the border areas. 
Though the 12ackage was annoJlnced hTith=<Lfl.Quri sb the--p.P-O.gr...arome 
had rel a tiveJ~J.itll~-suc.c.ess,,,=-..wi.tll~tJ1~~,~xg~p ~i"?n o[ _tw_g_yery _ well 
~tuateg $£.9J'JJ::J:1_,-~po~n,ts (Rosslyn near Pretoria and Hammarsdale 
near Pietermaritzburg) during the first few years of its existence. 
[he _ hikinK ___ yp __ Qf_ J.11,cen~ives in 1964, made relatively little 
~bifference a~d outside . of -Ros~l~ - a~d Hammarsdale development 
remained slow. (26) 
In 1967, in a move which infuriated sections of capital, the 
government established regulations which ;Lx;lbibi ted _ _tbe _Lldr:th~e_r 
Section 3 ,dev_eJ,opmen t~oL Q§rtgil'.}__ tDqus_tr_i_~$_ in _s_qpec:Iuled areas. --------- --
of the Act stipulated that ministerial approval was required for 
(i \new factories and factory extensions involving increased Black 
employment in the main urban areas of the Transvaal, Cape and 
Orange Free State. (27) It was most ~:t:'.if!~~~tlX~~?<PP~~-ecl~-2-n_ the 
\ittwatE;r.:3~~0~- For all intents and purposes, the object of 
Section 3 was to relocate "African labour intensive" industries 
© fl-W~Y from the Pretoria-Wi twa tersrand-Vereeniging ( PWV) ind us trial 
r~gio~, towards the bantustans. Ironically, the clothing industry, 
which was possibly the most seriously affected,_ failed to taker 
root in many "growth points" and instead grew rapidly in th~~ 
western Cape and in Durban. (28) Thus while some firms may hav~ 
been dissuaded from expanding or establishing new factories in 
the PWV region, Section 3 did not necessarily encourage the 
development of industry in the border areas. 
The regulation had been poorly framed. As P. J. van der Merwe 
wrote shortly afterwards, the Act "resulted in a great deal of 
uncertainty, and eventually proved to have a negative effect". 
( 29) H. R. P.A. Kotzen burg, by then chairman of the new Board for 
the Decentralisation of Industry, wrote that the Act posed: 
"quite a number of uncertainties for industry. These 
uncertainties stemmed from the very nature of the 
measure and the problems which industrialists encountered 
in decentralisation." (30) 
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Restrictions, it was argued, would not push industry into 
unrestricted areas unless the incentives were_ strQng enough_ to_ 
counteract the diBfillv~~l')_tag~~-~~-~- .~~~~~-_l9~~~ion_ w~~l1 _regard to~ 
s.:;:ry~c.e"~-~arld 1!1'1Tl<0ets. 
4. The Turnabout on Bantustan Industrialisation. 
In 1968, the year from which the Physical Planning Act took 
effect, several other important developments with regard to 
industrial decentralisation were under way. The policy of the 
Tomlinson industrialisation programme in 1956, was jettisoned. 
, In terms of the Promotion of the Economic Development of Bantu 
Homelands Act (No 46 of 1968) white investors were now to be 
~=--- ..,,_ ----2._·-...,-__:_.,,_=---~-----· -- . - ---- - __ - ' -
~t_t~<:f_Jtg __ i_r1v~st _Jo ~he_ bantustans. This was subject to a 
string of conditions meant to dispel the impression that the 
presence of white capital in the bantustans would be permanent. 
Most important ~o,_rig~t _them was th~ provision that firms could\ 
not own gither land or buildings in the bantustans. '.fhese had:' 
-.rr;~:-~~-.:-c-~-2': __ ,. - ·~ -
t.o,cc-be_ leased from the Bantu Investment Corporation, and later· 
[_r_om _t_he individual bantustan corporations when they were set up 
:i,__Q __ Jhe early seventies. 
In addition the "Agency system", as it was called, ~nQJ,uded 
9:. .. _S:£f!ciition that the plants would have to be sold to local Afr~~~~{ 
entrepeneurs after a period not exceeding 15 years. A furthen 
"""'- -· ... 
condition mandated firms to employ Africans at all levels wi thin(::j 
the plant where possible. At the same time a new and imprQved 
#'::::__~..-.=---~ ~, - --- ---- --- -
package of incentives to investors was announced. It included a 
wide range of tax benefits, transport rebates and low interest 
<" - - - ,_ • 
loans. Indeed the mode of leasing buildings and land at low 
rates by the development corporations was also an important 
incentive. 
J 
The most significant developments were yet to come. In 1::,:, -,4 /-- '>- --- ""'-'-
1970 an interdepartmental committee was set up under the chairman-
ship of Dr Piet Riekert to explore problems that had emerged as 
regards the decentralisation of industry. Two issues headed 
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the commit tee's agenda - the failure thus far of programmes to 
approach their targets; bantustan populations were expanding · 
fast and finding no employment possibilities in their vicinities. 
Second on the agenda was the fact that PWV based companies were 
unhappy and confused about the application of Section 3 of the 
Physical Planning Act and through representation had demanded 
clarification and the resolution of problems. A White Pap.er 
followed the committee's report in June 1971 which in addition to 
clarifying existing points of confusion and revamping the in-
centive package, restructured the administration of decentralisa-
tion. ( 31) 
The application of Section 3 of the Physical Planning Act 
was clarified and temporarily softened, principles for the 
selection of growth points were discussed and the process itself 
delegated to a Growth Point Committee. Perhaps most important, 
though underplayed in the report, was the establishment of the 
principle "that industrialists establishing themselves within the 
· Bantu Homelands, will receive concessions on a basis somewhat fni 
more liberal than that applicable in the case of border areas". (32)\!J 
That meant that in the space of three years the Strijdom/Verwoerd 
approach to bantustan industrialisation had been reversed. Far 
from being out of bounds for white industrialists, the bantustans 
were now the most favoured of all investment sites. Not long 
afterwards the provision obliging non-indigenous investors to 
sell their bantustan factories to locals after 15 years was 
dropped from the conditions pertaining to bantustan investment. 
The notion of "agency" as a phase leading to the development of 
national capital in the bantustans had clearly come to be less 
seriously regarded. 
A development that writers on decentralisation have tended ~\ 
to ignore, was the reorientation of the Department of Bantu !-
Administration and Development in 1970. This reorientation 
roughly coincided with a series of administrative developments 
that were to affect the bantustans, including the already mentioned 
restructuring of the decentralisation programme within the depart-
ments of Economic Affairs and Industries. The Bantu Affairs 
Commission (BAC) was reactivated in 1969 and to it was added 
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an Economic Committee comprising appointed experts. The 
committee's task included planning and administrative duties with 
regard to the development of economic infrastructures in the' n, 
·fl' 
bantus tans, housing and township development, and the "localisation"" 
(sic) of ind us tries in the homelands in accordance with the 
policy of decentralisation of industries." (33) 
Also established in 1969 was the large research body BENBO 
k ,(Bureau for Economic Research re Bantu Development), which was to 
berve the Department of Bantu Administration and Development 
{j) }(BAD), the BAC and the development corporations, which had begun 
to multiply. 
To cap it all the Minister of BAD announced in 1970, with a 
measure of os tenta ti on, "The Third Dynamic Decade 11 • ( 34) The 
1970s were to see a rapid development of bantustan policy. 
The period 1968 to 1971 clearly marked a very important \ 
turning point, not only in terms of decentralisation policy but 
in terms of bantustan policy as a whole. As regards decentrali-
sation, the policy towards the bantustans had been completely 
reversed. For bantustan policy, two important Acts of Parliament 
-~ ..•. ----
- ~J?.e:n,tu Homelands Citizenship Act (No 26 of 1970) and the 
Bfilltu_ I:!Q.rg~J,ands Constitution Act (No 21 of 1971) - signalled the '-:.4/ 
~v:~rnme_nt 's intention to push the bantustans into "self-govE:=rnme:°~n 
?-nd towards "independence". These parallel developments represen-, 
ted, it will be argued, a combined strategy in an attempt to 
counter mounting pressures in the face of disintegrating relations 
of social control in the bantustans. There was no longer any 
point in trying to shore up chiefly structures in the old way -
new methods were called for, requiring higher levels of intervention. 
5. The National Physical Development Plan - 1975. 
The remainder of the 1970s saw the government tinkering rather 
than engaging in major engineering in the machinery of industrial 
decentralisation. :]:nc~ntJy_~~s ____ were - gradually _ increased _and 
mcrea~:i,ng differentiation emerged in the application of incentives. 
\f''l pis the number of growth points grew, t ... l1E!_J1ierarchies amongst them 
' became more complex. Terminology diversified too. Most favoured 
sites would be termed "growth points" and less favoured sites 
merely "Recognised Decentralised Areas". Later the concept of 
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"Deconcentration Points 11 was developed to apply to large scale 
growth points relatively close to metropolitan areas, much as 
Atlantis near Cape Town. In 1978 the Federated Chamber of 
Industries was forced to publish a 53 page large-format booklet 
to explain the complexities of decentralisation to their members. 
( 35) This was supplementary to the regular publication of the 
Decentralisation Board. 
In 1975 the Department of Planning produced the National ' f hysical Development Plan in an attempt to coordinate and rationa-
ise development planning. It adopted a comprehensive approach 
@ o planning, ·but it did not deal with the major metropolitan 
regions or the bantustans. Those areas were regarded as outside 
its mandate. Its stated purpose was: 
" to give physical expression to the social and 
economic ideals which are being pursued in South Africa, 
thus ensuring that people will experience the greater 
measure of well-being, both spiritually and physically." 
(36) 
In terms of the plan, South Africa was divided into 38 
o=;gig_ns. Axes along which development should take place (e.g. 
Cape Town, Atlantis, Vredenburg, Saldanha, or East London, Berlin, 
King Williamstown, Dimbaza etc.) were determined, several potential 
new metropolitan centres were identified and suggested structures 
of incentives were proposed. 
The plan was never completely adopted or formally rejected -
it was not utilised as a plan in any strong sense of the word. 
One reason might have been that it was too ambitious and sweeping 
in its approach. What seems at least as important is the weakness 
of the Department of Planning and the Environment and the strength 
of some of the departments and bodies for which it was making 
plans. Most importantly the mighty Department of BAD resisted 
,,,]change and in a way represented a different coalition of class 
~lliances. Though this is discussed in more detail in Chapter 
Three it may be worth stating, at this point, that it will be 
argued that the Department of BAD continued to reflect a petit-
bourgeois/ farmer conservatism whereas the Department of Planning, 
staffed by highly trained technocrats, would tend to find itself 
21. 
more likely to reflect the interests of big capital. 
time, BAD was too strong. 
At the 
6. lhe Second Plan - lhe RDP, 1982. 
In the late 1970s the report of the (Riekert) Commission of 
Inquiry into Legislation Affecting the Utilisation of Manpower 
initiated reassessment of a wide range of policies. Included 
amongst them was industrial decentralisation. The coill!llissimL. 
criticised the a£plication of Section 3~ th~ ]~~~~nm~~ Planning 
.6£1. (formerly the Physical Planning Act) ~i:_e_c9mmended _ ;Lt;,s, 
~p~al. It further recommended that 
II where decentralisation concessions do not appear to 
be adequate active steps should be taken to augment them 
so that they will be able to serve as a positive 
incentive to industrialists to decentralise. 11 (37) 
The Riekert Commission's report was the first formal indication 
that a restructuring of decentralisation incentives was under 
way. 
At the well publicised Good Hope Conference held in Cape 
Town late in 1981, to which were invited the elite amongst South 
Africa 1 s bureaucrats, technocrats and capitalists, the Prime 
Minister, Mr P. W. Botha, unveiled the new "co-ordinated regional 
development strategy for Southern Africa". (38) Its most notable 
departure from previous plans, including the N. P. D. P. was the 
fact that now South Africa including the bantustans, independent - -
or not, was_tr_:-~ate?_ ~-~ __ a single economy, divided into eight(fj 
r._egi9p.~-- The regions were, it is claimed, demarcated w:i,_t.h_ceLex:e~ 
to economic cr:i te.r..ia-onJs. Economic region D, for example, 
includes the Ciskei and the southern part of the Transkei as well 
as the eastern part of the Cape Province. Other elements of the 
plan, which thus far has focussed heavily on industrial vis a vis 
other forms of development, are a restructured incentives system 
and the establishment of a "multilateral" Development Bank of 
Southern Africa loosely modelled on the World Bank (I.B.R.D.). 
The economic regions are demarcated 
h!Jopment needs, development potential, 
\G!nd physical characteristics." (39) 
with reference to "deve-
functional relationships 
Within each region 
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coordinating structures have been or are being developed; where 
"independent" states are involved facilities for "mutual consulta-
tion 11 are provided. Within the regions a number of "industrial 
development points" ( 47 altogether) and 11 deconcentration points" 
{!) ( 11 in all) have been demarcated. Incentives are geared to 
priori ties both between regions and within regions. Region D 
has been given the highest priority rating reflecting the govern-
ment's serious concern at the massive unemployment and political 
instability of the region, especially in the south-eastern part 
of the Ciskei and neighbouring East London. (40) 
The new incentives structure is clearly superior to its 
predecessors, being more responsive to regional concerns and in 
general being more generous than the previous system. Thus, for 
example, whereas in' the past tax rebates against a percentage of 
wages paid were granted, these are now converted into cash grants. J® 
This means that even if a firm does not reflect taxable profits, 
it is liable to grants against wages paid to wage earners. 
As important as the restructured incentives is the establish-
ment of the Development Bank, which was commissioned in 1983. 
It takes over many of the functions of the Corporation for Economic 
Development (formerly the Bantu Investment Corporation) which was 
dissolved in early 1984. It has become the main financing body 
for .industrial decentralisation and is financed by the South 
African government at a rate of approximately R300 million a year 
for the first five years. (41) It may also raise finance in the 
private sector. 
The Bank's formation was fraught with tension with its 
Managing Director designate, Professor Jan Lombard, withdrawing 
after a dispute over the structure of the board of directors. 
It is believed that Lombard demanded greater autonomy from the 
control of the South African government. Dr Simon Brand, economic I 
advisor to the Prime Minister, was appointed in his place. :5 
It is too early to establish the significance of the recent 
developments in decentralisation strategies and structures (though 
this will be attempted briefly in the concluding chapter). What 
does appear significant is the fact that the abolition of the 
C.E.D. in favour of the Development Bank seems to indicate 
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weakening control by the Department of Cooperation and Development 
(formerly BAD) over the industrialisation of the bantustans. 
Shifting power between departments can indicate the shifting of 
the balance of forces within the ruling alliance. 
will be further discussed in later chapters. 
* * * * * * 
This, too, 
In this chapter the decentralisation of industry in South Africa 
has been treated as an evolutionary process as well as an area of 
policy where major shifts and changes have occurred in a relatively 
short period of time. 
The development of industrial decentralisation is most/ 
clearly seen as an evolutionary process if one focusses upon the 
techniques of encouraging decentralisation - the refinement of 
incentive structures, for example. This has clearly occurred as 
state bodies responsible for decentralisation learn both from 
twenty five years' experience in South Africa and experiences 
elsewhere. 
Focussing on the evolution and refinement of techniques 
should not be allowed to·blind economic historians and economists 
to the, at least, · as important changes in policy direction which 
are less a product of learning from experience than a product of 
---- ·- -~·-¥-~ 
altering political imperatives and directions. This is perhaps 
'--.--, .. . . 
most important in. a study of bantustan industrialisation which 
can only be understood in terms of a careful analysis of changes 
in political, economic and ideological spheres in the South 
African social formation. 
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CHAPTER 2 
POLITICS AND ECONOMICS IN STUDIES 
OF 
INDUSTRIAL DECENTRALISATION A REVIEW 
In this chapter influential writings on industrial decentralisation 
in South Africa will be reviewed. While their general contributions 
to an understanding of decentralisation policy will be briefly 
discussed, t.his chapter focusses on their treatment of the olitical 
and economic determinants, and implications, of decentralisation. 
. ~
It will argue that the writers, in spite of the wide range of 
perspectives represented by them, commonly underemphasise the 
importance of distinguishing between different periods, during 
which the implementation of decentralisation policy took distinct 
forms (as was mentioned in the introduction to Chapter one). 
This chapter will attempt to indicate why the writers have failed 
to adequately periodise and will suggest an alternative approach 
to periodisation. 
In a sense this chapter is a direct continuation of Chapter 
one, insofar as its central focus is the industrial decentralisation 
policy of the South African state. It attempts to take the study 
of decentralisation a step further by concentrating on method. At 
the same time it is closely linked to Chapter three which examines 
bantustan industrialisation specifically, in the context of bantu-
stan policy. The fact that works on decentralisation have not 
attempted to carefully relate it to developments and changes in 
bantustan policy have weakened their understanding of decentralisa-
tion. 
Plans and programmes for industrial decentralisation in South 
Africa have been amongst the most widely debated of policy issues. 
Journalists, academics, politicians and state officials have all 
entered the fray. In recent years state institutions of various 
kinds have encouraged an unprecedented level of critical reflection 
on the successes, failures, strengths and weaknesses of decentrali-
sation programmes. The most important stimulus was the publication 
of the report of the (Riekert) Commission of Inquiry into 
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Legislation Affecting the Utilisation of Manpower late in 1978. 
Decentralisation was not its central concern, but it criticised 
the restrictive provisions of Section 3 of the Environment Planning 
Act (formerly called the Physical Planning Act) and recommended 
the upgrading of incentives. The publication of the Riekert 
Commission's report signalled the initiation of public reassessment 
of a range of policies, including decentralisation. (1) 
In a short time journals published by the Department of 
Cooperation and Development - Development Studies Southern Africa, 
an academic journal and Growth, a news magazine - carried articles 
that reflected critically on the success or lack of it of the 
decentralisation policy. ( 2) This was unusual, emanating as it 
did from a department not known for critical introspection (though 
it must be noted that such a large department cannot be one dimen-
sional). A range of academic contributions followed, particularly 
after the Regional Development Strategy was announced. 
If the Riekert Commission's report preceded and possibly 
stimulated recent debates on decentralisation, the previous surge 
of discussion on the subject followed the report of Dr Riekert' s 
inter-departmental committee on decentralisation in 1971. Indeed, 
a good deal was written on the subject of industrial decentralisa-
tion in the early 1970s. 
1. Professor Lombard's Contribution. 
Jan A. Lombard, professor of economics at Pretoria University, was 
responsible, indirectly and directly, for a good deal of writing 
on industrial decentralisation in the early 1970s. Directly, in 
that he wrote several articles on the subject himself and, indirect-
ly, in that some colleagues at Pretoria University were clearly 
influenced by his work and contributed to debates in a similar 
vein. (3) They included Dr P.J. van der Merwe, now Director 
General of the Department of Manpower and Dr Simon Brand, now 
economic advisor to the Prime Minister and managing director of 
the Development Bank. Lombard himself was then chairman of the 
newly created Economic Committee of the Bantu Affairs Commission. 
The Lombard school, if one can call it that, accepted what it 
regarded as the government's basic premise for decentralisation -
the relocation of economic activity to the bantustans to avoid 
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greater migration to the towns. They were, however, critical of 
both the rate and form of the implementation of the policy. Lombard 
and others criticised; in mild tones, the low level of incentives 
offered for decentralisation thus far and reproached the government 
for failing to locate widescale development within the bantustans 
themselves. 
Central to the Lombard school's position was the argument 
that the bantustans could no longer be seen as rural bavens where 
the chiefly system based on communal agriculture held the social 
order together. They argued that the bantustans. were becoming 
increasingly poverty stricken and that urqanisation was inevitable. 
It could not be reversed. As Lombard wrote: 
"The question is not whether massive concentrations of the 
Bantu in urban areas will actually develop. The question 
is where those concentrations can and should be located 
to ensure a political structure of justice and order." 
(My emphasis). (4~ 
These processes should not be blocked, as Lombard and Van der 
Merwe write in a later article: "the development of urban milieus 
may well provide the conditions for the way out of economic degene-
ration .... " ( 5) On the one hand this would relieve pressure on 
the land and, in their opinion, allow agricultural improvements or 
even an "agricultural economic revolution" to take place improving 
food supplies and increasing the national income of the bantustans. 
( 6) On the other hand those urbanised should remain in urban 
townships in the reserves. They could be employed in decentralised 
industry or its spin-offs in the border regions or, preferably 
within the bantustans themselves. (7) 
Bantustan industrialisation was not recommended for economic 
reasons alone, or merely to retain people in the reserves. As 
Lombard wrote: 
" ... whereas the cons ti tu tional basis for political 
decentralisation has been laid . . . I expect, that the 
economic basis for decentralisation will be built with 
equal perseverence." (8) 
Two pages later he continues: 
"In so far (sic) as the strategy must rest on industrial 
decentralisation it is becoming more and more clear to 
me personally that concentration on growth points in 
border areas alone will not have the desired effect 
politically. The process will have to penetrate the 
heartlands of the homelands " (9) 
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Lombard saw a direct relationship between the development of 
industry in the reserves and the development of bantustan political 
structures. 
In their joint article in 1972, Lombard and Van der Merwe 
called for the transformation of the Bantu Investment Corporation 
into a development bank reproducing in southern Africa the relation-
ship that exists between the World Bank and the underdeveloped 
countries. ( 10) It would deal with individual corporations in 
each bantustan, thus decentralising some power over the allocation 
of finance away from the centralised Department of BAD. These 
proposals were acted upon nearly a decade later. 
In summary it would seem that the chief concern of the1 
Lombard school was the fact that the Verwoerdian reliance on 
chiefly forms of control based on non-capitalist production 
relations in the reserves was outmoded. Capitalist forms of 
production were required in the bantustans both to counteract the 
population drift to the "white towns" and to give an economic 
content to the reformed political structures signalled by constitu-
tional innovations for the bantustans in the early seventies. 
These were the combined purposes of industrial decentralisation. 
However, in their published works, the political import of 
these writers is often difficult to discern. Their mode of 
discourse relied largely on the language of orthodox economics. 
Their policy proposals were normally justified in terms of economic 
imperatives: "the economic degeneration threatening many, if not 
_ most of the homeland communities" ( 11) was the central plank of 
their argument. Indeed, although their recommendations clearly 
had revisionist implications, Lombard and his colleagues took 
pains to formulate their arguments in such a way that they be 
clearly seen to be operating within given policy targets. Like 
other reformists of the time, they wished to voice their criticisms 
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without isolating themselves from the mainstream within the 
National Party. 
Thus in a manner common to those who wish to influence 
authority within a rigid ideological forum, they stressed the 
organic relationship between their position and the order of 
things. More precisely, they blurred the differences between 
their policy objectives and instruments and the established ones. 
Thus, for example, Lombard wrote: 
11 
••• that the economic basis for the development of all 
the Bantu homelands is not in practice emerging along 
the regional lines nor at the growth pace hoped for by 
Dr Verwoerd". (12) 
And further he wrote: 
"Dr Verwoerd was too pessimistic about the political 
ability of the African states to avoid indirect coloni-
sation of their domain through the power of foreign 
private enterprise within their borders, and too 
optimistic about the influence of the border area 
programme on the indirect generation of economic 
development within the homelands." (13) 
Lombard clearly realised that, at the time, he could not 
afford to say that Verwoerd's bantustan policies were anachronistic 
and disastrous, though his prescriptions suggest that that is 
what he thought. 
Indeed, a central problem of analysing the position of econo-
mists such as those of the Lombard school is the fact that many of 
the real debates of the time took place behind closed doors. As 
Anne Ratcliffe wrote in 1974: 
"Far too often discussions on economic policy in this 
country are carried on in camera; published works on 
economic policy become purely descriptive; and many 
writers accept as given, policy targets, even if these 
are ill-defined or incompatible with one another and 
thus allow their own investigations to incorporate 
severe inconsistencies." (14) 
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The work of the Lombard school is indeed, for these very 
reasons, often a little difficult to follow, and its significance 
difficult to establish. It can be somewhat misleading in its ex-
aggerated, though not entirely insincere, deference to established 
policies and practices. However, it is possible to extract at 
least some of the significant policy prescriptions that find their 
way into Lombard and his colleagues' published works. Dissembling, 
in form, as the work might be it is here that one can find some 
important pointers to the reasons behind, and the nature of, 
developments in industrial decentralisation policy since the early 
1970s. 
2. Trevor Bell's Contribution. 
The other significant body of work on decentralisation, produced 
in the early 1970s, is encapsulated in two works by Trevor Bell -
his book Industrial Decentrali~ation in South Africa and an article 
on the same subject. ( 15) Bell's work has been widely acclaimed 
as a penetrating critique of existing decentralisation policies 
and certainly contained much original and valuable research. His 
quantification of the failures of the policy was quite devastating, 
if, at times, a little overstated. His policy recommendations 
were seriously considered by government oriented economists, and 
amongst others, Dr Simon Brand paid him the tribute of a detailed 
response. (16) 
Amongst Bell's work's points were the following: he argues 
with some force that by international standards the South African 
economy is not over-centralised in its location and that economic 
criteria alone did not require industrial decentralisation 
existing concentrations were not uneconomically large; nor was 
the lack of availability of natural resources in the existing 
concentration a factor as some government rationales argued. (17) 
Indeed, the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Water Matters 
published in 1969 had shown that arguments for decentralisation 
based on the availability of water in decentralised areas were 
fallacious. ( 18) /In addition he clearly showed that existing 
decentralisation policies had undershot their targets by very high 
margins. He further pointed to a number of faults in the structure 
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and content of incentives programmes and suggested ways of elimina-
ting these weaknesses. Thus he both criticised the policy itself 
in terms of its rationales and criticised the manner in which the 
state had attempted to achieve its objectives. 
If Bell's assessment of the means and effects of decentralisa-
tion is valuable, his historical analysis of the development of 
decentralisation would appear to be somewhat flawed. He writes: 
"the border industries policy ... must be seen as t~ 
current phase of a continuous process of evolution in 
the country's thinking on racial policy. It· is part, 
almost an inevitable part, of an unfolding logic which 
appears to underlie the country's political history." j 
(19) _./' 
Bell would have, further, that the shift from a 
"border areas industrialisation" to the broader 
policy of 
"industrial 
decentralisation" in the early seventies was little more than a 
terminological shift. For Bell there is no notable shift in 
policy, rather an attempt to reclothe an ideologically motivated 
programme with the trappings of economic respectability. (20) 
© On historical grounds a case can be made against Bell on at 
least two counts. Ratcliffe notes that Bell has conflated the 
motivations and policies of the Social and Economic Planning 
Council and the Fagan Commission in the 1940s with that of the 
Tomlinson Commission and subsequent policy. She points out that 
whereas the former bodies sought merely to slow down the urbanisa-
tion process, the Tomlinson proposals were framed in terms of a 
policy which sought at least to prevent future influx from the 
Reserves to the "white towns", if not reverse the flow of people, 
pointing them back to the Reserves. (21) Ratcliffe may have, in 
turn, overemphasised the disjuncture between state policy in the 
1940s and the 1950s, but she does point to a weak spot in Bell's 
historical analysis. The weak spot is a shallowness in analysing 
broad political issues. 
This is one of the reasons why Bell fails to acknowledge the 
importance of policy changes in the early 1970s. He attaches no 
significance to the switch from border areas industrialisation to 
bantustan industrialisation, whereas, as this thesis argues this 
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and content of incentives programmes and suggested ways of elimina- ~?~ 
ting these weaknesses. Thus he both criticised the policy itself 
in terms of its rationales .and criticised the manner in which the 
state had attempted to achieve its objectives. 
If Bell's assessment of the means and effects of decentralisa-
tion is valuable, his historical analysis of the development of 
decentralisation would appear to be somewhat flawed. He writes: 
"the border industries policy . . . must be seen as the 
current phase of a continuous process of evolution in 
the country's thinking on racial policy.· It is part, 
almost an inevitable part, of an unfolding logic which 
appears to underlie the country's political history." 
( 19) 
Bell would have, further, that the shift from a policy of 
"border areas industrialisation" to the broader "industrial~ 
decentralisation" in the early seventies was little more than a 
terminological shift. For Bell there is no notable shift in 
policy, rather an attempt to reclothe an ideologically motivated 
programme with the trappings of economic respectability. (20) 
On historical grounds a case can be made against Bell on at 
least two counts. Ratcliffe notes that Bell has conflated the 
motivations and policies of the Social and Economic Planning 
Council and the Fagan Commission in the 1940s with that of the 
Tomlinson Commission and subsequent policy. She points out that 
whereas the former bodies sought merely to slow down the urbanisa-
tion process, the Tomlinson proposals were framed in terms of a 
policy which sought at least to prevent future influx from the 
··Reserves to the "white towns", if not reverse the flow of people, 
pointing them back to the Reserves. (21) Ratcliffe may have, in 
turn, overemphasised the disjuncture between state policy in the 
1940s and the, 1950s, but she does point to a weak spot in Bell's 
historical analysis. The weak spot is a shallowness in analysing 
broad political issues. 
This is one of the reasons why Bell fails to acknowledge the 
importance of policy changes in the early 1970s. He attaches no 
significance to the switch from border areas industrialisation to 
bantustan industrialisation, whereas, as this thesis argues this 
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switch is not only significant insofar as it indicates a changed 
set of objectives for decentralisation policy, but also as it 
indicates a significant development in bantustan policy. 
The fact that Bell's book is based on his thesis written in 
the late 1960s might help explain why the issue of bantustan 
industrialisation is not taken seriously in it. The policy only 
became relatively clear in the early seventies. The article, 
however, was published in late 1973 and could have been expected 
to take up the question. 
It would appear that the weakness within Bell's approach to 
the analysis of state policy stems from a combination of "economic 
liberal" methodology and a "South African liberal" approach to 
South African government. The "economic liberal"aspect is per-
tinent in that it contains an inbuilt suspicion of state interven-
tion in the economy. The "South African liberal" element is 
important insofar as it counterposes the question of race relations 
with economic relations and tends to see South Africa's problem as 
being the dominance of race issues (irrational) over (rational) 
economics. Deborah Posel has characterised the liberal position 
as a declaration of the primacy 
"of variables of race over those of class, and of the 
complete dysfunctionality . . . of segregation and then 
apartheid for capitalism in South Africa." (22) 
If the words "economic growth" were substituted for capitalism 
in Posel's passage, Bell might admit to holding such a position. 
Thus Bell, being wary of state intervention in the economy generally 
and regarding the actions of the South African state as determined 
basically by irrational race factors, not surprisingly conflates 
different forms or spheres in industrial decentralisation policy. 
At another level Bell's neo-classical economic tools seem to 
limit his inquiry. In its own terms Bell's work is applied 
welfare economics a branch of economics which, rather than 
attempting to understand the bases of state economic policy, asks ,,,/' 
how it measures up against a set of preconceived standards or 
assumed fixed objectives. 
For Bell the role of the economist is to determine which 
policies contribute best to economic growth; how resources are 
most efficiently allocated. Yet his work confronts questions of 
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state policy and thus requires political validation. For him it 
is sufficient to· suggest reasons why economic growth ought to be 
the central economic concern of government. One of these reasons 
is, he argues, that economic growth may have possible beneficial 
effects "on race relations within South Africa". This growth is 
required for a reduction in income inequality and thus "a lessening 
of social tension 11 • ( 23) 
However, on the penultimate page of his book he displays some 
doubts: 
11 It may be said that, while the short-term effects of 
attempts to decentralise industry will be to slow down 
the rate of growth, if we take into account the possibi-
lity of political upheaval in the event of industrial 
decentralisation not being achieved, this policy may 
actually result in a faster pace of growth than would 
take place without i~. Put this way, then the argument 
for industrial decentralisation may in a sense be seen 
as an economic one. There is no way of testing the 
validity of this sort of prediction ... " (24/ 
Almost as an afterthought, at the end of a book designed to 
show how the industrial decentralisation programme fails in its 
own terms and, secondly, handicaps growth which is held ipso facto 
to be the central economic concern of government, it occurs to 
Bell that he may have been addressing the wrong question. 
3- 1he Balance-Sheet Approach. 
Many of the writings on decentralisation that followed Bell in the 
1970s ,- though in some ways inspired by him, were not as ambitious 
as his work. Bell had constructed a set of criteria through 
which to assess the results of economic policy. Most of his 
successors followed the dull path trod by writers like Maasdorp 
who argues that "a policy can only be appraised by accepting it~ 
stated goals at face value". (25) Thus most debates about the 
origin and value of the policy are avoided; instead the central 
question becomes: how successful has the policy been in achieving 
its goal. It becomes a numbers game, which is why it is referred 
to as a "balance-sheet approach 11 • 
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In a recent article Maasdorp briefly outlines three approaches 
to the analysis of government decentralisation/"homelands" policy 
the conservative (which he oversimplifies and. seems to conflate 
different approaches emanating from established Afrikaner Nationa-
list institutions), the liberal/orthodox and the radical/revisionist. 
He concludes the section by simply stating: 
"no one school is likely to provide- all the answers ... 
they do not alter the facts of homeland underdevelopment 
... the question to which we shall now address ourselves 
is whether planning is attacking the problems in an 
effective way". ( 26) 
Thus Maasdorp, and writers who have adopted a similar approach, 
such as C.L. McCarthy, analyse decentralisation policy largely by 
assessing the number of jobs created against target figures, and 
explain in simple economic terms why the success rate is so low. 
The balance sheet approach purports to assess the success of state 
policy in terms of its stated goals. 
But even this limited promise is difficult to fulfil. 
Maasdorp identifies the goals of decentralisation policy in the 
seventies quite broadly: to resettle blacks at present in "white 
South Africa", "to increase black economic welfare and reduce the 
white/black income gap to avert political instability and to 
provide economic resources to strengthen the political authority 
of the homeland governments. " ( 27) However, in his analysis of 
the efficacy of the policy he only examines the extent to which 
the first (relocation of blacks) objective, and possibly the 
second (black welfare), but neglects the third (strengthening 
homeland governments). Maasdorp stops short of entering the 
field of political analysis. He prefers to dwell in the domain 
of quantifiable development economics. 
In these terms Maasdorp indicates how little industrial 
decentralisation policy ~chieved between 1960 and 1978: 
"Of the 87 000 jobs created in the border and homeland 
industries in the 1960s, 68 500 were for blacks. In 
1978 there were 78 000 blacks in industries in border 
areas and 24 700 in homeland growth points i.e. an 
addition of only 34 900 jobs in eight years :· 11 ( 28) 
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Similarly McCarthy avoids analysing questions other than 
those which can be quantified. He asks how successful the policy 
of decentralisation has been in terms of the dispersal of 
economic activity and, in particular, in terms of. the number of 
decentralised jobs created. He shows that between 1960 and 1980 
a total of 150 000 jobs were created in the "homelands". Clearly 
this is very far off the target of 20 000 industrial jobs per 
annum recommended by the Tomlinson Commission in 1955, as McCarthy 
points out. ( 29) 
More significant, it could be argued, is the fact that when 
measured against at least 115 000 people entering the labour 
market every year by the 1980s, the historical rate of about 
7 500 jobs per. annum is ludicrously small. As Van den Berg has 
pointed out, even if the rate at which decentralised jobs have 
been created has increased, the number of people entering the job 
market in the bantustans has done so at more or less the same 
rate. The number of decentralised jobs created is a more or 
less constant 73 to 83 of the number of people entering the job 
market in the bantustans. (30) 
It must be noted that job market entrant calculations for 
the bantustans conventionally ignore women. Furthermore they 
ignore the fact that in bantustan industry women are often employed 
at extremely low wages, in preference to men who at least have 
the option of looking elsewhere (this is dealt with in more 
detail in Chapter five). Leaving women out of the calculation 
means underestimating numbers of entrants into the job market and 
thus the figure of 115 000 people each year, cited above, is too 
low. 
It must also be noted that the calculations cited do not 
necessarily reflect the impact of decentralisation policy. · 
Official data, such as that cited by McCarthy and Van den Berg 
above, assumes that all jobs created in areas where decentralisa-
tion incentives operate are products of .that programme. If one 
replaces that assumption with the assumption that the proportional 
geographical distribution of jobs in industry would remain constant 
in the absence of state intervention, the impact of decentralisa-
tion appears to be extremely small. Trevor Bell makes the 
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latter assumption and finds that the percentage of jobs located 
in the "border and Bantu areas" increased from 11, 79°/o in 1959/60 
to 12,84°/o in 1970, indicating that only 11 579 jobs can be regarded 
as products of the decentralisation programme (31) (compared with 
Maasdorp 's 87 000 in the same period, cited above) . Bell's 
calculations (reproduced in Table 2. 1) would seem to support his 
argument though he probably underestimates the effects of decentra-
lisation policies. (32) 
4. Marian Lacey's Radical Critique. 
While there is a tendency by writers like Maasdorp and McCarthy 
who focus on quantitative analyses of decentralisation policy to 
avoid the broad questions of political and economic purpose and 
effect, this is not true of Marian Lacey's work. She tackles 
the question of industrial decentralisation policy in a manner 
quite distinct from the methods of those writers discussed thus 
far. Her starting point is that the government's central stated 
reason for the implementation of decentralisation policy the 
creation of employment in and around the reserves 
taken at face value. Lacey argues that: 
cannot be 
ncontrary tO the mythology Of 'homeland development I 
planning and policy, decentralisation was not inaugurated 
to eliminate unemployment or create ten viable bantustan 
economies". 
Instead she asserts: 
"Decentralisation must be seen as a part of the process 
of reorganisation of industrial production which has 
been brought about by changed conditions for capital in 
South Africa". (33) 
For Lacey, industrial.decentralisation is primarily an economic 
manoeuvre to counteract South Africa's weakness on the world market 
for manufactured goods. She argues that in order to keep costs 
of production of South African manufactured products in line with 
those in industrialising countries such as Taiwan and Brazil, 
"the monopolistic bargaining position of white trade unions and 
the attendant high wages and.shortage of skilled workers" had to 
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be overcome. (34) Job reservation and wage level patterns could 
be broken, she contends, by industries situated in areas where 
these unions had no jurisdiction or power. Border areas indus-
tries gave capital some leeway through exemptions from statutory 
agreements. Bantustan industry is completely outside the control 
of the established union movement and thus, Lacey argues, provides 
the opportunity for very high levels of exploitation. 
Not only does South Africa benefit through an improvement of 
its balance of trade, she argues, but investment by foreign 
multinationals in the border areas and the bantustans benefits 
the balance of payments capital account. 
In addition the difficulties faced by industry developing a 
skilled labour force amongst migrant workers in the metropolitan 
areas, she continues, are superceded if industry is located at 
the labour source. 
Marian Lacey also argues that Afrikaner capital stood to 
benefit through the border industries policy, presumably because 
it was unable to compete in a relatively capital intensive high 
technology market. More suitable for small and medium capital 
were labour intensive industries which required relatively small 
initial investments. 
In recent times, however, she argues, 
" the importation of modern process technology with 
its capacity to decompose highly complex production 
into elementary operations ~aking the (use of) unskilled 
and semi-skilled workers feasible, 
stimulus in the pursuit of this 
shortage of skilled workers." (35) 
has been a major 
policy, given the 
In addition, writes Lacey, "small business, commercial and 
agency promoted developments within the bantustans" which provided 
an "economic stake" for the bantustan bureaucrats to ensure that 
they would administer "the smooth and efficient system of labour 
allocation and control .... " (36) 
Marion Lacey's arguments are complex and multi-faceted and, 
perhaps because they are contained in a relatively short, generalised 
article, their precise implications are not always clear. In 
addition, in the nature of the article, little exemplification or 
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verification is present. What is clearly central, to her argument 
is that decentralisation of industry is chiefly designed to 
efficiently exploit cheap labour. Indeed, she suggests that 
population relocation to the bantustans took place for this purpose; 
she writes 
"To service these areas (of decentralised ind us try) a 
labour reserve accommodated within dormitory towns and 
situated within bantustan boundaries had to be created. 
Thus, the relocation of people to these areas is inextri-
cably linked with the state's decentralisation policy." 
(37) 
Much of what Lacey writes provides valuable and original 
insights into both decentralisation and bantustan policy. However, 
it would appear that her arguments centre far too closely on the 
requirements of industrial capital, and both the importance of the 
capitalisation of agriculture and the decline of the reserves in 
the economic sphere are missed. More generally, ideological and 
political issues are not adequately considered. 
If only successful and rapidly growing growth points were 
considered in an analysis, Lacey's explanations might be regarded 
as adequate. But, beyond three or four successful growth points, 
such as Hammarsdale, Rosslyn, Babelegi and Isithebe, by 1982 there 
were 51 designated growth points, with at least one in every 
bantustan and several in most. (38) Into these the government has 
poured a good deal of money building up infrastructures and contri-
buting directly to the financing of industrial investment. The 
latter is indicated in Table 2.2 which shows the levels and areas 
of investment, private and public in industry in various bantustans. 
By 1979 more development corporation capital (C.E.D, T.D.C., 
C.N.D.C. etc.) had been invested in the supposedly private "agency 
system" enterprises than private capital.. (39) Other than in 
Bophuthatswana where Babelegi is' an exceptionally well located and 
successful bantustan growth point, development corporation invest-
ment in "agency" industries consistently exceeded the amounts that 
private ca pi talis ts were prepared to invest. In the Ciskei the 
proportion of public to private investment in private industry 
exceeded 2:1 and in Venda it stood at about 5:1. (40) .Development 
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Corporation investment includes the cost of land and buildings 
(which may not be privately owned and are rented at subsidised 
rates) low interest loans and, more rarely, direct investment. 
It must be noted that the level of state injection is still higher 
when tax incentives, direct subsidies, state purchasing preference's 
and railage and harbour rebates are included. 
The proportion of public to private finance in the border 
areas is somewhat lower, a little below 1:2 in aggregate in 1979. 
Once again other forms of state expenditure, on infrastructure for 
example, are excluded from this calculation. As is the case with 
development corporations in the bantustans, the proportion of 
I. D. C. to private capital varies widely between growth points 
from 4: 1 in the Bophutha tswana border area to 1 : 3 in the border 
areas of the Transkei. (41) 
It would seem that the general thrust of Lacey's argument 
cannot explain the relatively high levels of state expenditure on 
decentralised industry. The twin questions that must be posed 
are: if the decentralised areas are so attractive to investors 
why were they so reluctant to take up the op port uni ties; and, 
secondly, why has the state been forced to extend such costly 
incentives to attract industry to the decentralised areas, and, 
particularly, to the bantustans? The steady elevation of incentives 
between 1960 and 1982 would appear to indicate that the state 
increasingly perceived a need to relocate industry and increasingly 
accepted that significant levels of state intervention were required 
.../ 
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to achieve that. (42) The availability of cheap settled labour L·_1 flr.t 1 
o, r .".t'.1 ,.~ t ' was by no means a sufficient incentive to capital to decentralise. 
Unlike the other writers discussed in this chapter thus far, 
Lacey writes within an historical materialist problematic. 
Within this problematic the state acts in the interests of the 
ruling class and in a capitalist society like South Africa, the 
ruling class is basically the capitalist class. Within this 
approach, however, Lacey puts too much emphasis on the role of the 
state in erecting, controlling and allocating a highly exploited 
workforce. She focusses almost exclusively on the state's role 
in reproducing the economic conditions of existence of capitalism. 
She notes that the state intervenes economically in order to 
strengthen political structures in the reserves; but even then it 
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is, as she puts it, to ensure the smooth functioning of the system 
of labour allocation and control. (43) 
Because of the scant attention she pays to political issues, / 
Marian Lacey's periodisation of decentralisation is inadequate. 
She divides industrial decentralisation into two periods: "earlier" 
when Afrikaner capital was catered to and labour intensive enterpri-
ses were moved to the border areas, partly to attempt to reverse 
the flow of Africans from the bantustans; and "today" when high 
technology industries employing operatives have become an important 
part of the policy given the skilled labour shortage. 
The first plant erected as a border industry Good Hope 
Textiles - was a large, sophisticated textile plant employrng 
operatives rather than skilled workers, jointly financed by the 
I. D. C. and Lancashire Cot ton Mills. The location of advanced 
plants in the decentralised areas is not a new development though 
it may have accelerated in recent years. Lacey's periodisation 
of forms of capital would have to be modified, not only to accommo-
date Good Hope Textiles, but several similar enterprises too. (44) 
More. important than the need for a modification of Lacey's 
periodisation of forms of capital in the decentralised areas is 
the fact that she neither notes the shift from border industries J 
to bantustan industrialisation in the early seventies nor attempts 
to explain it. While Marian Lacey's works take. the study of 
industrial decentralisation in South Africa a good deal further 
than most previous writings, her emphasis on economic issues and J 
particularly the exploitation of workers, though correct in princi-
ple, leads her to pay too little attention to a range of broad 
political issues that have centrally affected decentralisation 
policy. 
5. Nolutshungu's Revision. 
In a recent book on politics in contemporary South Africa, Sam C. 
· Nolutshungu ventures for part of a chapter into the area of 
industrial decentralisation. Nolutshungu's is a subtle and 
original historical materialist analysis which explicitly sets out 
to avoid the economism and functionalism which, as he notes, is 
present in many works on South Africa of recent times. 
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A central purpose of Nolutshungu' s book is to dispel the 
· notion that the South African state has deliberately and successful-
ly created a black middle class. In consequence not only is a 
•
11 united front of black opposition" possible, but within the front 
capital-ist interests are extremely weak, too weak to deflect the 
struggle for socialism. (45) 
Nolutshungu argues that decentralisation should not be seen 
"as primarily the fulfilment of a political purpose. " ( 46) The 
development of black elites or middle classes was merely a by-
product of decentralisation policy. The policy is a product 
". . . of economic developments _in the wider economy whose 
r- -~-· -·--~~ 
effects on the creation of a bourgeoisie and on develop-
ment in the homelands are secondary, if not wholly 
incidental." ( 47) 
At the same time that the policy of self-governing homelands 
emerged in the early 1960s economic planning came to be 
taken seriously, argues Nolutshungu. Decentralisation policy is 
largely a consequence of official thinking about planned growth in 
South Africa, thinking which incorporated a good deal of convention-
al capitalist planning considerations. The wider dispersal of 
economic activity sought to achieve several aims: 
"... to stimulate economic activity in less developed 
white areas, the border ar~as ... ; to stern the flow of 
black labour into the white metropolitan areas . . . and 
reserving the metropolitan areas for white labour inten-
sive industries." (48) 
Other considerations become important, he continues, most 
significantly the need to suspend the protective measures achieved 
by white workers in the metropolitan areas, as regards wage levels 
and job reservation. Agency investment marked an extension of 
these activities to the bantustans, but under tight control as the 
government feared the emergence of "little Hong Kongs" that would 
threaten existing industrial concerns in South Africa. 
The development corporations, responsible for bantustan 
development are, Nolutshungu argues, offshoots of the decentralisa-
tion policy, "for all that they incorporate other functions and 
aims as well." He continues: 
"Their emergence and their pattern of activity are far 
more intelligible in terms of industrial decentralisation 
in the wider national economy than in terms of a specific 
political policy of "creating a black bourgeoisie" or 
"middle class"." (49) 
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Nolutshungu's ls an analysis of depth. Unlike most writers 
on industrial decentralisation he analyses the subject from two 
perspectives; through the prism of decentralisation policy in 
general, and in the light of bantustan policy. He does not seek 
a simple monocausal explanation, but rather a carefully constructed 
hierarchy of reason. 
It is correct to situate bantustan industrialisation within 
the broad decentralisation policy in South Africa. This is 
precisely what this thesis sets out to do and is the chief conside-
ration that informs its structure. It could, however, be argued 
that Nolutshungu loses sight of two important dimensions of the / 
subject in his attempt to deflate the "black middle class" thesis. 
Firstly, like most writers on the subject he fails to adequately "./ 
periodise decentralisation policies. A consequence is that he 
fails to explore the implications of the policy shift marked by / _ 
the institution of the "agency system" and the 1971 White Paper. 
Secondly, and all the more surprising in a work that lays so 
much empahsis on politics and political institutions, he fails to 
adequately unravel power relations within the state in respect of 
decentralisation policy. Consequently he believes the influence 
of economic planning apparatuses to be far greater and freer of 
contradiction than it actually was. (Contradiction within the 
state is taken up in Chapter three). 
In addition in this section of his book, Nolutshungu seems to 
adopt a rather narrow view of the term politics. Bantustan 
industrialisation is "political" if it is designed to create and 
nurture a black middle class in the bantustans, he seems to argue. 
This, he argues, does not take place. Therefore, the reasoning 
seems to run, explanations for industrial decentralisation must be 
sought in the realm of economic planning. This is why Nolutshungu 
fails to explore the relationship between the restructuring of 
political apparatuses in the bantustans and bantustan industrialisa-




the formation of a bantustan middle class is small, indeed much 
smaller than the contribution of burgeoning bantustan state appara-
tuses, that does not mean that bantustan industrialisation is not, 
in large measure, a consequence of political pressures on the 
South African state. It also does not mean that bantustan 
industrialisation is not tied to the political development of the 
bantustan system. 
6. Economics, Politics and Periodisation. 
The explanation of state economic policy is a difficult task in 
any society. The integration of political and economic explanations 
is the chief problem. Political struggles and economic imperatives 
impinge directly on the formulation of policy, often in complex 
and contradictory ways. Not only must these factors be unravelled, 
but having done so the analysis must be able to make certain 
generali~ations. Without them a study becomes an almost useless 
collection of entirely unresolved factors. The analyses discussed 
in this chapter are not, by and large, afraid to generalise. 
Frequently, though, their generalisations are weakly founded. 
Trevor Bell passes by issues often because they are not the 
concern of orthodox economic theory, his methodological framework. 
The sphere of politics is a closed book, a subj~ct for political 
scientists, not economists: Politics is an irrational phenomenon 
which intervenes in the essentially rational workings of economics. 
Policies are assessed in terms of the extent to which they con-
form to Bell's model in which "economic growth" is the only valid 
purpose for state intervention in the economy. For this reason 
Bell does not ask how political struggles influence the formulation 
and alteration of industrial decentralisation policy. 
The work of the Lombard school is, by and large, not very 
much more helpful than Bell's in analysing the relationship between 
political struggles and economic imperatives on the development of 
decentralisation policy. Poli ti cal issues are avoided not only 
because they lie outside the limited conceptual vocabulary of 
economists, but also because Lombard and his colleagues were 
steering clear of confrontation with the National Party establish-
ment. Though politically informed proposals were made in their 
articles they stuck doggedly to the economic ·side of the fence, 
remaining on safe "technical" ground. 
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In Lacey's work the problem is precisely the opposite. 
Instead of maintaining an artificial barrier between politics and 
economics, she merges the two in an essentially functionalist 
analysis where politics is the hand-maiden of economics. Lacey 
sees decentralisation as an aspect of a continuing process of 
labour repression within South Africa's super-exploitative economy. 
The policy both enables labour to be super exploited in the decen-
tralised areas and shores up the migrant labour system. The 
lineage of Marian Lacey's position runs directly back to the work 
of Frederick Johnstone and Harold Wolpe in the late sixties and 
early seventies. (50) In criticism bf the liberal conception of 
apartheid and capitalist development being at odds with one another, 
Wolpe and Johnstone argued that segregation and apartheid both 
benefited capitalist development primarily by procuring cheap 
African labour. Since then historical materialist analyses of 
South Africa have moved away from the functionalism that marked 
the re-emergence of a lively historical materialist problematic in 
this country. Lacey's work, however, retains much of the functio-
nalism of that period and her political analysis and periodisation 
are the worse for it. 
Nolutshungu's book, in contrast, explicitly distances itself 
from functionalist historical materialism. However, it could be 
argued that the distance shrinks in his analysis of decentralisation. 
Momentarily, as a consequence of his preoccupation with the question 
of the creation of a black middle class in the bantustans, Nolutshungu 
lapses into a narrow definition of politics. Combined with his 
uneven research (see Chapter three Section 3 of this thesis) he 
fails to indentify the political significance of the switch from 
border areas to bantustan industrialisation. 
J 
/ 
As a form of state intervention in the economy industrial 
decentralisation poses particular analytical problems. State and 
economy come together in industrial decentralisation requiring not 
only sensitivity of analysis in the sphere of capital accumulation 
and the sphe~e of class struggles, but also at the intersection of 
the two in the formulation of state policy. A periodisation of 
industrial decentralisation policy entails a combined analysis of 
state and economy. 
j 
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To adequately accomplish that task, a good deal of detailed 
archival research would be required. A close examination of the 
consideration of government departments involved. in decentralisa-
tion would be one aspect of such a study. A detailed survey of 
capital's responses in various forms and at different times would 
also be required. Such a study would contribute a great deal 
towards an understanding of the nature of politics and capitalist 
development in apartheid South Africa. 
This dissertation aims to do a little less than that. By 
studying the relationship between bantustan policy, conditions in 
the bantustans and decentralisation, the following chapter attempts 
to overcome some of the difficulties thus far encountered. The 
following chapters on the Ciskei seek to concretely develop the 
analytical approach suggested. In doing so they seek to demon-
strate that a study of industrial decentralisation, while important 
in its own right, provides an invaluable window through which the 




TABLE 2. 1 
PERCENTAGE SHARE OF INDUSTRIAL EMPLOYMENT LOCATED 
IN 
METROPOLITAN REGIONS 1938/9 - 1970 
1938/9 1948/9 1959/60 1970 
Pretoria/Witwatersrand/Vereeniging 41,8 44,8 45,9 44,3 
Western Cape 20,7 16,2 16,8 15,4 
Durban/Pinetown 9,6 10,8 12,4 13,7 
Port Elizabeth/Uitenhage 6,0 5,9 4,7 5,8 
Total 78, 1 77,7 79,8 79,2 
Rest of South Africa 21, 9 22,3 20,2 20,8 
Source: R. T. Bell "Some Aspects of Industrial Decentralisation in 
South Africa" S.A. Journal of Economics, Vol. 41, No 4, 1973. 
. 
0-\ TABLE 2.2 
.:::r 
CUMMULATIVE INVE'S1MENT IN AGENCY SYSTEM ENTERPRISES (Excluding infrastructure) (R'OOO) 
31 March 1974 Kwazulu Qwaqwa Lebowa Gazankulu Kangwane Transkei Bophuthatswana Venda Ciskei Total 
By industrialists 1 475 86 2 614 300 78 5 239 18 112 737 52 28 693 
By development corporations 1 651 37 470 609 40 6 491 9 239 372 100 19 009 
Total 3 126 123 3 084 909 118 11 730 27 351 109 152 47 702 
31 March 1977 
By industrialists 8 715 5 673 601 118 31 245 40 081 909 . 2 659 90 001 
By development corporations 8 916 4 984 730 83 28 830 25 968 2 117 3 699 76 327 
Total 17 631 -( 1) 10 657 2 331 201 60 075 66 049 3 026 6 358 166 328 
31 March 1978 
By industrialists 19 980 297 7 143 1 953 144 30 932 62 368 1 115 3 949 127 881 
By development corporations 20 335 376 5 533 1 782 83 51 080 37 438 2 990 5 832 125 449 
Total 40 315 673 12 676 3 735 227 82 012 99 806 4 105 9 787 253 330 
31 March 1979 
By industrialists 29 613 297 7 558 1 989 144 62 041 785 4 084 106 511 
By development corporations 39 597 471 7 994 1 969 83 43 597 3 717 10 326 107 754 
Total 69 210 768 15 552 3 958 227 - ( 2) 105 638 4 502 14 410 214 265 (3) 
31 March 1981 
By industrialists 40 200 11 846 74 240 1 594 10 783 
By development corporations 49 072 11 446 52- 441 6 748 21 842 
Total 89 272 (2) 23 292 (4) (4) (2) 126 681 8 342(5)32 625 (4) 
50. 
TABLE 2.2 
CUMMULATIVE INVFS'IMENT IN AGENCY SYSTEM ENTERPRISFS 
(Excluding infrastructure) (R'OOO) 
1. Figures indicate disinvestment, possibly inaccurate. 
2. Transkei data becomes unavailable in 1979. 
3. Excluding Transkei for which no data is available 
4. Figures not obtained 
5. This is according to source 5. but source 6. indicates much 
lower figures. 
SOURCFS 
1. Benbo Black Development in South Africa, Benbo, Pretoria, 
1976, Table B.9.9. 
2. Benso Statistical Survey of Black Development 1978, Benso, 
Pretoria, 1979, Table 46. 
3. Benso Statistical Survey of Black Development 1979, Benso, 
Pretoria, 1980, Table 56. 
4. Benso Statis'ciral Survey of Black Development 1980, Benso, 
Pretoria, .1981 , Table 76. 
5. A.A. Ligthelm, The· Development of the TBVC Countries - A 
Review, Development Studies Southern Africa, Vol. 5 no 1, 
1982, Table 33. 


















FOOTNOTE'S - CHAPTER TWO 
Report of the (Riekert) Commission of Inquiry into Legisla-
tion Affecting the Utilisation of Manpower, Government 
Printer, Pretoria, 1979. See pp 232, 233 particularly. 
See Development Studies Southern Africa Vol. 2 No 4, 1980; 
and Growth Vol. 2 No 5, 1982 
Some of their important works in the area of bantustan 
industr~alisation are i) J.A. Lombard, "Problems of Regional 
Economic Planning in the Development of the Bantu Homelands" 
S.A. Journal of Economics, Vol. 39, 1971 (a); ii) Lombard 
Jan A, "Background to Planning the Development of Bantu 
Homelands in South Africa" in John Barrat et. al. (eds) 
Accelerated Development in Southern Africa, Macmillan, 
1974; iii) J. A. Lombard, "The Planning of the Economic 
Development of the Bantu Homelands" in J.A. Lombard (ed) 
Economic Policy in South Africa, Selected Essays, HAUM, 
1975 (?); iv) J.A. Lombard, P.J. van der Merwe "Central 
Problems of the Economic Development of Bantu Homelands", 
Finance and Trade Review Vol. X 1972173; v) S.S. Brand 
"Economic Development as a Policy Objective" Finance and 
Trade Review, Vol X, 1972173 and vi) Van der Merwe, P.J. 
"Industrial Decentralisation" - attached . to S. T. Kleu' s 
Chapter on Industrial Policy in Lombard J.A. (ed) Economic 
Policy ... , 1975, op. cit. 
J.A. Lombard "Political and Administrative Principles of 
Homeland Development" Bantu, February, 1971 (b) p 26. 
J.A. Lombard and P.J. van der Merwe, 1973, op. cit., p 26. 
ibid. 
ibid, pp 26, 27. 
J. A. Lombard, 1971 ( b) op. cit. , p 25. 
ibid,p 28. 
J.A. Lombard and P.J. van der Merwe, 1973, op. cit., p 22. 
ibid, p 27. 
J~A. Lombard, 1974 op. cit. p 464. 
ibid,p 466. 
Anne E. Ratcliffe "Industrial Decentralisation in South Africa" 
(Review article), S.A. Journal of Economics, Vol 42 No 3, 
1974, p 161. 
R.T. Bell: Industrial Decentralisation in South Africa, 
Oxford University Press, Cape Town, 1973 (a); and "Some 
Aspects of Industrial Decentralisation in South Africa" 
S.A. Journal of Economics, Vol. 41, No 4, 1973 (b). 
S.S. Brand, "Comment l", S.A. Journal of Economics Vol. 41 
no 4, 1973; other responses included one from J. H. Lange 
"Comment 11" in ibid, and Anne RatCliffe's article, 1974, 
op. cit. 
52. 
(17) For example, see B.I.C. Homelands - The Role of the Corpora-
tions in the Republic of South Africa, Chris van Rensburg 
Publications, N/d 1976 (?), p 11: 
"Purely on economic grounds the South African government 
would have been compelled, in the present circumstances, 
to launch such a decentralisation programme in order 
to promote economic growth in the underdeveloped 
areas of the country .... The availability of water is 
one of the most important considerations in decentrali-
sation. The substantial water resources in or near 
most of the homelands, coupled with the limited water 
resources in or near most of the white urban industrial 
areas make decentralisation virtually imperative." 
( 18) Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Water Matters RP 
34/1970, discussed in R.T. Bell, 1973 (b), p 427. 
(19) R.T. Bell, 1973 (a), op. cit., p 2. 
( 20) ibid, p 9. Bell recognises that the term has a broader 
scope geographically, but fails to identify the real shift 
that occurred. 
(21) Anne E Ratcliffe, 1974, op. cit., pp 162 - 164. 
(22) Deborah Posel "Rethinking the 'Race-Class Debate' in South 
African Historiography", in Martin Fransman et al (eds) , 
Southern African Studies - Retrospect and Prospect, Centre 
of African Studies, University of Edinburgh, 1983. 
(23) R.T. Bell, 1973 (a), op. cit., p 257. 
(24) ibid,pp 260 - 261. 
(25) G.G. Maasdorp Economic Development Strategy in the Homelands: 
The Role of Agriculture and Industry, S.A. Institute of 
Race Relations, Johannesburg, 1974, p 1. 
(26) Gavin Maasdorp "Industrial Decentralisation and the Economic 
Development· of the Homelands" in R. Schrire (ed), South 
Africa - Public Policy Perspectives, Juta, Cape Town, 1982, 
p 251. 
(27) ibid, p 252. 
(28) ibid, pp 242, 243. 
(29) C.L. McCarthy "Industrial Decentralisation - Reflections on 
the New Initiatives", S.A. Journal of Economics Vol. 50 No 
4, 1982, p 287. 
( 30) Servaas van der Berg "The Role of the Public Development 
Corporation in Generating Jobs and Incomes for Blacks, 
Particularly in the Black Homelands" a paper delivered to 
the Urban/Rural Conference, Stellenbosch, 1982, p 17. 
(31) R. T. Bell 1973 (b) op. cit. pp 402 - 405. Note that J.A. 
Lombard and P. J. van der Merwe ( 1973, op. cit. ) blandly 
state that: 
"The indirect and direct policy instruments have since 
the initiation of the programme (1960) resulted in the 
creation of 99 771 additional employment opportunities 
in decentralised areas (by 1971) ... " 
53. 
R. Tomlinson' s paper "Industrial Decentralisation and the 
Relief of Poverty in South Africa's Homelands" presentea to 
the 1983 National Conference of the S.A. Institute of Town 
and Regional Planners; and C.M. Rogerson' s "Industrial 
Decentralisation in South Africa : the Planning Uncertainties" 
Supplement to the Standard Bank Review, October 1974 also 
discuss these questions. 
(32) C f. R. Tomlinson, 1983, op. cit. 
(33) Marian Lacey "Locating Employment - Relocating Unemployment" 
in S. A. Research Service, Homeland Tragedy - Function and 
Farce, S.A.R.S., Johannesburg, 1982, p 48. 
(34) ibid. 
(35) ibid, p 49. 
(36) ibid. 
(37) ibid, p 48. 
(38) South African Digest 2/ 4/ 82, Supplement: The Promotion of 
Industrial Development : An Element of a Coordinated Regional 
Development Strategy for Southern Africa, Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Information. 
(39) Servaas van der Berg , 1982, op. cit. Table 4. 
(40) ibid, Table 3. 
f 41) ibid. 
(42) The changing incentives structure is discussed in detail in 
the Ciskei case study. 
( 43) I have identified the same problem in another article by 
Marian Lacey "The Resettlement Policy in Historical Perspec-
tive" in Ethel Walt (ed) A Land Divided, Black Sash, 1982, 
in my review in S.A. Outlook, November 1982. 
(44) In the Border region alone several important technologically 
advanced plants have existed for many years - particularly 
in the chemicals industry. Chloride, Raylite and Agbro 
are three examples. See Alan Hirsch and Alide Kooy "Indus-
try and Employment in East London" S.A. Labour Bulletin, 
Vol. 7 no 4/5, 1982. 
(45) Sam C. Nolutshungu Changing South Africa, Manchester Univer-
sity Press, 1982, pp 206, 207. 
(46) ibid, p 83. 
(47) ibid. 
(48) ibid, pp 83, 84. 
(49) ibid, pp 84, 85. 
(50) Frederick A. J6hnstoi1e "White prosperity and white supremacy 
in South Africa today" African Affairs, Vol. 69, No 274, 
1970; Harold\ Wolpe "Capitalism and cheap labour power in 
South Africa : from segregation to apartheid" Economy and 
Society VoJ. 1 No 1 , 1972. 
54. 
CHAPTER 3 
ECONOMIC INTERVENTION IN TifE BANTUSTANS: 
CONCRESCENCE AND CONTRADICTION IN STATE POLICY AND PRACTICE 
The bantustan industrialisation programme cannot be understood 
through an examination of industrial decentralisation policy 
alone. The formation of industrial development policy for the 
bantustans can only be adequately comprehended in the context of v"' 
the overall development of the state policy towards the reserves 
since the Second World War. It will be argued that the key to 
understanding bantustan industrialisation is to see it as a point 
of intersection between two strands of state policy - general ./ 
policy towards the bantustans and the specific strand of economic 
planning that encompasses industci~l_depentralisation. -. 
It will be argued that bantustan industrialisation is a 
product of policies emanating from different state apparatuses 
for not entirely congruent purposes. This is indicated by 
contradictions in both the formulations and the practices of the 
policy. The various apparatuses of the state do not necessarily ...! . 
have identical objectives. Bantustan industrialisation contains 
contradictory elements which can only be explained by reference 
to and analysis of contradictions within the state. 
In chapters one and two it has been suggested that a central 
reason why writers on industrial decentralisation have difficulties 
analysing policy developments in the 1970s is that they do not 
take the political sphere seriously enough. They do not adequate-
ly relate developments in policy to the objectives of and contradic-
tions between apparatuses within the apartheid state. This 
chapter will focus on policy towards the reserves in the post-war 
period drawing out those factors which explain the shift towards 
bantustan industrialisation in the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
This chapter is divided into two main sections. The first 
section, after a methodological preface, identifies and analyses 
I 
the causes and consequences of the demographic crises that hit 
the reserves in the 1960s and 1970s. In the second section, 
economic programmes for the bantustans are examined. Through 
0 
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these programmes the essential features of bantustan economic 
policy during different periods since the Second World War are 
revealed and discussed. 
In a concluding section to this chapter relations between 
state apparatuses involved in the formulation of bantustan in-
dustrialisation policy are considered. The peculiar path of 
development of the policy . is explained in terms of struggles 
within the state reflecting, in different ways, struggles in the 
social formation as a.whole. 
I Crisis and Restructuring - From Reserves to Bantustans 
1. The Role of the State. 
The analysis of state policy in South Africa has evolved in some 
very important ways over the last fifteen years. A brief review 
and assessment of the work of some important writers during the 
early 1970s, concerned with the development of policies towards 
the Reserves, is designed to bring out guidelines for the analysis 
of state policy. Central points are elaborated in a short 
general discussion on the analysis of the capitalist state. 
A central issue within the new wave of historical materialist 
writings in the early 1970s was why the Reserves were restructured 
into bantustans during the 1950s. It was clear that a qualitative-
ly new range of policies was initiated with the passing of the 
Bantu Authorities Act (No 68 of 1951) whose purpose was to erect 
' 
new administrative structures in the Reserves. Most significant 
were Tribal Authorities in which chiefs assumed some of the 
functions of magistrates. .The Native Laws Amendment Act (No 54 
of 1952) and the Natives (Abolition of Passes and Coordination of 
Documents) Act (No 67 of 1952) initiated the stringently tightened 
control to be exercised over the influx of.Africans to the schedu-
led (white) areas, at the same time controlling population efflux 
from the bantustans. Labour bureaux institutionalised the 
migrant labour system. Throughout the 1950s these policies were 
strengthened, modified and supplemented. A reserve policy that 
had changed relatively little between 1913 and 1950 was being 
transformed into a bantustan system which comprehensively denied 
Africans rights outside of the batustans. 
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For Harold Wolpe it was the destruction of the economies of 
the Reserves that provoked this transition from segregation to 
apartheid. He argued that the position of the Reserves had 
changed in the 1930s: 
"In the earlier period of capitalism (approximately 
1870 to the 1930s) the rate of surplus value and hence 
the rate of capitalist accumulation depended above all 
on the·maintenance of pre-captalist relations of produc-
tion in the Reserve economy .... " (1) 
However, this form of production where, through migrant labour, 
the non-capitalist sector contributed to the costs of reproduction 
/'\,___/'- _./ 
of the labour force which would otherwise have to have been borne 
by the capitalist sector had contradictory effects on the Reserves. 
In conjunction with land shortages it undermined their reproductive 
capacity. Ultimately the relationship 
"made impossible the continuation of the pre-capitalist 
relations of production in the reserves." (2) 
The consequent decline of agricultural productivity in the 
Reserves lessened the contribution of the Reserves to the produc-
tion of surplus value in the capitalist sector. The capitalist 
rate of surplus value, and therefore the rate of profit, was 
threatened. (3) The bantustan system and new forms of oppression 
and control b~ought in by the apartheid state, after 1950, were 
created as a revised means of keeping wages down thus defending 
the rate of surplus value and the rate of profit. A new form 
of cheap labour emerged, cheap now because of political domination 
rather than economic subsidisation. 
Wolpe's was one of the most important steps forward in the 
development of an historical materialist analysis of apartheid. 
Following seminal articles by Stanley Trapido and Frederick 
Johnstone it was the first attempt at a systematic scientific 
historical materialist analysis of the relationship between 
racialism and capitalism in South Africa. (4) 
Though it represented an advance, several aspects of Wolpe's 
article were critisised. In an essentially sympathetic appraisal 
Mike Morris criticised Wolpe for attributing too much force to 
/ 
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changes in the Reserves themselves. In a paper adopting a 
position from which he later withdrew he argued that 
"In order to determine what the role of the black 
reserves in the South African political economy is at 
any particular point in history, it is necessary first 
to determine which branch/fraction of capital is 
dominant at that particular point. In other words it 
is necessary to determine whose interests these reserves 
are serving. 
This can be summed up by saying that in general when 
examining the relationship between a dominant capitalist 
mode and a subordinate pre-capitalist mode of production 
it is changes occurring in the former that will de-
termine the overall relationship between the two." (5) 
Morris stressed the function of labour allocation between 
different sectors of production as the central element of the 
apartheid state. 
In another response to Wolpe, Michael Williams also stressed 
the dominance and determinant role of the advanced capitalist 
sector in the transition to apartheid. Rather than pointing to 
fractional conflicts ov.er labour as the major variable, Williams 
emphasises the shift from absolute surplus value production to 
relative surplus value production in the manufacturing sector in 
the 1940s and 1950s. This shift is a consequence of the rapid 
growth of manufacturing during this period and the increased J 
levels of competition, forcing capital to sophisticate production 
techniques. Thus Williams emphasises the form of exploitation 
.J 
of labour whereas Morris focusses upon the distribution of 
labour between sectors of capital. 
While these works clearly represented advances, they had 
in common with Wolpe's article certain weaknesses. In general 
terms, they concentrated too exclusively on broad economic 
structures· and their requirements. More specifically, they 
were "structuralist" in the sense that they concentrated on J 
structures, rather than relations between and within structures, 
and they were "economis tic" insofar as they analysed activities 
concerning the state almost exclusivel¥ in terms of the economic 
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requirements of, and constraints on, capital. 
The term "functionalism" has also been used to describe 
these tendencies in the early revisionist writings. As Deborah 
Posel has succinctly put it, functionalism, in this sense, 
describes the manner in which: 
"the South African 'social formation' has been treated 
as if a functionally integrated whole, its racist ~ 
political and ideological superstructure wholly serving 
the interests of the capitalist base which determines 
it". (7) 
Politics and class struggle were almost entirely neglecte0 
and the state was effectively seen as an instrument guided by 
the hidden hand of capital. 
The errors of the revisionists, as the new wave of historical 
materialist writers on South African history is often termed, 
are understandable in terms of the context in which their work 
was produced. Their overriding project was to criticise the 
liberal school of analysis, which at the time was the most 
widely accepted critical view of apartheid. The liberals 
argued that apartheid was at odds . with the existing economic 
system and was the product of an irrational political ideology. 
They stressed the separation of the economic from the political, 
sphere in the analysis of South Africa. Politics dominated and 
distorted the economic system, but apartheid would ultimately be 
eroded by economic logic. (8) 
In contrast the revisionists had sought to emphasise the 
close relationship between South Africa's political form and its 
economic structure. Apartheid was not an irrational phenomenon 
ultimately to be worn down by a rational economic system, they 
argued. Rather, the level of exploitation which made powerful 
capitalist structures possible in South Africa, was only able to 
e·xist because of the r:acially discriminatory political system. 
Capitalism was the raison d'etre of apartheid. Far from being 
essentially incompatible, racial discrimination and capitalist 
deveiopment in South Africa were two sides of the same coin. 
What the revisionists had done was to bend the stick too 
far to the other side. In their attempt to re-integrate economics 
J 
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into politics they had subsumed politics under economics. 
A good deal of the more recent work by revisionist historians 
and social sci en tis ts, including those originally culpable, has 
concerned backing out of theoretical cul de sacs. . The need to 
integrate class struggle, politics, economics and ideology far 
more carefully has been a central objective of more recent work 
on South Africa reflected in the work of Kaplan, Wolpe, Hindson ~ 
and Nolutshungu, amongst others. (9) Three things have provoked 
these d~velopments. Most importantly the political flux in Q) 
South Africa that followed the scholars' revolts of 1976 and 
1977 and. the "Mulderga te" scandal began to suggest that the 
theoretical tools thusfar utilised in the revisionst analyses 
were not adequate to the analysis of political flux, crisis and 
change. 
Also important was the work of historical materialist .,/l1) 
historians such as William Beinart and Peter Delius. (10) Their 
detailed research pulled the revisionists away from a functional-
ist approach. They showed, for example, that migrant labour 
was not simply a consequence of capital's demands for cheap 
labour. Instead migrant labour was the consequence of a series 
of struggles and experiments, within the capitalist and non-capita-
list sectors as well as across both. The historians taught the ../ 
lesson that patterns of development cannot simply be read off an 
analysis of the requirements for the development of capital. 
The third contributing factor to the move away from functiona-
list conceptions of historical materialism in the analysis of 
South Africa was the fact that important developments were (:£) 
taking place in the theory_ of the state. Amongst the important 
contributions were works by writers such as Ernesto Laclau, Bob 
Jessop and, most importantly, the later work of Nicos Poulantzas. (11) 
In moving away from the classic base-superstructure formu-
lation of the state as the instrument of the ruling class, 
historical materialist theory was subjected to an extended and 
often confusing debate. In the course of it, in order to 
sustain the argument that the state was relatively autonomous of 
th~ ruling class, the state disappeared as an object. Instead 
it became~ "a nexus of class forces", . "a relation". ( 12) In his 
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later work, however, Poulantzas re-instated the "materiality" of 
the state without returning to instrumentalist conceptions. 
As Poulantzas wrote: 
"The State . . . is rather a relationship of forces, or 
more precisely rather the material condensation of 
such a relationship among classes and class fractions, 
such as this is expressed within the state in a necessa-
rily specific form." (My emphasis; the whole passage 
.is emphasised by Poulantzas). ( 13) 
A page later Poulantzas elaborates on what appears as a 
qualification in the passage above. 
"The State is not reducible to the relationship of 
forces; it exhibits a capacity and resistance of its 
own. To be sure, change in the relationship of 
forces always affects the State, but it does not find 
expression in the State in a direct and immediate 
fashion. It adapts itself exactly to the materiality 
of the various state apparatuses, only becoming crystal-
lised in the State in a refracted form that varies 
according to the apparatus." (14) 
In this way Poulantzas explains that the state has material 
qualities (though they are not static) and in this way has a 
character over and above that granted it by the relation of 
class forces at a particular conjuncture. The state is a 
complex and changing object, but i~ is an object, insofar as it 
has qualities other than those bestowed on it by the relationship 
of forces at any moment. Class and fractional struggles are 
reflected in the state, but not in an unmediated, or alternative-
_ly, symbolic fashion. Struggles are reflected within the very 
apparatuses of the state itself. (15) The interests of different 
elements of the ruling alliance might be represented unevenly in 
different·departments or apparatuses, but those that most strongly 
represent the hegemonic section of the alliance would tend to be 
the most powerful. Other apparatuses might also be powerful in 
certain arenas. 
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Even the interests of the dominated classes may be present 
within apparatuses but they would be represented in an 
extremely mediated fashion, always subsumed to the interests of 
the dominant class(es). 
This formulation of the state in capitalist society begins 
to give content to the concept of relative autonomy, a concept 
which has been structurally derived from the logic of the capita-
list mode of production in earlier analyses, but without real 
content. It has been a concept that was difficult to utilise 
in the analysis of concrete social formations in -any other than 
a structuralist manner. 
Recent discussions of state theory indicate that an attempt 
to "provide a spuriously definitive general theory of the state 
apparatus and state power in capitalist societies" would be 
reductionist if it was abstracted from the specific object of 
analysis. (16) Historical materialism is not model building. 
As Poulantzas put it: 
"Social formations are the actual sites of the existence 
and reproduction of modes of production. They are 
thus also the sites of various forms of State, none of 
which can simply be deduced from the capitalist type 
of State understood as donating an abstract-formed 
object". (17) 
This is not to reject materialism and sink into positivist 
empiricism or Weber'i_an institutionalism; -"To situate the State 
with reference to the relations of production is to chart the 
original contours of its presence in the class struggle." ( 18) 
These are the guidelines that inform the analysis of the state 
and state policy in this dissertation. Most importantly for 
the purposes of this chapter they make provision for the analysis ~ 
of contradiction in state policy. 
2. Situating the Crisis of the Reserves. 
Though it has been argued above that one should not look to 
either the Reserves or capitalist production outside the Reserves 
for the essential reason for the movement of policy from Reserves 
to bantustans, the starting point for analysis chosen in this 
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thesis is the economic conditions in the Reserves. This is a 
convenient starting point from which to construct an analysis, 
but as will be shown, the economic crisis in the Reserves can 
only be understood in terms of a broader analysis of South 
African society. Similarly an understanding of state policy 
towards the bantustans entails reference to a range of factors 
within and outside the bantustans. 
® 
* * * * * * 
The point at which the Reserves enter a phase of rapid decline 
of agricultural productivity per head of population is one of 
the crucial watersheds in South African history, a fact widely 
recognised by historians liberal, revisionist and otherwise. 
Monica Wilson refers to "a fall in productivity" which she says 
began in the Ciskei in the late 19th century and she suggests 
became generalised in the 1920s and 19 30s. ( 19) Harold Wolpe 
relying largely on commissions describes 
"the ever increasing total and irredeemable destruction, 
through soil erosion, of vast tracts of land (and) ... 
the decline of production and . . . the impoverishment 
of the people .... " 
in the Reserves. (20) 
Like Monica Wilson, Wolpe identifies the 1930s as the 
period during which the decline takes serious effect. For 
Wolpe, not only is the decline important for its social effects 
in the Reserves, but also because it means the Reserves ·no 
longer subsidise migrant labour. Locating the decline is / 
essential for the purpose of contextualising state policy towards 
them. 
A superficial glance at statistics, however, would seem to 
suggest that it is not so easy to identify the 1930s as the 
point during which rapid decline occurs. This is certainly not 
true if gross production and ownership figures are to be believed. 
Table 3.5 shows that, according to official statistics, while 
the production of sorghum declined between 1918 and 1957, figures 
for maize production and the. ownership of cattle and sheep all 
increased. The number of cattle held in the Reserves more than 
doubled from 1,7 million to 3,8 million. Ownership of ploughs 
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increased from 154 649 in 1926 to 320 581 in 1955. 
Naturally, on their own, these statistics mean very little. 
They do strongly suggest that the catastrophic ecological disaster 
had not yet taken full effect in the Reserves. The figures do 
not, however, indicate productivity levels measured either in 
proportion to the amount of land cul ti va ted or the number of 
persons on the land. Charles Simkins found that total agricultu-
ral production valued at constant prices did not fall over the 
period 1918 to 1965, confirming the impression created by the 
statistics cited above. (21) More importantly _he found that 
output per head of population in the Reserves only began to fall 
significantly during the late 1940s. (22) Simkins also examined 
non-agricultural requirements of Reserve dwellers and found that 
"Taking the reserves as a whole, one finds that their 
inhabitants were far from able to provide for their 
subsistence requirements from agricultural production 
as early as 1918. However, the proportion of require~ 
ments they were able to meet remained substantially 
constant between 1918 and 1955, declining rapidly 
after that date" (23) 
Ultimately Simkins argues that during the period until 1955 
the Reserves managed to sustain a level, inadequate though it 
was, of production of living requirements for the population 
which remained resident. He termed the period that of "fragile 
productivity maintenance." The subsequent period 1955 to 
1969 he called "the period of rapid decline". ( 24) His analysis 
ends in 1969 as he argued that by the seventies agricultural 
production had fallen to a relatively low level, amounting to 
about 25% of total product and had thus become quite meaningless 
as an indicator of general conditions in the bantustans. 
When production per capita declines it indicates that the 
production levels are falling and/or population levels are 
rising. As production levels remain more or less static between 
1918 and 1965 it would stand to reason that population levels 
must have risen. In fact, population density altered little 
between 1918 and 1955, rising slowly from 50 persons per square 
mile to 60 persons per square mile in that 37-year period. In 
the 14-year period between 1955 and 1969 population density in 
the bantustans near~y doubled to 110 persons per square mile.(25) 
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Two things need to be explained. On the one hand the, 
relatively slow population density growth in the earlier period 
has to be accounted for while, on the other hand, the very 
marked increase that begins in the 1950s demands interpretation. 
Two factors help explain why population density did not 
rise rapidly in the Reserves during the earlier period ( 1918 -
1955) in spite of the African population growing relatively 
quickly. Firstly, as Tables 3. 1 and 3.3 indicate, significant 
levels of permanent and temporary outmigration from the Reserves 
occurred during this period. There was a net ·flow from the 
t
white rural areas as well as from the Reserves to the towns. 
This was made possible by relatively relaxed influx control 
regulations particularly during the Second World War. This is 
discussed in more detail in the next section. 
Secondly, a significant quantity of land was added to the 
Reserves during this period. This was mainly, though not 
entirely, a consequence of the Native Trust and Land Act (No 18 
of 1936) which provided that 7 250 000 morgen should gradually 
be added to the Reserves, nearly doubling their size. Though 
the full amount was never demarcated, let alone allocated, a 
substantial part was granted. (26) In effect the amount of land 
in the Reserves increased at approximately the same average rate 
as the resident population until the 1950s. 
The reasons for the rapid increase in population density 
since the early 1950s is the subject of the next part of this 
chapter. 
3. The Causes and Nature of the Crisis. 
It might be thought that the term crisis is an inappropriate 
term to apply to the subject of this discussion. The temptation 
to use the term has led to it being widely and indiscreetly used 
and has thus lost much of its value. 
at the end of this section. 
Its use will be reassessed 
At its simplest, the crisis that began in the bantustans a 
few years after the Second World War could be identified as 
demographic. An appraisal of tables 3. 1, 3.2 and 3.3in conjunc-
tion with each other indicates the. following: while permanent 
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urbanisation for Africans had expanded until the late 1940s it 
slowed down very sharply from a rate of 6, 6% per annum 
between 1946 and 1951 to a rate of 4, 5% per annum between 1951 
and 1960 and down to 3,9% between 1960 and 1970 (as indicated by 
census data which may not be entirely accurate, though the 
trends indicated are broadly accurate). (Table 3. 1). Between 
1950 and 1980 the African population in the metropolitan areas 
increased by 2,5 million (from 1 452 800 to 3 915 600). In the 
white rural areas African population increased by an even smaller 
1,3 million (to 4 310 000), whereas in the bantustans African 
population increased from 3, 4 million to 11, 1 million - a very 
large increase of 7, 5 million people. Whereas in 1950 about 
39,6% of Africans lived in the bantustans by 1980 the figure had 
reached 52, 7%. In short, the tendency towards urbanisation 
evident in the 1930s and 1940s had been slowed whereas a massive 
transfer of population from the white areas, especially the 
rural areas, to the bantustans had occurred. This transfer 
accelerated in the 1960s and 1970s. 
This movement was taking place in spite of the fact that 
agricultural productivity per head in the bantustans was declining 
rapidly and by 1960 the vast majority of districts in the Reserves 
produced less than 50% of the food required for their population 
and a large proportion of those produced less than 25%. ( 27) 
The demographic crisis is thus quite simply the increased crowding 
in of large numbers of African people into poverty stricken 
Reserves. 
The first question to ask is how did this process take 
place. -A glance at Table 3.6 provides the first part of this v 
answer. Though pass convictions eased off during the Second 
World War boom years they escalated rapidly from the late 1940s. 
In the ten year period between 1945 and 1955 pass convictions 
more than doubled, from 137 177 to 345 421. They nearly doubled 
again between 1960 and 1970, 632 077 Africans being convicted in 
the latter year. Influx control regulations having been strength-
ened and extended to women during the 1950s, were being increasing-
ly stringently applied. 
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~rom the 1960s widescale population relocation programmes 
began to transfer large numbers of people to the Reserves. It 
has been estimated that between 1960 and 1982 about 3 522 900 
persons were relocated under various programmes (in that year 
about 1 765 500 were still threatened with removal). (28) The 
single most important group of people relocated were · those 
Africans moved from white farms to the bantustans. About 1 129 000 
people were moved in that direction between 1960 and 1982. 
Also moved from white rural areas were 614 000 Africans, in 
terms of the consolidation of bantustans and the .eradication of 
"black spots". ( 29) Other major categories of removal, as 
defined by the Surplus Peoples Project are those moved fr.om 
townships in towns to distant townships that fall within bantustan 
boundaries. About 730 000 people were moved in this way between 
1960 and 1982. Lastly, Group Areas Act (no 41 of 1950) removals 
where suburbs are declared open to a certain 11 race group" only 
and the rest have to leave, affected about 834 400 people in the 
22-year period but this category of removals does not generally 
affect the bantustans. (30) 
Thus the immediate forces behind the demographic squeeze in 
the bantustans are the tightening up of influx control in conjunc-
tion with a widespread resettlement programme. 
land was added to the overflowing Reserves. 
Little or no 
Why did these processes take place? To adequately answer 
this question would require an extended discussion it involves 
many of the central issues of South Africa's political economy 
since the Second World War. Here it will be answered in a 
brief and schematic fashion. 
•' 
There are two intertwined areas to examine. Firstly the .../ 
economic processes that have expanded, but have not prevented 
the growth of unemployment must be surveyed. Secondly, the 
political processes that led to the location of South Africa's / 
unemployed masses in the bantustans require explanation. 
The most significant development in the South African 
economy over the last half a century has been the rapid expansion 
of manufacturing industry. Between the beginning and the end 
of the Second World War, the value of manufactured goods in 
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South Africa more than doubled, making that sector the largest 
contributor to South Africa's gross domestic product. In 1943 
manufacturing passed mining in terms of its contribution to GDP, 
becoming the sector with the greatest output by value. (31) By 
the mid-1960s the contribution of manufacturing to GDP exceeded 
the combined totals of mining and agriculture and by 1970 the 
value of output of manufacturing had reached more than double 
that of mining, the second in rank productive sector. (32) It 
must be stressed that this was not a period of stagnation in any 
sector of the capitalist economy; between 1960 and 1970 the 
real GDP of the South African economy grew at an average annual 
rate of 6, 2°/o. ( 33) In the previous and subsequent decades 
growth was slower, but nevertheless substantial growth took 
place. 
Although the capital/labour ratio in all sectors of the 
economy has tended to rise since the Second World War, this 
process took place slowly at first and levels of employment rose 
in all sectors. The very high demand for labour in manufacturing 
during the war itself was a consequence of the relaxation of the 
pass laws during that period. 
While some of those people drawn to the towns by growing 
employment opportunities and war-inflated wages came from the 
Reserves, others were drawn from the white rural areas. In 
both cases farmers felt threatened and applied pressure to 
protect what they regarded as their labour reserves. Thus the 
migrant labour and population movement controls imposed during 
the early 1950s can be seen in some substantial measure as a 
response by the National Party government to one of its major 
constituencies - white agriculture. (34) 
At this stage white agriculture was still labour intensive: 
"The ox was the main form of traction in the maize 
industry in 1947; there were no hybrid seeds no 
artificial fertilizers and no chemical weed killers. 
During the 1950s the pre-harvest functions in the 
maize industry were mechanized, while wheat farming 
was totally mechanised during this period. The maize 
farmer did not, on the whole reduce his complement of 
labour a~ a result of pre-harvest mechanisation because 
labour was still required for harvesting .... " (35) 
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In the 1960s and 1970s, however, mechanisation and centrali-
sation spread rapidly across important sections of agriculture, 
leading to widespread shedding of labour. This will be discussed 
further below. 
The extension of migrant labour to some extent to manufactu-
ring industry in the 1950s was, by and large, not very favourably 
regarded by vocal representatives of industry at first. Restric-
tions on the movement of labour were considered inimical to 
industrial development. (36) Cries of outrage rapidly died when 
manufacturers found themselves little heeded. Indeed, it has 
been argued that the extension of migrant labour in the early 
1950s was designed to enable the greater exploitation of semi-
skilled African labour in industries where technical innovations 
eliminated the need for a wide range of skills in most operations. 
Legassick has argued 
"that the principle inducement to industry to increase 
its degree of capital intensity was the desire to use 
semi-skilled black operative workers in place of 
skilled whites." (37) 
Most of these were to be drawn from the ranks of migrant 
workers. Kaplan has argued 
"that manufacturing industry, still relatively small 
scale in the world context, required ultra-exploitable 
migrant labour. This would enable industry to consoii-
da te and improve its world position in the difficult 
years following the war." (38) 
Though Trevor Bell has challenged some of Legassick's 
broader generalisations, (39) there is clearly some substance in 
the arguments that manufacturing industry could take advantage ./ 
of migrant labour. Certain sections of industry came to rely 
increasingly heavily on migrant labour. It could be noted 
though, that existing studies do not carefully distinguish 
between those sectors of industry that rely heavily on migrant 
labour and those that employ largely permanently urbanised workers. 
What needs to be more fully explained, however, is why the 
labour is migrant. In other successful late industrialising 
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countries like Brazil and South Korea, for example, employees in 
the large industrial sectors live mainly in urban slums. 
Poli ti cal considerations certainly contributed to the 
formation of the post war version of influx control; not only 
were the economic requirements of the major productive sectors 
taken into account. Rapid urbanisation had led to an enormously 
heightened level of class conflict, of various kinds, in the 
urban areas. African worker organisation took off for the 
first time in large industrial unions during the war. ( 40) 
Squatter movements expressed the widescale discontent of Africans 
with inadequate housing. (41) By the end of the 1940s important 
political leaders amongst the small black middle class in the 
towns had committed themselves to an alliance with the working 
class. This was symbolised in the Programme of Action in 1949 
and in the Congress Alliance of the 1950s. These developments 
were precisely what the commissions of the 1950s (quoted in 
Chapter one) were referring to when they wrote about the evils 
of urbanisation. 
The National Party could neither ignore the farmers who 
formed an important section of its base,northe threat of politi-
cal unrest in the urban areas. Influx control and the institu-
tionalisation of migrant labour was the course of action chosen. 
The mining industry which remained dependent on migrant labour 
was well suited by this arrangement, and the industrial sector 
learned to take advantage of the system before long. 
In the 1960s and 1970s the course of capitalist development 
was to force increasingly large numbers of people into the 
Reserves. The mechanisation and centralisation of agriculture 
had very serious effects. Relatively few studies of the post 
war development of agriculture have emerged though this is being 
remedied. ( 42) All available works point to the same basic 
processes. In the case of crop production maize and wheat 
being most important rapid mechanisation has occurred over 
the last three decades. In the 1970s the average annual rate of 
increase in capital stock per farm worker was 5,853, faster than 
the 5. 173 in mining or the 5. 343 in manufacturing. Between 
1960 and 1980 the capital stock per employee in the white agricul-
tural sector as a whole (at constant 1975 prices) more than 
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doubled from R2 597.87 to R5 311.41. (43) In stock production 
areas mechanisation has not been as significant as centralisation 
and rationalisation as regards labour saving. (44) The total 
number of farming uni ts in white South Africa has fallen from 
105 850 in 1960 to 71 206 in 1978. (45) This does not adequately 
reflect the extent of centralisation and concentration in farming 
generally, as farming units need not be officially dissolved as 
they are taken over. It does, however, give an indication of 
the existence of this process. Field work in the Eastern Cape 
suggests the presence of a steady process of centralisation and 
consequent rationalisation of production amongst stock farmers. 
(46) 
Even as agricultural output has expanded the level of 
employment has fallen. In 1960 1 221 000 people were employed 
in the "white" agricultural sector, but by 1980 employment had 
fallen to 973 000 (as indicated in Table 3.7). As significant 
as the gross figures is the fact that agriculture in 1980 employed 
9.3% of the economically active population (as defined by the 
census), compared to 21,3% in 1960. 
After the process of capi talisa ti on of agriculture, (or 
during it, in some countries) the expelled population was gradual-
ly drawn into other sectors of the economy in the advanced 
capitalist states. Most important in absorbing labour was the 
industrial sector, though subsequently the tertiary sector grew 
in importance. As Table 3. 7 indicates, this has not happened 
in South Africa. Although employment in manufacturing increased 
from 644 000 in 1960 to 1 238 000 in 1980 its share of employment 
of the economically active population rose negligably from 11,3% 
to 12, 6% in 1970, but fell back to 11 , 8% by 1980. The mining 
sector employed 725 000 people in 1980, as opposed to 615 000 in 
1960 al though t ts share had fallen from 10, 7% to 6, 9% of the 
economically active population. (Table 3.7). 
Manufacturing as the most rapidly growing productive sector 
of the economy might have been expected to expand its share of 
the economically active population in comparison with other 
sectors. This was not to be. The reason is, at one level, 
quite simple. While manufacturing industry's output rapidly 
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of production. This involves the incorporation of capital into / 
expanded it increasingly employed more capital intensive methods 
production and the technical sophistication of capital. Hindson's 
work suggests that the incorporation of capital into production 
occurred rapidly in the 1950s and 1960s, while in the 1970s / 
increasingly sophisticated methods of production were introduced. 
The net effect was an accelerating rate of growth of the capital/ 
labour ratio in industry. ( 47) In other words, increasing 
quantities of commodities were being produced by a relatively 
smaller number of workers working with increasingly advanced 
machines. 
Why this process should take place at a time when, as will 
be shown, there was a rapidly increasing rate of unemployment, 
is a fundamentally important question that requires a detailed 
answer. This will not be provided here. The short answer is 
that as the South African economy is capitalist in nature and 
exists in the context of a capitalist world economy, p,roduction 
techniques are to a very significant extent determined by pressu-
res from the most advanced sectors of production. Even if the 
South African economy is not entirely open it is forced to ./ 
compete in some ways at an international level. Besides, South 
African manufacturing industry is in the more advanced sectors 
heavily dependent on foreign investment and expertise. To that 
is attached certain forms of production. These forces result J 
in what Alec Erwin has called uneven development, allowing 
unemployment to accelerate while output grows. (48) 
The dimensions of South Africa's unemployment problem are 
difficult to calculate. Unemployment has been estimated to 
have risen from 832 000 (11,8% of the e.a.p.) in 1970 to 
2 004 000 (21, 1%) in 1981 (see Table 3.8). It has grown rapidly 
in spite of an average annual rate of growth of 3, 9% between 
1970 and 1980. Unemployment is clearly not a cyclical problem ~ 
in South Africa, but rather a structural one increasing 
unemploymen~ is implanted in the structure of the economy. (49) 
The response of the state to increased structural unemploy-
ment has been to tighten up infiux controls still further, as 
in, for example, the Bantu Laws Amendment Act (No 42 of 1964) 
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which amongst other things placed a 72 hour limit on all "unquali-
fied" Africans entering "prescribed areas" (all urban areas 
outside the bantustans) and extended the grounds on which Africans 
could be declared "idle or undesirable" and thus could be endorsed 
out of a prescribed area. Since then measures have been tighten-
ed still further. The recommendation of the Riekert Commission, 
that urban residence be dependent on having both a job and a 
house, is the logical extension of a sys tern which has been 
increasingly applied to keep the unemployed out of the "white" 
areas. (50) 
In a sense, it is possible to periodise the application of 
influx control in the post war period into two phases, though in 
several ways these phases overlap. The initial phase, roughly 
speaking the first ten years of National Party rule, was dominated 
by considerations of labour supply on the one hand and, on the 
other the political problem of black urbanisation. In the 
course of the 1960s the net surplus of labour became increasingly 
evident. Emphasis in state policy shifted, away from the 
canalisation of labour, to controls over efflux from the Reserves. 
This was accompanied by resettlement programmes, mainly from 
white rural areas to the Reserves. By the late 1960s it had 
become increasingly evident that the state faced an unprecedented 





II Economic Intervention in the Bantustans 
Changing state policies towards the Reserves/bantustans are evi-
dent in changing forms of economic intervention in them. In this 
• section three forms of economic intervention will be examined: 
1l, 
agricultural betterment schemes, commercial transfer and loan 
schemes and bantustan industrialisation. These forms of inter-
vention do not exhaust the state's catalogue of schemes for the 
Reserves, and neither do they fall entirely into different 
phases. However, they are the most significant forms of inter-
vention and they represent very well the changing forms of 
intervention that correspond to different policy phases. 
1. Agricultural Betterment Schemes. 
The first three decades after the formalisation of the Reserve 
system in 1913 saw very little creative economic intervention 
from the State. The term "neglect" has often been applied to 
the attitude of government towards the Reserves during this 
period. In a sense this is correct, but insofar as neglect 
suggests that the state had no policy, that the Reserves were 
"forgotten", the term neglect is inappropriate. A "one man, 
one plot" system was deliberately imposed on the Reserves to 
ensure access to land for the twin purposes of retaining old 
social and ideological structures of control, at the same time 
subsidizing migrant labour. The system was also designed to 
prevent the accumulation of land by individuals. White agricul-
ture, by contrast, was assisted towards capitalist development. 
Stagnation in the Reserves was not an accident of history. 
However, by the late 1920s concern about conditions in the 
Reserves began to mount. The work of writers such as W.M. 
Macmillan,and commissions such as the Native Economic Commission 
which reported in 1932, said that the Reserves were riot merely 
stagnating~ Rather, it argued, the Reserves were heading towards a 
state of rapid decline. (51) While some reports may have been 
unduly alarmist (52), the state slowly began to take seriously 
the question of agricultural decline in the Reserves. 
In 1929 the Native Affairs Department established a Native 
Agriculture and Lands Branch to extend assistance to the Reserves.(53) 
74. 
However, it was granted a very small budget, only reaching · 
£90 000 in 1945. (54) Like its successors, the Native Agricultu-
re and Lands Branch was mo ti va ted by the idea that the problem 
of Reserve agriculture was the ignorance and poor farming 
practices of "the native". Its purpose was limited to the 
reclamation and stabilisation of land; programmes were designed 
to intervene at a technical rather than social level. 
In other words, it introduced soil conservation measures 
that were not meant to confront directly existing forms of 
social organisation, though measures such as villagisation and, 
particularly, cattle culling were very unpopular, sometimes 
provoking active opposition. 
The Native Trust and Land Act of 1936 and Proclamation· 31 
of 1939 initiated a systematic approach towards what came to be 
known as betterment. Betterment took place mainly on Trust 
land (land incorporated under the 1936 Act), with its attached 
conditions making it easier to intervene. Betterment had two 
components - Rehabilitation and stabilisation. Rehabilitation 
involved the active reclamation of land, usually having been 
spoilt by erosion. It involved expensive and time-consuming 
activities such as filling in dongas and re-routing streams. 
the term indicates, consisted of measures 
further erosion of land or destruction of 
Stabilisation activities included cattle 
Stabilisation, as 
designed to prevent 
soil fertility. 
culling, fencing off pastures for rotation and advice on alterna-
tive crops and cultivation patterns. 
By the 1950s rehabilitation had been abandoned, as it was 
too expensive and time-consuming. Instead the Trust and the 
Agricultural Branch focussed upon stabilisation. (55) Even here 
relatively little progress had taken place partly because of the 
small amount of resources devoted to the programme, and partly 
on account of the increasing resistance expressed towards the 
stabilisation programmes. Resistance took different forms in 
different parts of the country. Frequently N.A.D. officials 
found combined opposition from people and headmen. The people 
objected to cattle culling and the fencing of pastures which 
often meant a decline in agricultural land available. Headmen 
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feared betterment would threaten their legitimacy. ( 56) . In 
response a revised betterment proclamation was promulgated (No 
116 of 1949) which contained punitive measures to be used against 
resisters. Resistance usually took a passive form, but on a 
number of occasions betterment programmes provoked open and 
sometimes violent opposition. A number of such instances have 
been recorded, but it is quite likely that a good many incidents 
remain unchronicled. 
The Tomlinson Commission found that, by the end of 1952, 
only 23% of Trust land and 3,8% of the scheduled areas, making 
up 9,4% of the total area of the Reserves, had been "stabilized". 
At this rate, it estimated, "it would take 245 years to complete 
the task." (57) 
The Tomlinson Commission not only recommended a drastic 
stepping up of the stabilisation programme but it proposed that 
large numbers of people be removed from the land and placed in 
· urban-type settlements in the Reserves. Remaining men would be 
able to operate "economic units" of land that could fulfil their 
income needs. Instead of the men being each part peasant and 
part wage-earner, the population w.as to be divided into peasants 
and workers. Most of the workers thus created would still need 
to be found jobs, but that was dealt with in another section of 
the report. 
The reasons for the rejection of the bulk of the Tomlinson 
Commission's proposals have been discussed in _ Chapter one. 
Although the White Paper indicated that the government was not 
prepared "to do away with tribal tenure of rural land and to 
substitute individual tenure based on purchase" it accepted in 
principle that "a certain basis must be laid down for different 
types of farming." (58) As a consequence of this a programme of 
planning began, dividing the bantustans into three categories of 
land - arable, pastoral and residential. Ultimately the land 
would be used ·only for its prescribed purpose. 
The implementation of betterment policy in the 1950s contain-
ed an irony. After 1951 chiefs were expected to play an important 
role in betterment. The Bantu Authorities Act had elevated the 
administrative role of the chiefs as part of the state's plan to 
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rebuild "tribal" structures of control and thus re-introduce 
indirect government. Each chief's Tribal Authority was now 
expected to administer betterment and to recruit volunteers to 
work on the project (part of the state motivation was to save 
costs by using volunteers rather than paid workers (59)). How-
ever, chiefs were often reluctant to participate. One reason 
was the fact that betterment schemes were often unpopular and 
chiefs preferred not to entirely alienate themselves from their 
constituents, even if they were government servants. An equally 
important reason, often, was the fact that altering land holding 
patterns potentially threatened chiefly powers by possibly 
shifting the capacity (at least theoretical) to allocate and 
distribute land out of the control of the Tribal Authorities. 
(60) 
Thus the state was pursuing a potentially contradictory 
policy. Considerations of conservation and production suggested 
the need to alter the social organisation of production, whereas 
political considerations required the maintenance of the status 
quo. For the time, political considerations triumphed. 
Betterment remained restricted to superficial alterations. No 
significant reorganisation of land use occurred. Possibly the 
most notable consequence of betterment schemes was the collection 
of scattered homesteads into villages which assisted administra-
tion. 
One analysis of betterment, written by an economist in 
1964, opens by remarking on the visibility of change over the 10 
year period preceding 1962. Homesteads which had once dotted 
the countryside were now collected in orderly villages. Fences 
now marked the edges of grazing fields. Yet, in his conclusion, 
Boardman writes: 
"There is, as yet, little evidence that the rehabilita-
tion programme has achieved its principle objective of 
remoulding the agricultural patterns of the Bantu 
people." (61) 
Few people, if any, had been deprived of rights to land and 









Boardman's findings are typical of studies of betterment in 
South Africa's Reserves. Where studies have been undertaken it 
is generally found that while some administrative reforms were 
accomplished, most importantly villagisation, no major alteration 
of production patterns had been achieved. (62) 
The betterment schemes which had begun as programmes oriented 
towards conservation (63) had backed off in response to pressure 
from the masses and government appointed headmen and chiefs. 
Instead, by and large, politically oriented reforms such as 
demarcating a headman's domain by villagisation and fencing 
often came to comprise the main part of betterment schemes. 
The state had been forced to settle for a spacially reorganised 
political structure around the Tribal Authorities system, while 
agrarian reform measures, which were expensive and unpopular, 
formed a minimal part of betterment programmes. This phase of 
intervention is marked by reluctance to interfere with the 
existing social relations of production. 
2. The Bantustan Trader Prograrmne. 
It was only in the late 1950s that the future of the bantustans 
began to be clearly formulated. In 1950 the Prime Minister, Dr 
Malan had stated: 
"If one could attain total territorial apartheid, if 
it were practicable, everybody would admit that it 
would be an ideal state of affairs ... but that is not 
the policy of our party." (64) 
By the early 1960s "vague talk about the native's right to 
self government", as Giliomee put it, had made way for a policy 
in which eight separate African ethnic units would be prepared 
for political independence. ( 65) From 1959 the programme was, 
for a few years, instituted with some haste. It was a form of 
response to the rising tide of black nationalism in the 1950s 
and to increasing international pressure. At the same time the 
government severely repressed the nationalist movement. It 




This development in bantustan policy was marked by the 
passing of the Promotion of Bantu Self Government Act (No 46) 
and the Bantu Investment Corporation Act (No 34) in 1959. F'our 
years later the Transkei obtained "self governing" status. The 
purpose· of . the Bantu Investment Corpora ti on ( B. I. C. ) Act was to 
provide some economic basis for the new political structures 
that were being erected in the bantustans. 
The Act defined the objectives of the B.I.C. very widely. 
They included "the encouragement and promotion of industrial, 
commercial, financial and other undertakings." However, in the 
first decade of its existence, its activities were concentrated 
almost exclusively in one sphere - commerce. In 1964 Niewenhuysen 
wrote that 
"the major part of the capital that the corporation 
has so far made available has been used for financing 
the retail and wholesale trade." (67) 
In fact, the retail trade received the most attention 
during this period. Out of the 1 300 instances of financing by 
the B.I.C. betw$en 1959 and 1974, 112 were to the commercial 
sector and 164 to the service sector. (68) The average loan was 
very small, amounting to R2 662 in 1960/1 and R7 729 (at current 
values) in 1973/4. 
The activities of the B. I. C. in the 1960s centered around 
purchasing trading stores and other small commercial ventures 
from whites in the bantustans for the purpose of selling them 
through subsidised loans to existing or prospective African 
entrepeneurs. Between 1959 and 1975 the number of licensed 
black traders in the bantustans rose from 3 900 to 9 500. (69) 
At the same time as black traders were being nurtured in 
the bantustans, African businessmen in the white areas were 
being blocked at every turn. F'rom the mid-1950s obstacles for 
African businessmen outside the bantustans escalated until in 
1963 the B.A.D. laid down what Roger Southall described as "the 
harshest restrictions ever imposed on African businessmen." (70) 
The bantustan trader programme was part of a two-pronged 
plan. On the one hand the state wished to remove middle class 
Africans from the white towns and did almost everything possible 
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to push the traders out. The African middle class was perceived 
both as a sign of permanency and the class from which political 
leadership was drawn. On the other hand African traders were 
nurtured in the bantustans - for the same reasons: the traders 
would join the bantustan elite as a section with a stake in the 
sys tern, it was hoped. ( 71 ) At the same time African middle class 
professionals were being actively drawn to the bantustans through 
the expansion of the educational structures, the legal structures 
and the bureaucracies. (72) 
What characterised all these processes was that they could 
be undertaken without intervening in production relations in the 
bantustans. The trader loan programme was an attempt to bolster 
the political structures in the bantustans without interfering 
too radically in existing social patterns. Where they differed 
from the betterment schemes of the 1950s and early 1960s was 
that they represented a deliberate process of class formation. 
The traders, chiefs and bureaucrats were to constitute a new 
conservative subaltern ruling alliance in the bantustans. 
3. Bantustan Industrialisation. 
By the late 1960s it was becoming increasingly evident that, 
though the state might have been avoiding it, the radical altera-
tion of social relations of production and control in_the Rese~ve~, - --- - ~-
was beginning to take place. Resettlement, overcrowding and 
increasing poverty were rapidly undermining the existing social ------- -·-. - . --
and political structure. Conflicts between newcomers and old 
inhabitants and their chiefs, and the development of urban 
settlements within the bantustans presented challenges which 
tested the bantustan structures. (73) A detailed account of 
this process in the Ciskei is provided in Chapter four and 
Chapter five. 
The state responded with a flurry of legislation, most 
importantly the Bantu Homelands Constitution Act (No 21 of 1971) 
and the Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act (No 26 of 1970) designed 
to set the bantustans on the road to self-government and ultimate-
ly independence. By 1971 only the Transkei had qeen granted 
self-goverment, under a previous Act, drafted specifically for 
the Transkei. By 1977 all but the two most recently created 
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bantustans had been granted self-government and the Transkei had 
become "independent". 
Accompanying these constitutional developments was the 
rapid growth of state employment in the bantustans. This was 
particularly the case in those bantustans which decided to opt 
for independence. Table 3.9 shows this clearly. Between 1973 
and 1979 state employment in the Transkei increased from 30 8614 
to 65 432, an increase of 112%, and in Venda it increased from 
2 985 to 8 319, an increase of 279%. At the lower end of the 
scale state employment in Kwazulu grew from 18 500 to 28 722 
(55%) and in Gazankulu it grew from 5 853 to 8 447, a mere 44%. 
The total number of Africans in the state sector in the bantustan 
increased from 93 019 to 170 260, or by 83% in a six year period. 
A concerted attempt was clearly being made to strengthen the 
bantustan political structures. 
Giliomee has argued that the political developments of the 
1970s, following a period of stagnation in bantustan policy, 
were connected with developments in foreign policy. He argues 
that they coincided with South Africa's "dialogue policy" with 
southern African states in the early seventies and were designed, 
at least partly, to satisfy foreign criticisms. (74) If that is 
accurate it is a supplementary reason. Most important is the 
fact that the. existing political structures in the bantustans 
were under great latent pressure from internal developments in 
the bantustans themselves. Indeed, in another paper Giliomee 
himself refers to "the steady erosion of the Legitimacy and 
si.;pport system" of the bantustans. (75) 
These political innovations, while resting heavily on 
bureaucracies as the new centres of power in the bantustans 
requir~d development in the private sector too. Three reason~-; 
can be advanced for private sector development in the bantustans. 
Firstly, there was the need to create employment. The bjp; 
boost provided by the expansion of the public sector in the 
Reserves was a once-off phenomenon. Expansion was not like I y 
to occur at the same rate in the 1980s. Besides, relying 011 
the public sector alone would make the expansion of employme11L 
very expensive for the state. 
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Secondly, the ideology of nation building required the 
establishment of structures which, at least superficially resem-
bled an economically developing state. Private sector investment 
~~---~"'-· --- - _,--·-·--=- ~ 
was required to convey some legitimacy on the emerging state 
structures. Interviews in the Ciskei indicated unambiguously 
the political importance of industrial development within the 
Ciskei. ( 7 6) 
In addition, the South African government was clearly 
seeking international recognition,for the bantustans and private 
' 
sector investment could serve this purpose. On the one hand it 
could simply grant the bantustan structures some additional 
legitimacy. On the other hand, if foreign investment could be 
at~tracted, it seemed likely that some form of diplomatic link 
would have to be created between the c,ountry from which the 
investment came and the bantustan in which the investment took 
place. 
Benbo explained the considerations involved in the form of 
economic development in the bantustans in the 1970s. It argued 
that industrial development was required in order to l,end __ "econo-
mic content to the political power of the homeland governments." 
(77) 
Lombard argued along similar lines in the course of critici-
sing the rate and forms of development in and around the 
bantustans thus far. He wrote: 
"The results of the border development programme are 
partly satisfactory and partly unsatisfactory from a 
political point of view. They are satisfactory 
insofar as the Permanent Committee has proved that 
genuine industrial resettlement can be canalised 
The unsatisfactory part of the results is that little 
attention has indeed been paid to the priorities of 
geographical distribution from a political point of 
view. Relatively speaking, far too much emphasis has 
been laid on certain areas, and far too little on 
others." (78) 
Lombard argues for the development of industries within th(~ 
bantustans, by subsidised private capital, not only to directly 
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strengthen the political structures, but also to absorb as many 
as possible of those peop1e coming onto the labour market in the 
bantustans. 
While it is undoubtedly true that the two goals, absorption 
of labour and strengthening of political structures are linked, - ·~ -- - ~~--~-- --- ~. ~-.-- _ ____,.. 
they are not necessarily entirely complementary policy objectives. ( 
The political significance of bantustan industrialisation is not \ 
only connected to the number of jobs it creates. Not only are \ 
central state structures to be strengthened but also regional 
structures. The distribution of industrial development directly 
affects the structures of the region within which it is located. 
In terms of the job creation objective, the planning tendency 
would be to locate the most favourably located sites and to 
concentrate industry around them. Regional political considera-
tions would favour the widest possible distribution of industrial 
development. 
The tension between these two objectives can be detected at 
two levels: firstly, as regards the distribution of industry 
between bantustans and, secondly, with reference to the distribu-
tion of industry within bantustans. . Table 2.2 clearly indicates ) 
that some bantustans, or locations within them, are far more 
"' attractive to- private investors than others. These are the 
locations where relatively high levels of private investment 
have taken place, and where the ratio between corporation invest-
ment and private investment is relatively. low. The clearest 
example of a relatively favoured investment site is Bophuthatswana, 
where the bulk of private investment in indust\Y has been located 
in Babelegi. In 1978, the last year for which figures for all 
the bantustans are available, private investment ih industry in 
Bophuthatswana, at R62 368 000 stood at almost half the total 
private investment in all bantustan industry - R127 881 000. Of 
the rest, according to Table 2.2, the more favourable sites 
would appear to be located in Kwazulu and Lebowa. Though 
private investment in the Transkei, at R30 932 000 was relatively 
high, the level of corporation investment required to entice 
private investment was very high, at R51 080 000. From the 
point of view of encouraging investmE;nt, and thus the creation 
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of employment, it would appear that state finance would be most 
efficiently allocated to sites in Bophuthatswana, Lebowa, and 
Kwazulu which, not unexpectedly, are the bantustans located 
relatively close to major industrial centres. The recently 
created Kwandebele would probably also fall into this category. 
But, when the distribution of development corporation 
finance is examined, it can be seen that only half the amount 
spent by 1978 went to these three bantustans; about R63 000 000 
out of about R125 000 000. If the amount spent on infrastructu-
ral development was added (unfortunately these figures are 
unobtainable), it would very probably be the case that an even 
greater proportion was spent on the bantustans which attract 
. investment w.,:i.t1:Lsggie __ diffiCIJ~ty. Thus, it would appear that 
the political considerations of bantustan industry play an ,. 
important role in its distribution. 
If one examines the location of growth points within bantu-
stans similar conclusions can be drawn. Instead of focussing 
on the best located industrial site, industrialisation efforts 
are frequently distributed amongst several. In the Ciskei, for 
example, at one time five locations were considered industrial 
growth points: Sada, Alice, Dimbaza, Mdantsane and Middledrift. 
Subsequently some have been dropped and others added (see Chapter 
six). Once again, the distribution of development efforts can 
only be explained in terms of the need to distribute the political 
advantages of industrialisation across the bantustans. 
There is undoubtedly a trade-off between the goal of job 
creation, entailing the "efficient." distribution of the state's 
resources, and the politically required distribution of industrial·· 
activity between bantustans and within bantustans. In recent : 
years this has been clearly recognised in industrial decentralisa-
ti on. The introduction of the concept of deconcentration 
points, located relatively close to existing industrial centres 
indicated the increasing emphasis granted to employment creation 
objectives. Through the course of the 1970s, however, it would 
seem that the greatest emphasis was laid on the broad distribution 
of growth points. 
8~. 
III Industrial Decentralisation and Bantustan 
Industrialisation - The Institutionalisation of Contradiction 
It was argued in the first part of this chapter that different 
state apparatuses, though linked with regard to the broad formula-
tion and execution of policy, might be imbued with policy 
objectives which do not entirely correspond. This, it was 
argued, might be a product of the respective apparatuses represen-
ting differing compositions of the ruling class alliance, and of 
their being subject to differing pressures from ·the dominated 
classes. Struggles are reflected in the apparatuses of the 
state. 
Different policy objectives are evident amongst the various 
state apparatuses involved in industrial decentralisation. In 
arguing along these lines, I take issue with the position put 
forward by Nolutshungu with regard to the role of state apparatu-
ses in the development and administration of industrial decentra-
lisation. (It should be noted that Nolutshungu is amongst the 
very few writers on aecentralisa tion who takes the question of 
the relationship between state apparatuses at all seriously). 
Nolutshungu argued the following: that bantustan industria-
lisation, like industrial decentralisation in general, can only 
be understooq as a consequence of broad economic developments -
it is not primarily political in form (7~); and that the develop-
ment corporations responsible for bantustan industrialisation 
initiatives must therefore be seen as "offshoots of the decentra-
lisation policy for all that they incorporate other aims as 
well" ( 80). In support of these arguments ,he points to the 
emergence of economic planning in South Africa in the early 
1960s and argues that the institutions developed for this purpose 
are responsible for the formulation and execution of industrial 
decentralisation as a whole. (81) 
A brief examination of the central institutions involved 
will, it . is argued here, suggest the need for a more complex 
analysis of the apparatuses involved in the execution of aspects 
of industrial decentralisation policy. 
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The economic planning apparatus that emerged in the early 
1960s, coinciding roughly, as Nolutshungu points out, with the 
reorientation of bantustan policy towards "self-government", 
consisted of two main parts: the establishment of a Department 
of Planning and the formation of an Economic Development Programme 
(E.D.P.). The first E.D.P. was published in 1963 and the 
Department of Planning was established in 1964. An important 
precursor of the latter was the Permanent Committee for the 
Location of Industry established-in 1960, and which continued to 
exist until 1971. 
In the hierarchy of government, these bodies had little 
clout. P. S. Rautenbach, then Secretary of the Department of 
Planning later wrote about the weakness of the department: 
"from the outset it was made exceedingly clear that 
this new department (of Planning) would not usurp the 
existing planning functions of other government depart-
ments." (82) 
As regards the Permanent Committee Rautenbach writes 
"its task was unenviable from the start .... Criticism, 
apathy and even obstruction was experienced in many 
quarters. Funds . . . were limited .... " ( 8 3) 
In short, despite being responsible for the controversial 
Physical Planning Act, or, at least, for its presentation, the 
Department of Planning never developed substance amongst the 
apparatuses of government. Perhaps the most pertinent indicator 
of the failure of the department is the fact that when Prime 
Minister P.W. Botha wished to strengthen the planning apparatuses 
for the purpose of preparing the Regional Development Programme, 
he abolished the Department of Planning and incorporated its 
functions into the Office of the Prime Minister. 
The Economic Development Programme, too,· had very little 
effect on the formulation of state economic policy. . Referring 
to the E.D.P. of the 1960s Dr Simon Brand, Economic Advisor to 
the Prime Minister wrote that evidence suggests that: 
"at least some private business firms had found the 
information framework provided by the E. D. P. of some 
use in their own forward planning, but that very 
little use ha9 actually been made by the government 
sphere of this planning instrument." (84) 
-
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The E.D. P. amounted to "perspective or indicative planning" 
which means little more than making predictions about the possible 
outcomes of some policy alternatives. 
its title was a misnomer. 
The term "Programme" in 
What went for economic planning structures in the 1960s 
were therefore of little substance. Indeed several government 
officials and ideologues have remarked in retrospect that the 
period was marked by a lack of coordination. (85) 
While Nolutshungu would seem to overstate the importance of 
economic planning structures, he underestimates the importance 
and power of the Department of Cooperation and Development. 
In 1979 the Riekert Commission noted, with surprising 
frankness, the tendency of the Department of Cooperation and 
Development to attempt to monopolise all aspects of matters 
concerning Africans, with some good measure of success: 
"The Commission can find no g9od and sufficient reason 
why ... the Department of Plural Relations and Develop-
ment (as it was then called) should operate as a 
"public service within a public service" in respect of 
the administration of matters affecting black persons." 
(86) 
The department had continued to behave as a Department of 
Native Affairs - a department responsible for almost all aspects 
of the affairs of Africans. Not least amongst these affairswas 
the economic development of the bantustans. 
The economic development of the bantustans had, ever since 
the formation of the Department of Native Affairs, fallen within 
its domain. Since 1936 most aspects of economic development, 
such as it was, in the bantustans came under the South African 
Native Trust. Clothed in the garbs of trusteeship, the S.A.N.T. 
was no more than a wing of the Department of Native Affairs. 
When in that year it was decided that economic development in 
.the bantustans had to be somewhat stepped up, the Bantu Investment 
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Corporation was established under the S.A.N.T. - which had been 
renamed the S.A. Bantu Trust. The S.A.B.T. also controlled the 
corporations subsequently spawned, from the Bantu Mining Corpora-
tion to the Venda National Development Corporation. 
Other state departments had little to do with the bantustans. 
Health and education in the bantustans, for example, were increa-
singly drawn into the ambit of the N.A.D. and its successors. 
As r~gards industrial decentralisation, between them the Corpora-
tions which fell under the Department of Cooperation and Develop-
ment had a large number of representatives on the Decentralisa-
tion Board. The reverse, however, was not the case. 
The fate of the National Physical Development Plan, it 
would seem, demonstrates both the weakness of the economic 
planning apparatuses and the strength of the Department of 
B.A.D. Issued by the Department of Planning and the Environment 
as an alternative, coordinated approach to industrial decentrali-
sation, it was quietly shelved. However, seven years after the 
N. P. D. P. was published the Regional Development Programme based 
on the former .Plan was launched. This was in 1982, three years 
after the Riekert Commission signalled the government's intention 
to restructure the Department of Cooperation and Development by 
limiting its powers. 
It could be argued that the Department of Cooperation and 
Development was shaped to match a particular set of objectives 
and that although the general objectives of the government began 
to shift in the 1970s the momentum of the Department was too 
great. Thus contradictions emerged. Parallel to that it 
might be argued that the Department of Planning and the Environment 
and the policies it expressed were premature in the 1960s and 
early seventies; that its policies only achieved weight when 
the department its elf was dissolved and its functions were 
incorporated in the Department of the Prime Minister. 
This argument may be basically correct, but it remains 
superficial. The interests represented by the various departments 
and the struggles from which policies emerge should be examined 
in more depth. Thus, for example, it might. be argued that the 
policies promoted by the Planning Department represent more 





ruling alliance. This is demonstrated, for example, by its 
push to open up fields' of investment whereas, in contrast, the 
tendency of the Department of Cooperation and Development is to 
maintain tight paternalistic controls, protecting the interests 
of the small farmers and white wage-earners. To sustain these 
arguments a great deal more evidence would have to be marshalled, 
yet it seems that they must point to the nature of some of the 
contradictions within the state apparatus. 
In this chapter it is argued that bantustan industrialisation 
can only be adequately analysed from a perspective which sees 
the state not only as representing the interests of the dominant 
alliance, but that it represents them in a complex way. State 
policy, though in general cohesive, must be examined as a collec-
tion of contradictory or potentially contradictory objectives. 
Which of those objectives achieves dominance at a particular 
time depends on both the nature of struggles in general during a 
particular phase and the make-up of the ruling alliance and 
power relations within the alliance. During the 1970s, when 
the bantustan industrialisation programme was launched, policy 
objectives and contradictions amongst them reflect the powerful 
interests of the Department of Cooperation and Development as 
well as the urgent political need to strengthen bantustan politi-
cal structures. This becomes more clearly evident when compared 
with the early 1980s during which, in terms of the Regional 
Development Programme, the Corpora ti on for Economic Development 
was dissolved and its bantustan development financing functions 
were taken over by the Development Bank which, unlike the C.E.D., 












( 1 ) 
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TABLE 3. 1 
URBAN AND RURAL AFRICAN POPULATION ( 1) 1911-1970 ( '000s) 
Total Urban African 
All Races African Total Male Female 
5 973 4 019 508 410 98 
6 929 (1,8)(2) 4 698 (1,6) 587 ( 1 '5) 440 (0,7) 147 ( 4' 1) 
9 590 (2,2) 6 597 (2,3) 142 (4,5) 785 (3,9) 357 ( 6' 1) 
11 418 (1,8) 7 832 (1,7) 689 ( 3, 4) 097 ( 3, 4) 592 (5,2) 
12 671 ( 2, 1) 8 560 (1,8) 2 329 (6,6) 424 (5,4) 904 (8,8) 
16 003 (2,6) 10 928 (2,8) 3 471 (4,5) 2 023 (4,0) 1 448 (5,4) 
21 794 (3, 1) 15 340 (3,4) 5 070 (3,9) 2 870 (3,6) 2 200 (4,3) 
Derived from South African Statistics 1980 p 1.7 presented as table 
1 in D.C. Hindson's thesis draft (unpublished) "Pass Offices and 
Labour Bureaux : An Analysis of the Development of a National System 
of Pass Controls in South Africa 1923 - 1980." 1981. 







AFRICAN POPULATION DISTRIBUTION 1950 - 1980 (1) 
Metropolitan Towns Rural Bantus tans Total 
1 452 800 751 000 3 025 700 3 439 400 8 669 400 
2 325 400 050 400 3 690 900 .4 440 200 11 506 900 
2 808'600 382 800 3 794 800 7 481 900 15 468 100 
3 915 600 691 100 4 310 000 11 055 600 20 972 300 
(1) Derived from Charles Simkins "The Distribution of the African Popula-
tion of South Africa by Age, Sex and Region-type 1950-1980" Paper 
presented to the S.A. Institute of Race Relations Conference on 
Urbanisation, October 1982, various tables. 
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TABLE 3.3 
NUMBER OF TEMPORARY MIGRANTS ABSENT FROM THE 
RURAL AREAS OF· SOUTH AFRICA ON CENSUS DAY (1) 
Year Men Women Total 
1936 409 000 67 000 476 000 
1946 415 000 122 000 537 000 
1960 671 000 216 000 887 000 
1970 035 000 260 000 1 295 000 
1975 232 000 303 000 535 000 
1980 451 000 182 000 633 000 (2) 
( 1) J. Nattrass "The Migrant Labour System and South African 
Economic Development", unpublished Ph.D Thesis, University 
of Natal, 1976. 
(2) J. Nattrass The South African Economy : Its Growth and 
Change, Oxford University Press, 1981. 
TABLE 3.4 


































AGRICULTURAL INDICATORS FOR TIIE RF.SERVF.S IN SELECTED YEARS. 
Production of . Production of Cattle Sheep Ploughs 
Maize - Tons Sorghum - Tons ( '000s) ( 'OOOs) 
292 748 133 837 1 680 3 016 
290 671 65 061 2 942 3 289 
(1926) 154 649 
153 368 94 971 3 906 4 675 184 848 
368 889 118 672 3 466 3 207 
(1937) 227 783 
240 137 69 085 3 899 3 655 
243 220 58 428 3 608 3 375 301 503 
271 358 52 739 3 350 3 358 314 247 
( 1955) 320 581 
328 355 71 002 3 771 3 722 
Source: Union Statistics for 50 Years Government Printer, Pretoria, 1960, 
Tables: I - 9; I - 11; I - 22. 
. Wagons and 
Trolleys 
(1926) 12 953 
18 096 
(1937) 17 648 
18 103 
20 793 
(1955) 21 490 
TABLE 3.6 
CONVICTIONS UNDER PASS LAWS FOR SELECTED YEARS. 
(Note: Only Convictions are recorded) 
1940 183 829 (1) 
1945 137 177 ( 1 ) 
1950 217 387 (1) 
1955 345 421 ( 1) 
1960 340 958 ( 2)( 3) 
1970 632 077 (4) 
(1) Source: Union Statistics for 50 Years (1960) p F.4 
(2) Source: S.A. Institute of Race Relations, Annual Survey, 
1964, p 138. 
(3) Note: In 1960 the anti pass campaign forced the government 
to suspend the implementation of the pass laws for a 
period pushing the numbers substantially below 1959's 
413 639. 
( 4) Source: Muriel Horrell (Compiler) Laws Affecting Race 
Relations in South Africa 1948 - 1976, S.A. Institute of 
Race Relations, 1978, p 194. 
TABLE 3.7 
TOTAL EMPLOYMENT IN THREE PRODUCTIVE SECTORS 
1960, 1970, 1980 (1) ('000s) 
1960 1970 1980 
White Agriculture 1 221 1 351 973 
(21, 3%)(2) ( 16' 7%) (9,3%) 
Mining & Quarrying 615 680 725 
(lO, 7%) (8,4%) (6,9%) 
Manufacturing 644 1 026 1 238 
(11,3%) ( 12' 6%)- ( 11'8%) 
( 1) Source: J. A. du Pisanie "Verwagte Regionale Verspreiding 
van Ekonomiese Aktiwiteite en Bevolking tot die jaar 
2000" BEPA, No 8, 1981. 
(2) Percentage of Economically active population. Note, du 
Pisanie's calculation of the e.a.p. is slightly higher 









Labour Supply . Employment 
7 112 000 
8 588 000 
9 497 000 
6 274 000 
7.113 000 
7 493 000 
Unemployment 
N 0/0 0. I' 
838 000 
255 000 




(1) Source: Charles Simkins "Structural Unemployment Revisited" 
SALDRU, 1982, Table 5. 
TABLE 3.9 
GROWTH IN STATE EMPLOYMENT IN SELECTED BANTUSTANS 
1973 - 1979 (1) 
































( 1) Source: Benbo Black Development in South Africa, 1976, 
Table B.9. 17 and Benso Statistical Survey of Black Develop-
ment 1980, Table 105. 
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CHAPTER 4 
POLITICS AND ECONOMICS IN 11IE HISTORY OF THE CISKEI. 
This brief historical sketch attempts to lay the groundwork for 
analysis of the Ciskei's industrialisation programme. The study 
focusses upon economic and political relations in the Ciskei over 
the past one hundred and fifty years. More precisely, it attempts, 
in a preliminary way, to draw out the way in which the economic 
conditions in the Ciskei and its position within the South African 
economy as a whole affect and are affected by the political and 
administrative structures pertaining in the Ciskei. 
A comprehensive history of the area now known as the Ciskei 
would be a task of some complexity. An initial difficulty would 
be defining the Ciskei geographically. Not only have the bounda-
ries of the Ciskei been frequently re-drawn in its short history 
as an administrative entity, but its current borders are still 
not entirely settled. Lennox Sebe's Ciskei National Independence 
Party accepted "independence" in 1981 before the Ciskei 's domain 
had been clearly defined and at a time when a good deal of land 
promised to the Ciskei had not been transferred. 
1. The Ciskei in the Nineteenth Century. 
The economic and political history of the area between the Great 
Fish River and Kei River, within which the Ciskei is located, 
was for several centuries before 1800 chiefly concerned with 
the activities of Xhosa speaking people who had lived there at I'-\ G-u"' l 
least since 1550. (1) By the late 18th century there had been a 
major split amongst the Xhosa - the people who lived in the south 
western part of the Transkei and those who lived up to and beyond 
the Great Fish River in the west. Those in the western part of 
the region became known as amaRf)artabe, and those in the east 
amaGcaleka, named after the sons of Phalo, first leaders of the 
two groupings. The Rfarfabesplit again into the Ngqika and the 
Ndlambe. ( 2) 
In the third decade of the 19th century, fugitives from 
Shaka' s wars fled south-west from Natal into the land of the 
Xhosa. Though they were composed of several Nguni speaking 
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groupings (the Bhele, the Zizi and the Hlube most importantly) 
the fugitives came to be known as the Mfengu, commonly corrupted 
into Fingo. According to Manona the name Mfengu derives from 
the fugitives having initiated communication with the Xhosa 
chiefs with the word "Siyamfenguze" ("We are hungry and seek 
shelter".). (3) 
Most Mfengu settled amongst the Gcaleka whose paramount 
chief, Hintsa, at tempted to incorporate them in a subordinate 
status. They served as economic producers and as soldiers to 
the Gcaleka. 
Some Mfengu notables were incorporated into the political 
and economic structures of the Gcaleka. However, those Mfengu 
who arrived in small groups, without substantial leaders or 
possessions, were distributed amongst Hintsa's people as servants. 
Their status is the subject of some dispute. The British, after 
the missionary John Ayliff, believed that the Mfengu were slaves 
of Hintsa's people. This justified their later actions. However, 
slavery in the European sense did not exist. (4) The Mfengu were 
held in an inferior position, without the full rights of the 
Xhosa whom they had settled among, but they were not chattel. 
After the passage of years the Mfengu might eventually have been 
fully absorbed. There was, nevertheless, ill-treatment of 
Mfengu, and economic tribute was extracted, particularly from 
those who were accumulating wealth. 
Two factors sowed hostility between the Mfengu and the 
Gcaleka almost from the start. The first was the fact that, 
having become accustomed to using iron,hoes in Natal, some Mfengu 
rapidly succeeded in cultivating crops more widely and effective-
ly than their hosts. Important amongst their crops was tobacco 
which they were able to cure, and trade over long distances. 
Through the sale some accumulated wealth mainly in the form of 
cattle. ( 5) Secondly, while the Gcaleka had always distanced 
themselves from the Methodist missionaries based in Butterworth, 
the Mfengu were relatively open to relations with the mission. 
The Reverend John Ayliff gained influence among some Mfengu, 
several of whom were then educated and converted. 
102. 
Antagonisms between the Mfengu and the Gcaleka were exploited { 
by the British colonists who eventually annexed the land between 
the Great Fish and the Kei rivers. The fissure between the 
Gcaleka and Mfengu widened during the Sixth Frontier.War. First 
the Mfengu defended the mission station and other whites in 
Butterworth against the Xhosa. The following year, 1835, saw 
almost a thousand Mfengu fight on the side of the colonists and 
play an important role in the defeat of the Xhosa. The Mfengu 
continued to act as auxiliaries to the British until the end of 
Xhosa military resistance in 1879. (5) 
In 18 35, in response to petitioning from Mf engu headmen, 
Governor of the Cape, Sir Benjamin D 'Urban moved 17 . 000 Mfengu 
out of Gcalekaland and settled them near the eastern bank of the 
Great Fish River. Having been unsuccessfully incorporated by 
Hintsa, partly as buffers against the Rfarfabe and against the 
colonists, Mfengu were settled on land formerly occupied by 
hostile Xhosa groups as a human buffer to protect the British 
from the increasingly pressurised Xhosa. (6) 
" 
From 1847 the larid between the Great Fish and the Kei came 
under direct colonial rule and it became known as British Kaffraria. 
The western part of former British Kaffraria is now the Ciskei, 
and the eastern part is the so-called "white corridor" between 
the Transkei and the Ciskei, also known as the Border district. 
The economic position of British Kaffraria between the 1830s 
and the 1890s can be divided into two phases. The earlier 
period saw the chief concern of the colonists as the securing of 
land for grazing and cul ti va ti on by settlers, and consequently 
the natives needed to be "pacified". In the later period the 
colonial state moved hesitantly towards incorporating black 
peasants into the merchant dominated trade economy of the Cape. 
During both periods cattle and labour was extracted from the 
indigenous people. 
Forms of administration roughly reflect this periodisation .. 
In the 1830s Governor D1 Urban sent agents into the region to 
control the chiefs and headmen. The agents were empowered to 
dispense justice and recruited policemen amongst the indigenous 
people. Under Sir George Napier the power of the chiefs was 
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further weakened and they were compensated with payments for the 
removal of judicial powers. In 1846 the British withdrew recogni-
tion of chieftainship in British Kaffraria and in i 848, after 
annexation and the declaration of martial law, Sir Harry Smith 
forbade the chiefs to recognise any authority other than Her Majesty 
Queen Victoria and her magistrates. (7) 
After the defeat of the Xhosa in the frontier war of 1850 -
1853, colonial policy towards British Kaffraria began to alter. 
Under Sir George Grey, Governor between 1854 and 1861, the establish-
ment of more systematic structures of control _coincided with 
moves to incorporate the region more fully into the economy of 
the Cape. The position of the chiefs was further weakened by 
the re-introduction of magistrates as judicial and administrative 
officers, and the sub-division of chiefs' domains into districts 
and sub-districts which were administered by headmen and sub-
headmen who were remunerated by the Crown. ( 8) Thus the chiefs, 
who were still paid annual stipends were weakened by the distribu-
tion of powers upwards to the magistrates and downwards to headmen 
and sub-headmen. Peires argues that the survival of "chiefship" 
was a consequence of African resistance to colonial control. 
The institution of chiefship had not been unambiguously revered 
by Africans. Chief ship did involve exploi ta ti ve relations, 
argues Peires. However, 
"Chiefship was supported because it was the symbolic focus 
of the cultural, religious, political and economic life 
of the people, and because the chiefs were in the 
forefront of resistance to the Europeans." (9) 
The power of the chiefs had rested on a combination of 
factors. While they had the right to dispense both justice and 
land for their followers, the re la ti ve abundance of land and 
increasing abundance of chiefs - until the 19th century - had 
meant that the ability of chiefs to command a following had 
rested on their leadership qualities, in addition to their lineage. (10) 
The system of administration deprived chiefs of most of their 
powers. Magistrates were given the power to allocate land and, 
under the Glen Grey Act (No 25 of 1894), magistrates chaired 
District Councils, made up of location councils' representatives 
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and appointed members. The council system, though widely rejected 
initially, began to operate effectively in the early part of this 
century. 
There is relatively little published material on the economic 
history of the Ciskei region in the 19th century. Bundy' s 
pathbreaking book is clearly the most significant, though when fAJJ~ 
Jack Lewis Is work becomes available it will undoubtedly take the '~';('~ 
study, not only of the Ciskei, but of the Reserves in general, I 
several steps forward. (11) In short, the economic history is 
the story of the economic decline of the region,. after a brief 
period of limited commodity production, to become little more / 
than a labour reserve of the South African economy by the end of 
the century. But the story is by no means as straight forward 
as the account of Monica Wilson, or even Colin Bundy, would seem 
to suggest. ( 12) Lewis in particular has pointed to the problems 
entailed in an analysis which depicts the rise of a peasantry in 
the third quarter of the 19th century and its rapid decline. (13) 
The Mfengu, settled by the British in land confiscated from 
the Xhosa in the Peddie district in 1835, were the · first of 
several groups of Mfengu to be settled by leasehold, · quitrent or 
freehold title in what is the Ciskei today. It was amongst 
these groups of people that commodity producers emerged at certain 
times~ The socially dislocated Mfengu people were more l_ikely 
to engage in trade, being less firmly tied than the Xhosa to 
non-capitalist power bases and ideological structures. The land 
grants were important too. Grants provided r~ vely ample 
quantities of land for cultivation while the forms of tenure 
weakened the influence of potential chiefly structures. 
The Xhosa chieftaincies in the region, in contrast, maintained 
a relatively tight-knit opposition to colonisation and commoditisa-
tion-. This led to two disastrous episodes in the 1850s, the 
decade during which the most southerly Nguni resistance was 
decisively broken, if not ended. Firstly, at the beginning of 
the decade, the major Xhosa chiefdoms and some allies launched a 
courageous all-out assault against the colonists. After initial 
successes, the Xhosa were crushed after a war which lasted between 
1850 and 1853. The Mfengu assisted in the downfall of the 
• 
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Xhosa, most importantly by uncovering the Xhosa's secret grain 
stores and thus cutting their supply lines. One of the consequen-
ces of the defeat was the expulsion of the Ngqika and their chief 
Sandile from the Keiskammahoek district and their replacement 
with Mfengu in villages subject to colonial administrative structu-
res. Land thus acquired by the Mfengu was known as "reward 
land". ~ 
Barely four years later, in ~ a millenarian prophecy 
called for the Xhosa to kill their cattle as a prelude to liberation. 
A great proportion of cattle held by the beleaguered Xhosa people 
was killed provoking a serious economic crisis amongst them. 
Though many people were forced to leave the region and seek work, 
the ideological resistance of the Xhosa to full incorporation 
within colonial political and economic structures remained strong. 
( 14) 
In Bundy's analysis peasant prosperity, for a minority 
emerged in the 1850s and 1860s and then declined after the 1870s 
in the Ciskei region. In districts further east the process 
began and ended later. (15) The volume and value of commodities 
sold by blacks undoubtedly reached its zenith during this era. 
However, Lewis has taken Bundy to task, suggesting that his 
research and analytical methods were inadequate. Lewis contests 
the appropriateness of the concept of "peasant prosperity" for 
the Ciskei. He argues that the marketing of commodities neither 4 7 
suggests that there was necessarily a prosperous peasantry, nor 9 
that it was simply a question of responding to market opportunities. 
Statistics indicate instead that the black agriculturalists who 
supplied the market were not prosperous, on the whole, particularly 
those who sold their produce to the Xhosa at the time of the 
cattle-killing. Bundy's use of the term "surplus" had suggested 
that marketed produce would necessarily be that over and above 
the amount of produce required for subsistence. ( 16) Instead, 
some Mfengu had to proceed "into the Cape colony for service ... 
in a very destitute state as they sold their corn to the Kaffirs 
during the time of starvation" as a contemporary observer pointed 
out. ( 17) 
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Whatever prosperity existed, argues Lewis, followed the 
expulsion' of the Gcaleka from the south-western Transkei and 
their replacement with Mfengu settlers from the Ciskei in 1865. 
This improved the person to land ratio in the Mfengu parts of the. 
Ciskei, particularly Victoria East. As plough ownership increased, 
a general increase in returns from agriculture was achieved for a 
relatively short period. Lewis therefore argues that the 
conditions for agricultural expansion, shortli ved as they were 
(until the mid 1870s), were created by the vagaries of colonial 
intervention in settlement patterns, rather than si~ply a response , 
to the market. To this is added his strongly made point that ) 1 
peasant prosperity in the Ciskei should not be exaggerated and, ' 
if it existed, lasted only between the mid-1860s and the mid-1870s. 
Lewis also stresses the stratification present in African 
society in the Ciskei, rooted in the pre-existing mode of produc-
tion. Though some peasant prosperity might have existed, it was 
thinly distributed, while the bulk of the population remained 
poor. (18) He suggests that the sale of produce was often merely 
a means of avoiding wage labour, but did not represent prosperity 
at all. ( 19) 
Further, Lewis makes the important connection between the 
growing power of the headman at the local level and the growing 
stratification of African society in the Ciskei. He suggests 
that as the homesteads disintegrated and stratification between 
the households proceeded, the colonial authorities and skilful 
collaborators were able to take advantage of the fragmentation of 
traditional power structures. (20) 
Bundy, too, points to the connection between changing economic 
structures and the decline of chiefship. He points to the 
importance of the supplantation of pastoralism by agriculture. 
Most importantly he shows that the production of grain by 
households, rather than homesteads, set up obstacles to the 
extraction of tribute by chiefs, particularly by paramount chiefs. 
( 21) 
William Beinart has similarly pointed to the relationship 
between the declining power of the Mpondo paramount chief and the 
introduction of grain cultivation and sale in Pondoland in the 
1880s. (22) It was difficult to levy each household or establish 
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what production levels were. In comparison counting and control-
ling the movement of cattle was a simple matter. 
Though some dispute may still exist over the interpretation 
I of trade in produce in the second half of the 19th century,~ ~agree that by the 1880s and 1890s conditions in the 
Ciskei were poor for the vast bulk of the population. British 
Kaffraria had been the battle field of the eastern frontier of 
the Cape, and had been ravaged by war and conquest. -Reserves 
scattered about the district were small and subject to increasing 
population pressure both as a consequence of internal growth and 
the slow return of Xhosa to the districts. As the demand for 
labour on the mines and in the towns grew, increasing numbers of 
men began to migrate to and from wage labour. 
Politically, the process of subordination of chiefs and the 
elevation of the relationship between magistrates, as the real 
chiefs, and headmen as petty officia_ls, had begun. This was to 
continue until the 1950s when the Bantu Authorities Act revived 
the institution of chiefship in a distorted form. (23) Chiefs 
did not disappear, but their real power was seriously weakened. 
2. The Hidden Half Century - 1900-1950. 
" ... Native conditions in the area between the Great Fish 
River and the Kei, conveniently known as the Cis-Kei, 
best illustrate the general confusion which threatens 
to engulf large areas throughout the rest of the Union. 
Poverty, congestion and chaos are worst in these districts 
... where the shortcomings of earlier attempts at Native 
Policy have had the longest to work themselves out." 
W.M. Macmillan, 1930. (24) 
Though·no systematic examination of the economy of the Ciskei 
region during the first half of · the twentieth century, W.M. 
Macmillan's remarks leave little room for doubt. 
J.B. Mc I. Daniel passes . over the period in one' sentence. 
"The first half of the twentieth century was a period of stagnation 
in the sphere of agriculture in the Ciskei. " ( 25) This is a 
misleading statement. All evidence suggests that, instead of 
f 
stagnating, conditions in the Ciskei deteriorated more or less . 
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Perhaps the most significant study of a district of the 
Ciskei was that undertaken by the Keiskammahoek Rural Survey 
(K.R.S.). Two years of fieldwork in six villages was published 
in four volumes in 1951 and 1952. ( 31) It is amongst the most 
detailed of district studies conducted in any South African 
Reserve. Its weakness, for historical purposes, is that it is 
essentially a synchronic, rather than a diachronic, analysis, 
though some historical trends are examined. 
One sentence encapsulates.the central finding of the survey: 
"None of the families living in the Kei.skammahoek 
district make a living out of farming and few of them 
have sufficient land to do so, even with considerably 
improved farming techniques." (32) 
The most fertile valley in the Ciskei had been reduced to 
poverty and had to rely on remittances from family members working 
away from home. Hobart Houghton and Edith Walton in the volume 
on the economy argued that by the time of the study the population 
of the district had exceeded saturation point. It stood at 
about 17 250 people. Population size increased by 10% between 
1921 _and 1946 notwithstanding a net emigration of about 3 000 
people between 1936 and 1946. (33) Agricultural production 
provided, at best, one half of the subsistence requirements of 
the district. In a bad year it provided as little as one-twentieth. 
Approximately one half of all adult men and one sixth of the 
women were absent at any time working as migrants in the towns or 
on the mines. (34) 
One interesting feature of the Survey was its findings on \ 
"'(- ~n~~~-c stratification. While it is often argued that the ' 
restrictions on development imposed by the state led to a process 
of "class levelling'" . in the Reserves - that all inhabitants were 
reduced to a common level of poverty (35) - the survey indicates 
that large differences in wealth and income existed. Houghton 
and Walton show that a very wide range of income9 existed though 
there were extremely few well-off families. More than half of 
the families surveyed had incomes between £13 and £52 per year; 
1,4% had incomes greater than £100 per year and could be regarded 
as relatively well-off, though not rich; and 9.2% of families 
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were destitute with annual incomes of less than £13. (36) State 
employment typically provided most of the income for the more 
weal thy. Typically, they would be employed as teachers, court 
interpreters or headmen. (37) At the other end of the spectrum 
the widowed or deserted families that owned and earned next to 
nothing, survived by reciprocities or the kindness of their 
neighbours. While large variations in the size of land holdings 
existed, between those who had none and those who had several 
hectares, no-one surveyed had sufficient land on which to make a 
living by farming. (38) 
In short, 1)~ combined to relegate the Reserves 
in the Ciskei (and elsewhere) to the status of labour reserves in 
. r.\ 
the early part of the 20th century. ( 1 Firstly, although land was 
supplemented by additions.after the 1936 Native Trust and Land 
Act these were very small and were generally areas on which 
rela tiJely lar:ge numbers of Africans were already living. ( 39) 
Thus fland hunge)~ grew and overcrowding became chronic. As plots 
~-... - . 
of land were passed down families the amount received by each 
heir shrunk rapidly. Increasing pressure was the continuous 
return of Xhosa people from the dispersion that followed the 
cattle-killing. Many settled on Trust- land but some were taken 
as tenants on quitrent and freehold land. This process, of 
course,accelerated in the 1960s and 1970s with the capitalisation 
of agriculture and 
2:_: Secondly, the 
tightened influx control. 
mi~n~~ to work on the ,_. - ·- - r ,, 
the towns expanded rapidly during the first half of 
mines and in 
this century. 
As statistics for the Cape are combined for the period under 
discussion, precise information is unobtainable but area studies 
such as that in Keiskammahoek indicate that by 1950 about half of 
the working males in Ciskei Reserves had become migrant labourers, 
at any one time. (40) Chamber of Mines data suggest that about 
8% of workers on the mines by the 1940s were drawn from the 
Ciskei. ( 4 1 ) 
{j) The third process was the agricultural smothering of the 
Ciskei Reserves by· surrounding white farms. It had been Sir 
George Grey's policy to scatter white settler land grants amongst 
Mfi:;ngu land grants in the 1850s. The pattern created resulted 
in the Ciskei Reserves being relatively small pieces of land 
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surrounded by white owned farms. A series of measures aided the 
development of white farming at the expense of African farming, 
and in the district, local relations of dependency emerged. (42) 
This could be contrasted, for example, with parts of the Transkei 
which formed relatively large, contiguous stretches of land, 
relatively insulated from white farming pressures. 
The sys tern of adminis tra ti on was consolidated by the Na ti ve 
Affairs Act (No 23 of 1920) which extended the council system to 
all Reserves, and provided for the formation of a General Council 
for each group of Reserves judged to constitute a Reserve territory. 
The Ciskei General Council, which comprised of representatives of 
each District Council (which was made up of delegates from Location 
Councils), was established in 1934. Magistrates became Native 
Commissioners and the Chief Magistrate became Chief Native Commis-
sioner. 
Each village had a headman who was paid and was relatively 
well-off as he could not migrate, who was responsible for local 
administrative and petty judicial decisions. Ostensibly elected 
by and responsible to the village (or location) council (consisting 
of all adult men) he had to be approved by the district's Native 
Commissioner, who was responsible for the district's legal and 
adminis tra ti ve affairs. The Na ti ve Commissioner was also ex 
officio chairman of the District Council. The General Council 
was chaired by the Chief Native Commissioner. 
Unnamed "radicals" interviewed by the K.R.S. described the 
administrative system thus: 
"The Native Commissioner is the Chief of the District. 
When he is placed as chairman over the Local (District) 
Council, he can only administer what prospers the 
government and not the people. The same applies to 
the Chief Native Commissioner as chairman of the General 
Council. . . . councillors are the "good boys" used as 
weapons against the people." (43) 
The structure of adminis tra ti on only resembled traditional 
local structures at the local level, and even at that level the 
headmen and sub-headmen did not necessarily relate appropriately 
to lineage structures. 
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It becomes increasingly clear that analyses, which draw 
analogies between the system of administration in the Reserves 
and ideal forms of indirect rule, or which see the basis of 
administrative structures in pre-capitalist modes of production 
which prevailed, for a time, in the Reserves, have to be regarded 
with some reservation. (44) Certainly in the Ciskei, and in the 
Transkei as Philip Mayer contends, direct rule prevailed and 
tribal relations were not conserved by the state. (45) At the 
economic level the existence of quitrent and similar forms of 
land tenure helped hold clans or lineage groups together by 
preserving a certain, if deteriorating constancy in land holding. 
But this did not contribute to the maintenance of wider tribal 
structures. At the ideological level what Mayer calls "School 
Ideology", associated with the influence of missionaries and 
schooling, was widespread in the Ciskei and was evolving into an 
ideology of protest. (46) 
3. From Bantu Authorities to Independence 1951 - 1981. 
As previous chapters have indicated, the state of the 1950s 
sought to resolve emerging social problems in the towns and 
cities by controlling influx into the towns and setting up politi-
cal structures in the Reserves which could be regarded as legitima-
te by their inhabitants and would strengthen the structures of 
control. It was in this context that the Bantu Authorities Act 
was framed. In short, its purpose was to reinstate chiefs as 
the "legitimate" leaders of Africans in the Reserves. 
In the Ciskei, as elsewhere, this involved the establishment 
of Tribal Authorities as the local administration for chiefs. At 
higher levels Regional Authorities and Terri to rial Authorities 
were to be created, the latter being established in the Ciskei in 
terms of Proclamation 496 of 1961. In practice it appears that 
Regional Authorities never came to much. In the Ciskei the 
implementation of the Bantu Authorities Act amounted to, perhaps 
to a greater extent than elsewhere, "a purposeful reconstruction 
of something which had to a large extent been destroyed." (47) 
Chiefdoms that had been ignored for decades were· restored, but 
with some serious complications. Existing administrative units 
did not always coincide with chiefly allegiance and conflicting 
loyalties occurred. 
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The state, by reviving chiefdoms, deliberately reconstituted 
the politics of patronage along ethnic lines. Section 2 (b) of 
the Act prescribes that a tribal authority be established in 
terms of a tribe or ethnic unit. The Councillors of a tribal 
authority are those members of the tribe who are acknowledged as 
councillors according to the customs of the tribe. Years of 
subsumption of ethnic differences had meant that Xhosa people had 
settled in Mfengu chiefdoms and vice versa. ( 48) Such people 
were rendered rightless in terms of local authorities. Conflicts 
along ethnic lines emerged as institutions were granted greater 
powers, even if those powers remained relatively petty. Politics 
in the Ciskei began to revolve more and more around the re-establi-
shed and newly established chieftaincies, leading to the emergence 
of competition along ethnic lines. Thus in 1961, when the 
Territorial Authprity was established in place of the old General 
Council, a Mfengu chief, Mabandla, refused to recognise the 
newly appointed paramount chief of the Xhosa. 
In 1967 people who regarded themselves as Mfengu leaders, 
fearing the growing power of the Xhosa majority petitioned for 
the partition of the Ciskei into Xhosa and Mfengu parts. Failing 
that,Mabandla accepted the Executive Councillorship of the revamped 
Territorial Authority (the "New Deal") . ( 49) When the lines 
were drawn after the 1973 election to what had now become the 
Ciskei Legislative Assembly, Lennox L. Sebe 's victorious Ciskei 
National Independence Party could be identified as Xhosa supported 
whereas Mabandla's Ciskei National Party was Mfengu based. 
The issue which most easily inflamed ethnic rivalry was the 
land issue. While Xhosa chiefdoms had been defeated, economically 
weakened by the "national suicide", ·and the people were dispersed 
across the country seeking land or jobs, Mfengu were settled with 
freehold or quitrent-title on whatever good land was not taken by 
white settlers. The Mfengu had been granted freehold or quitrent 
title to the land, which was mostly "reward land", for their role 
in the defeat of the Xhosa. The return of the Xhosa began 
immediately, but slowly. Some were incorporated on Mfengu owned 
land and others were settled on Trust land added to the Ciskei in 
terms of the 1936 Native Trust and Land Act. But in the 1960s 
the movement to the Ciskei was accelerated as a consequence of 
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the capitalisation of agriculture and resettlement programmes. 
(Resettlement also seriously affected Mfengu people, some of whom 
had been granted what were now called black spots.) 
The · demand for land grew rapidly. Many of those who 
resettled themselves (50) had no rights to land and were forced 
to rent land. When the immigrants were of a different ethnic 
group from those whose land they rented, the potential for tension 
and mobilisation by opportunistic politicians existed. One case 
illustrates the economic implications that ethnicity had gathered 
by the 1970s. A widow evicted from her home in Cradock moved to 
Peddie where she and her son were able to buy a plot of land. 
"We stayed in Peddie until there was a change in govern-
ment. When Sebe took over from Mabandla the Fingos in 
Peddie started fighting the Xhosa saying that they (the 
Xhosa) were on Sebe's side and must move. Then Sebe 
found people other places in Zwelitsha and Dimbaza so I 
bought a plot here." (Dimbaza) (51) 
As pressure for land increased politicians, usually chiefs, 
increasingly exploited ethnic tensions. They were able through 
these means to enhance their small political base - if they were 
able to deli yer the. goods - either land, jobs, housing or perhaps 
a school. This became the economic basis of the new chieftaincy 
- the power of the local authority to dispense goods and favours. 
A further basis for the power of the chiefs was that as the 
Native Commissioners were downgraded into magistrates, increasing 
police and judicial power came the way of the chiefs. Though 
they were meant to deal with cases that fell under customary law 
I 
only, they could and did exceed their powers. (52) 
At the central level of government the Ciskei Legislative 
Assembly (C.L.A.) came to be granted more powers. As in similar 
bodies in the past, the C.L.A. was dominated by chiefs appointed 
by the South African government. In 1972 30 of the 50 members 
were appointed chiefs. Though the number of members of the 
C.L.A. increased. the proportion of chiefs to elected members 
remained the same. With independence the power to appoint 
chiefs devolved onto Se be himself. The Ciskei therefore, has 
never had even a formally democratic government. 
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Despite its essentially undemocratic nature, the C. L.A. was 
the scene of lively debate and contestations for a few years 
following Sebe's victory in 1973. By 1979, debate had disappeared.~ 
In 1978 elections were held effectively under martial law and 
the opposition won no sea ts. Within a year the opposition 
dissolved and its chiefs in the C. L.A. crossed the floor. 
Mabandla was made Speaker of the House as a small compensation. 
It has been said that opposition members were left with little 
choice but to cross the floor as their constituencies or chiefdoITB 
were being deprived of services. (53) 
Amongst those issues hotly debated in the mid-seventies was 
the position of the chiefs. As chiefs formed the majority of 
the C. L.A. members, the two parties were forced to battle for 
allegiances. (54) Sebe was attacked, the implicit criticism 
being his commoner status. But as he and his advisors controlled 
the purse strings, he quickly won over most of the chiefs. 
Several new chieftaincies were created shortly after his electoral 
victory and all but one were Sebe supporters. (55) Sebe himself 
was made a chief in 1976 on the basis of very dubious evidence 
about his ancestors. (56) 
Debates in the C.L.A. seldom dealt in any great detail with 
the administrative responsibilities of the Cabinet. Indeed, it 
was widely understood that most ministers were little more than 
mouthpieces for the departmental secretaries - all of whom were 
white. In any case, Sebe soon sunk into the habit of frequently 
shuffling his cabinet. On occasions ministers, whose appointment 
soon became Sebe's sole responsibility (57) were fired for incompe-
tence. More frequently they were removed because they were 
becoming too powerful and were potentially threatening to Sebe. 
Early victims were Mr S.M. Burns Ncamashe and Mr R.B.D.R. Myataza. 
Many followed. Most recently the powerful Rev. Xaba, Minister 
of Agriculture, was removed from office ( 1983) and several of 
Se be' s relations in the Cabinet were detained. ( 58) The power 
of Sebe, who made himself Life President in 1983, became increa-
singly clearly the deadly combination of brute force and command 
over state resources in an extremely poor society. 
During the 1970s employmen~ in the Ciskei government grew 
very rapidly. Two periods of rapid growth stand out: the_ early 
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1970s with the South African government's new urgency towards the 
bantustans and the granting of self-governing status to the 
Ciskei in 1972, and the period preceding and following independence 
in December 1981. Employment by the Ciskei state increased from 
8 540 (8 247 Black) in 1973 to 12 462 (12 191 Black) in 1975. 
Between 1979 and 1981 it grew from 12 297 (12 043 Black) to 
14 492 (14 246 Black). If experiences in Bophuthatswana and the 
Transkei are analysed, growth of employment in the state sector 
tails off two or three years after "independence". (59) 
Of the approximately 13 000 workers in 1980 about 4 200 were 
teachers, 2 000 health workers (all levels), about 2 000 were 
semi-skilled or unskilled public works employees and the remainder 
worked directly in government service. (61) The state was the 
single most important employer of wage labour and the central 
locus of the middle class in the Ciskei. 
What has been examined in this chapter has been the evolving 
and changing relationship between political structures in the 
Ciskei, and economic relations within the Ciskei in the context 
of the Ciskei's economic position in South Africa. The destruc-
tion of the chieftaincies and their reconstruction alongside a 
new middle class not based in agriculture has been covered. 
Perhaps most importantly the new political phase that began in 
the 1950s has been pointed to. This phase marked the, initially 
slow shift towards the construction of a black elite combining 
bureaucrats, traders, teachers and peasants in a kind of comprador 
ruling class that would serve the interests of the South African 
ruling class. This area has just been touched upon in this 
chapter. It is the task of chapters five and six to examine 
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DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE AND POLITICS IN THE CISKEI. 
The peculiar demographic patterns produced by influx control, 
migrant labour and resettlement have had very deep . effects on 
every aspect of society in the Ciskei. The Ciskei is not unique 
amongst bantustans in this respect, though it must be said that 
the impact of resettlement on the Ciskei has been relatively more 
severe than on some larger bantustans, like the Transkei, where 
the numbers resettled have been relatively and absolutely smaller.(1) 
Aside from being examined in general works on resettlement, 
resettlement in the Ciskei has been the subject of several indivi-
dual studies. (2) Most substantial amongst them has been the 
Surplus Peoples Project's Eastern Cape Report. A study published 
by SALDRU on which the author collaborated with Pippa Green, 
focussed on the social and political impact of resettlement. (3) 
These studies have shown that the social fabric of the Ciskei has 
been altered fundamentally by demographic developments, particular-
ly those since 1960. 
1. Population Growth 1970 - 1980. 
The previous chapter indicated that as a consequence of various 
forms of immigration and influx control policies, the population 
of districts studied in the Ciskei has increased substantially 
over the last one hundred years. Between 1970 and 1980 it 
practically doubled again. _ 
Population statistics derived .from censuses are normally 
regarded with some suspicion. In South Africa bantustan popula-
tion data is particularly suspect. (4) In addition to conventional 
problems, analysing population trends in a bantus tan like the 
Ciskei presents special difficulties. Not only have the bounda-
ries of the Ciskei itself changed, but the magisterial districts 
themselves have altered. One notable instance for the Ciskei, 
for example, was the transference of the districts of Glen Grey 
and Herschel to the Transkei in 1976 in exchange for land 
contiguous to the northern section of the Ciskei. However, it 
has been possible to obtain data which allows for a comparison of 
population in the Ciskei in 1970 and 1980. 
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The Department of Statistics made available to the Ciskei 
(Quail) Commission data which would allow a comparison between 
like geographical definitions of the Ciskei in 1970 and 1979. 
This information was not published in full in the Commission's 
report but the author was granted access to the unpublished 
evidence delivered to the Commission. ( 5) The release of 1980 
census data in 1981 made possible the analysis of population 
trends in the Ciskei summarised in Table 5. 1. (6) The results 
of this analysis are confirmed by the similarity of results 
achieved by other researchers. (7) To summarise the most notable 
statistics: 
* between 1970 and 1980 the population of the Ciskei 
increased from 350 741 to 630 353 representing an 
average per annum increase of 6%; 
* if it is assumed, as seems fair, that the natural rate 
of growth of the African population of the Ciskei was 
2,7%, as was the case for Africans in South Africa as a 
whole, net immigration into the Ciskei amounted to 
172 537. people; 
* the size of the urban population in the Ciskei increased 
from 102 380 in 1970 to 228 539 in 1980 representing an 
average annual growth rate of 8,2%; 
* the rural population grew from 248 361 to 401 794, an 
average annual rate of 4,9%; 
* considerable regional variation is detectable with 
districts such as Hewu and Victoria East experiencing 
very high growth rates and Keiskammahoek and Middledrift 
having relatively slow population growth; 
* by and large the level ~f increase of men and women was V 
equal, though men start from a lower numerical base - /· 
therefore registering a higher growth rate. 
For the structure of the population one still has to rely on 
the 1970 census data. It found that the male: female ratio in 
the 20 to 50 years age group was 30: 70 indicating high male 
"absenteeism", through migrant labour. (8) Mastourides has 
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indicated that the number of migrant workers from the Ciskei has 
increased very slowly between 1970 and 1981 from 52 000 (5,4% of 
the population) to 60 000 (4,5%) (9) which would probably produce 
a slight narrowing of sex differentials as table 5. 1 suggests. 
(See also Tabl.e 5.2 - Migrants and Commuters 1970 - 1981). 
An additional feature of the structure of the population is 
the low ratio of all people of working age, say between 20 and 
50, to people either too old or too young to work. ( 10) That 
indicates that, legally or otherwise, many men and women of 
working age seek employment outside the Ciskei. It also points 
to the facts that 1) old people were resettled (or dumped) in the 
Ciskei; they were not able to collect their. pensions outside 
(11), 2) the government has provided substantial primary school 
facilities in the Ciskei to force people to move there for their 
childrens' education. (12) 
It is not surprising, therefore, that the proportion of not 
economically active (n.e.a.) people in the Ciskei is inordinately 
high. Even more serious is the very high unemployment rate. 
No accurate records of unemployment are kept for blacks in South 
Africa. However, the S. P. P. established unemployment rates in 
resettlement locations at generally between 30 and 40%. (13) This 
is higher than the general level in the Ciskei but not'by much, 
argue the S. P. P. ( 14) ·However, a recent Commission of Inquiry 
(Swart) appointed by the Ciskei government estimated that unemploy-
ment .stood at 225 000 people, or 50% of the economically active 
Ce.a.) population. It does not explain how these figures are 
arrived at. ( 15) Unemployment is undoubtedly very high, if not 
quite as high as the Swart Commission suggests. 
2. Sources of Resettled People. 
According to the Minister of Cooperation and Development, Dr Piet 
Koornhof, the number of people resettled in the Ciskei between 
1970 and 1980 (in terms of Section 5 of the Black Administration 
Act No 38 of 1927) was 40 601. ( 16) This figure amounts to less 
than 25% of the total net influx into the Ciskei calculated 
above. 
reasons. 
This is explained by one or a combination of the following 
Firstly the Minister may have been mistaken; secondly, 
resettlement is not only carried out under the Black Administration 
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Act (17); and thirdly a good deal of influx into the Ciskei was 
voluntary - in the sense that it was not directly carried out by 
government agents. Many people were left with no realistic 
al terna ti ve but to go to the Ciskei and did so under their own 
steam. 
By far the most important source of people resettled in the 
Ciskei is the rural Cape - the farms and villages. It has been 
estimated that close on 70 000 of net immigrants into the Ciskei 
come from the farms alone. A further 11 000 to 12 000 were 
drawn from small country towns. ( 18) Investigation has indicated 
that evictions from white farms are consequences of declining v-
employment on the farms, particularly casual labour. Mechanisa-
tion plays a relatively small role in the expulsion of labour v 
from farms in the Karoo and Eastern Cape, the regions from which 
the bulk of rural immigrants come. More important is the centra-
lisation of ownership and consolidation of land holdings which, 
in stock farming districts, allow the shedding of labour. (19) 
Some families that had lived on farms were simply evicted. 
Others left when life became intolerable, hoping that they would 
find ·sanctuary in the Ciskei. Some were promised land, which 
they could farm, by opportunistic Ciskei politicians (see below), 
though very few rece.i ved ;;my. Some people who left the farms 
went to the country towns; others went to cities such as Port 
Elizabeth and Cape Town, from which they were frequently expelled 
under influx control regulations_ and sent to the Ciskei. Those 
who moved voluntarily to the Ciskei saw it as the only secure 
site of residence, where state housing could be obtained, or they 
moved there in order to gain access to social security payments 
which were only paid out inside the Ciskei, at a particular 
magistrate's office. (20) 
A second significant form of resettlement for the Ciskei 
was the .. urban removals that occurred on a large scale during the 
1960s and 1970s. Towns located re la ti vely near the Ciskei would 
have their townships for Africans relocated inside the Ciskei. 
Re la ti vely near in the government's terms could mean up to 40 
kilometers distant. Small towns such as Stutterheim have had 
their location moved, turning African workers into "frontier 
commuters". The most important instance of urban relocation in 
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the Eastern Cape has been the attempt to eliminate Duncan Village, 
the African suburb of East London, and move all Africans from 
East London to Mdantsane, a new town 20 kilometers away, inside 
the Ciskei. Many thousands have been moved. The S.P.P. estimate 
that up to 110 000 people have been moved out of Duncan Village 
between 1964 and 1982 - however, many thousands may have returned 
to Duncan Village once or several times. In 1980 about 40 000 
still remained in Duncan Village, while the population of Mdantsane 
was estimated to be greater than 300 000. 
One important example of large scale voluntary resettlement 
was the mass exodus from the Transkei in 1976. Many thousands 
of people, estimated at between 32 000 and 51 000, fled the 
Herschel and Glen Grey districts. These districts had recently 
been transferred from the Ciskei to the Transkei, which was about. 
to become independent. The people feared the actions of the 
Matanzima regime. In addition, they were encouraged to move to 
the farm Thornhill, which had recently been incorporated into the 
Ciskei, by ambitious politicians seeking to increase the size of 
their following. The thousands who moved found disastrously 
inadequate facilities when they arrived in Thornhill in July 1976. 
Many of those who survived the appalling winter slowly left 
Thornhill, some, it appears, returning to Herschel. (22) 
Other forms of resettlement have contributed to the overcrow-
ding of the Ciskei. Amongst them are the implementation of both 
influx control regulations and measures in terms of the coloured 
labour preference policy throughout the Cape, west of Aliwal 
North after the Eiselen Line moved east in 1967. Even farms are 
subject to coloured labour preference policy. In addition there 
have been squatter and labour tenant removals from farms, black 
spot and homeland consolidation removals and removals within the 
Ciskei its elf, usually connected with betterment or irrigation 
schemes. 
The causes of resettlement were briefly discussed in Chapter 
three. What the brief survey above has reiterated is that there 
are several forms of relocation and that the causes of resettlement 
are complex, making simplistic explanations questionable. Two 
fairly common explanations. rendered inadequate by examination of 
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the Ciskei data are 1) that resettlement can only be understood 
in "ideological terms" - as part of a grand apartheid plan that 
demands conformity; and 2) that resettlement is primarily designed 
to develop the cheap labour system through migrant labour. 
Neither explanation is entirely incorrect, but nor are they 
remotely adequate. 
Arguments which revolve around "apartheid ideology" tend to 
ignore the objective processes at work which dispossess people 
and render them homeless. (23) Most important is the process of -
expulsion of people from the land as capitalist accumulation 
proceeds in the countryside. What happens in South Africa is 
that for political reasons those expelled from the land, if they 
are African, are prevented from migrating to the large industrial 
towns. Instead a form of urbanisation occurs in the bantustans. 
The resettlement programmes have evolved in an efficiently functio-; 
ning capitalist social formation and the links between the develop-
ment of capitalism and the evolution of relocation are visible to 
those who penetrate the apparently irrational appearance of 
events. 
One must not, however, go to the opposite extreme and attempt 
to explain relocation in terms of the economic requirements of 
capitalist development. An article by Marian Lacey suggests the' 
following line of reasoning: migrant labour, which is cheaper 
and easier to disorganise than settled urban labour, is the basis 
of capitalist development in South Africa; the pre-condition for 
migrant labour is the existence of large pools of unemployed 
people in the bantustans; and resettlement of people to the 
bantustans is essentially the extension and deepening of the 
migrant labour system. (24) 
It is true that many men in resettled families become migrant 
workers, though it is instructive to note that while resettlement 
escalated in the 1970s in the Ciskei, migrant labour grew very 
slowly (compare tables 5. 1 and 5.2). Some resettlement camps or 
towns have high proportions of men of working age undertaking 
contracted employment in distant places. However, the connection 
between resettlement and migrant labour is more complex. 
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The key question is whether migrant labour is necessarily 
cheaper for capital when the families in the bantustans have no 
other means of support and are totally dependent on migrant 
workers remittances. In the resettlement camps too, the state 
has to provide housing and basic social services. The houses 
eventually built in Sada, for example, are hardly different from 
many existing in Guguletu or Soweto. Migrant labour may not be 
suitable for sophisticated production processes where high levels 
of training and job continuity are required. This is an additional 
reason to question the cheap migrant labour thesis .as the central 
explanation for resettlement. 
It is certainly true that some resettlement towns exhibit 
relatively high levels of migrancy to and from distant work 
places. In the Ciskei, Sada is a case in point. However, 
there are also many resettlement areas that have extremely high 
levels of unemployment, far higher than needed for a pool of 
labour. The S.P.P. report argues that 
"There is good reason to believe that these poorer places 
may be representative of most resettlement sites in the 
Ciskei " 
Further: 
"The incidence of poverty among rural communities is in 
·all likelihood as high as among the mass of resettled 
people." (25) 
Why has relocation continued under these circumstances? The 
migrant labour argument cannot answer that question. Relocation 
is a consequence of the political and economic form of capitalist 
development in South Africa, as discussed in Chapter three. · In I 
this section it has not only been intended to repeat the argument 
that resettlement is a complex product of the form of capitalist 
development in South Africa. I~ addition the point that needed 
to be made is that resettlement has contributed to poverty throug-
out the Ciskei, though it is more serious in some regions. This 
has implications for the social organisation and control of 
settlements in the Ciskei. 
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3. The Sites of Relocation. 
The sites at which resettled people are deposited can be distinguished 
in two main categories. Those which display some basic characte-
ristics of urban living, particularly the existence, in the 
vicinity, of some employment possibilities, and those which 
contain some basic services can be classified broadly as resettle---ment towns. For those whose only resemblance to urban living is 
~-
a concentration of people, with, perhaps, minimal services, the 
term closer settlement is used. These conform to the conception 
of resettlement camps - totally inadequate settlements. These 
definitions should not be regarded as absolute categories but, 
rather, the polarities of a continuum. 
In the Ciskei the categories tend to follow a regional 
pattern. In the south-eastern part, in the periphery of the 
East London-Berlin-King Williamstown axis, resettlement sites 
tend to be classifiable as towns; Mdantsane, Zwelitsha and to a 
lesser extent Dimbaza are the best examples. However, even in 
this region the huge sprawling settlement of Ndevana lacks basic 
y.rban facilities and _-is as underdeveloped as any settlement in 
the Ciskei. (26) Resettlement towns tend to have a relatively 
higher standard of living, a higher proportion of the population 
employed in industry and fopms of administration and control more 
closely approximating conventional African townships in South 
Africa. The Mdantsane Town Council exemplifies the most highly 
developed administrative structure in a resettlement town. 
Closer settlements, on the other hand, are located predominant-
ly in the north-western part of the Ciskei, in the Hewu district, 
though there are some such sites in Victoria East and Peddie in 
the west - Glenmore and Kammaskraal, for example. In the semi-
desert Hewu district, however, there are a large number of closer 
settlements some of which are quite well known, such as Thornhill, 
Oxton and Zwelidinga, and others whose existence is barely recorded 
such as Tentergate and Tentergate No 2. (27) These places are 
primitively constructed, the standard of living in them is very 
low, unemployment is high and very rudimentary forms of administra-
tion exist. Sada is also situated in Hewu but while there are 
few employment opportunities in the vicinity, Sada is well integra-
ted into the migrant labour network and exhibits more urban 
characteristics. 
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There is an additional form of resettlement that is difficult 
to research but appears to be very important in some districts. 
In many cases refugees from farms and country towns have moved to 
rural ·villages in the Ciskei. There they have · either asserted 
their hereditary rights to land or, at least, accommodation, or 
they have become tenants or sharecroppers. The Gaga Valley 
area in Victoria East, for example, appears to have rapidly 
filled up in this way. ( 28) Indeed, the quite substantial rate 
of population increase in Victoria East can only be fully explained 
when this form of resettlement is taken into account. Manona 
has described the effects of this process in the. village of 
Nyanyso in the Peddie district. (29) 
4. Social Cohesion and Disintegration in the Ciskei. 
Attempts to re-establish chiefships in the 1950s were based on 
very little substance, as has been shown in Chapter four. The 
political and ideological relations on which they were based had 
been weakened by the influence of missionaries and schooling and 
also by the form of direct rule imposed between the mid-nineteenth 
century and 1951. At an economic level traditional relationships 
had been weakened by shrinking land holdings, increased landless-
ness and the variety of land tenure systems created for the 
Reserves. The position of chief was often further nuanced by 
the betterment schemes of the 1950s and early 1960s. 
In spite of the disappearance of conditions of existence for 
traditional Xhosa or Mfengu culture, the people living in the 
Ciskei had not been politically or culturally assimilated into 
the dominant structures of South African society. Old systems 
had broken down but nothing had been provided in their place. In 
consequence remnants of old political and ideological structures 
remained, albeit in distorted forms. 
An adequate understanding of social forms in the Reserves 
rests on a conception of historical time that presupposes the 
existence of relatively autonomous political, ideological and 
economic spheres. The concept of "relative autonomy" is one 
which many social scientists writing in the historical materialist 
tradition have scorned. It does not conform to the marxist 
orthodoxy which argues that history can be understood in terms of 
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a cultural and political superstructure which always conforms to 
a determining economic base. When the superstructure defies 
explanation, this approach argues, our understanding of the base 
must be inadequate. 
But, as Al thusser argues, the spheres, or levels, do not 
have exactly "the same type of historical existence. On the 
contrary, we have to assign to each level a peculiar time and 
history. 11 ( 30) This is not an escape route, a way of avoiding the 
necessity of reconciling base and superstructure. Its implications 
for historians are quite the opposite. Concepts like "unevenness 
of development", "survivals" or "backwardness (in consciousness)" 
have to be interrogated and explained. The level to which the 
phenomenon pertains has to be analysed, as well as the articulation 
of that level with the whole of society. (31) 
The persistence of elements of traditional Xhosa and Mfengu 
society should be explained not only in terms of the changing 
economic base but also in terms of an historical study of culture 
in the Ciskei. Little work of this kind has been done and less 
from an historical materialist perspective. The most useful 
work is that done by Philip Mayer whose work provides an impressive-
ly broad sweep of history, and the work of Cecil Manona who 
prefers microstudies. (32) Both utilise quite eclectic methodolo- / 
gies. Mayer, though not a marxist, makes full use of marxist 
analyses and refers to Althusser's work. 
Mayer's work shows how Xho.sa traditionalist (or "Red") 
culture was able to persist, albeit in new guises, at the clan 
and village level. This occurs in spite of and is a form of 
response to the disintegrating social and economic circumstances 
that confronted inhabitants of the Ciskei. Mayer argues that, 
as late as the 1950s: 
"The Red way continued to provide a coherent moral 
philosophy which instructed people how to live their 
lives in the villages in ways as uncontaminated as 
possible by those of the whites whom they held responsi-




Red culture provided a form of insulation from the moral 
decay that threatened people ravaged by a racialist form of 
capitalism, and by the migrant labour system. Yet at the same 
time Mayer demonstrates that the moral tenets of Red society -
the sane ti ty of the homestead ( 11umzi 11 ), fitted in remarkably well 
I 
with 11 the requirements of a smoothly working system of oscillating 
migration .... 11 ( 34) While sufficient conditions for its existence 
remained, this traditionalist Xhosa culture had the complex role 
of both enabling the continued cohesion of rural villages and 
supporting the continuation of the migrant labour system. 
What Mayer is arguing is that in spite of the collapse of 
the non-capitalist mode of production and the destructive effects 
of direct rule on chiefly structures resilience existed at the 
umzi level at least until the 1950s. 
Amongst the school people, however, the expectations created 
by mission influence gave rise to an ideology of protest somewhat 
earlier, though it did not take a mass form, by and large. 
5. The Undermining of Social Control. ---,.,...------
Since the 1950s, however, f~r g~l processes have combined to 
~~ ~ -T--
radically undermine whatever elements of conservative social 
relations and ideology remained. ~ They are the ~'~iterment schemes 
of the late 1950s and since; re~lement and overcrowding; the 
0 extension of migrant labour-and- its increasing importance; and 
~ the changing political st!'~ct:ires ._ . 
The betterment schemes are examined through an example in 
Chapter six. Two aspects of the schemes bear on the argument 
here. Firstiy, there is the fact that while many betterment 
schemes achieved little else, most did entail the abolition of 
scattered homesteads. They were regrouped into densely populated 
compact villages. Secondly, in many cases the use of land was 
reorganised under betterment schemes. Even when people were not 
deprived of their land rights, the reallocation of land to 
specified uses, cattle culling, and reorganised production processes 
disrupted existing patterns. In addition the method of implemen-
ting betterment provoked opposition. Though 11 the people 11 were 
meant to be consulted, this rarely occurred and this provoked 




the headmen who were clearly powerless to alter policy on their 
own. 
* * * * * * 
The impact of resettlement will be dealt with in greater detail. 
In the case of resettlement towns, the effects are quite obvious. 
Urban communities oriented towards wage labour accelerate the { 
development of the forms of CQ!1SCiousne!:_?s that one might expect 
in capitalist societies. Very often traditional customs, such 
as male initiation, remain, as they do in Cape Town or Port 
Elizabeth, but they become relatively meaningless .rituals rather 
than essential facets of everyday culture. The Mdantsanes and 
the Zwelitshas of today present bantustan government with entirely 
new problems - problems which certainly could not be met by the 
structures of social control envisaged in the Bantu Authorities 
Act. 
The more rudimentary towns and the closer settlements share 
some features of the towns. ( 35) Most importantly, they have no 
rural base and a proportion of their inhabitants are dependent 
on wage labour. Like the towns, a substantial section depends 
on social security payments which, small as they are, are often 
the sole income of a household. There are important differences, 
too. Some closer settlements may be culturally homogeneous 
having the same point of origin though others may be randomly 
thrown together. Some inhabitants of closer settlements have 
fairly comfortable relations with the people who were moved to 
adjacent land to make room for the grim rows of rudimentary 
shelters, some are deeply resent~d. Some are blessed with 
regional chiefs who pay some attention to their concerns, for 
whatever reasons, others are cynically neglected. A generalisa-
tion that is possible, though, is that people moved to closer 
settlements are soon forced into a process of questioning, dismayed 
as they are by their new surroundings. Often they have been 
made false promises; sometimes they merely had false hopes. 
Sada is the largest long-settled closer settlement and in 
many ways represents the future for more recently established 
rural ghettos. A sprawling township, it now has a population of 
between 35 000 and 40 000 people, including the mud hut settlement 
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on its western periphery. Most arrived during two waves in the 
early- and mid-seventies and were refugees from farms from which 
they had been forced to leave, physically or otherwise. They 
came from all parts of the F.astern Cape and some from beyond, 
making up a fragmented new community. Far from fitting into the 
existing political order it seems that the newcomers were resented 
by the local Shiloh chief and his followers. ( 36) The settlers 
found themselves in a rudimentary settlement located on what 
formerly had been a cattle-post for the Shiloh people. The 
latter were compensated with an irrigation scheme, but it had not 
been very successfui and failed to mollify the cattle owners of 
Shiloh. 
As for the people of Sada, they have no agricultural future 
and are fully aware of it: 
"We have no land here and no livestock. In Whittlesea 
we had one cow but no land. The office people made my 
wife sell the cow before she left Whittlesea, because 
they said there was no room for livestock in Sada. 
This is a township so no livestock is allowed. The 
land outside the camp is for Shiloh people only and 
people inside Sada cannot use it." (37) 
For people who had been squatters or labour tenants on farms 
the decline was still worse. Though some have found employment 
nearby most income derives from migrant labour, mainly on the 
Witwatersrand. 
In spite of the urban nature of the settlement (though jobs 
and services are thin on the ground), the political structure 
created peculiarly resembles Bantu Authorities style rural structu-
res. Sada is divided into zones/wards and in each zone there is 
a headman appointed by the Ciskei government. The headmen from 
all zones sit on a committee which people must approach if they 
have complaints or require housing or social security payments. 
Local jobs are often also allocated through this structure. But 
the headmen are not like traditional headmen; they do not necessa-
rily emerge from a traditional lineage - indeed, their roots may 
be extremely shallow. One, I was informed, was a recently 
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settled shopkeeper from Paarl. (38) The leader of the towfship 
was not a chief, but a commoner M. P. in the Ciskei government, 
who also happened to be a shopkeeper. Access to jobs, housing 
or influence for Sada citizens is not obtained by hereditary 
right, but rather by paid-up membership of Sebe's Ciskei National 
Independence Party. Even the distribution of contracts for 
migratory jobs seems to be influenced by this new form of patronage 
politics. 
Thus control over the inhabitants is obtained through the 
ability to dispense extremely scarce vital resources - in return 
submission to party and state is required. As a teacher remarked: 
". . . Ciskei citizenship cards, even C. N. I. P. membership 
cards (with proof that dues are paid) - having these 
extends to all things here - it is most important. " 
(39) 
But economic blackmail only works when there are rewards for 
the compliant, and not only are these extremely scarce, but they 
are increasingly distributed in a class b~ased fashion. It is 
difficult to attract members of the Ciskei state-petit-bourgeoisie 
to Sada. They have to be promised decent housing. This has 
meant that families have been ejected from their houses, at the 
slightest pretext, to make way for teachers and nurses. Often 
two families are ejected from one house to make way for one 
middle class family. They are forced to lodge in still worse 
conditions of overcrowding or to obtain mud huts in neighbouring 
Emandakeni. ( 40) Further, though Sada is relatively favoured in 
this respect amongst closer settlements, local and contract jobs 
are scarce and even the greatest submission cannot guarantee 
employment. So, while traditional forms of control have been 
remodelled to suit a community where there is little traditional 
ideological cohesion and absolutely no substance to it, the new 
. structures are limited by the availability of resources to distri-
bute. Even if housing improves, the battle for jobs has become 
desperate as the Hewu district overflows with unemployed resettled 
people. The ability of the Ciskei government to maintain order )r 
through consent, or at least passivity, is strained to the limit, [1 ' 
ultimately resting on disorganisation, demoralisation and force. 
* * * * * * 
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The effect of migration into existing rural communities, as has 
been noted, is not widely researched. Indeed it ·would be a very 
difficult and time-consuming subject to research. (41) Where the 
impact of resettlement of this kind has been examined it has been 
the by-product of broader research into a particular village. 
Manona has written up studies of two villages where resettlement 
has taken place. The findings of his study of Burnshill in the 
Keiskammahoek district would seem to represent a relatively 
common situation. 
Centrally he has shown that 
"The immigration of a large number of landless people 
into the village has increased landlessness which is 
contributing a great deal to the decline in agricultural 
production." (42) 
As a consequence, though the level of migrant labour has not 
increased dramatically, it has assumed increasing centrality 
vis-a-vis agriculture in the village. The importance of control', 
over land has declined and "the economic power has shifted from 
the senior to the working generation." (43) 
Young adults are increasingly independent of their parents 
and traditional marriage customs, including lobola, have suffered 
a serious decline. Kinship relations have weakened, coinciding 
with the weakening position of old people, and thus elders and 
headmen. Manona concludes: 
II today young people no longer conform to the norms 
and values which their parents uphold. The declining 
hold. of tradition is noticeable in both sections of the 
community (old residents and immigrants)". (44) 
Perhaps what immigration.into villages has done has been to 
hasten the process of overcrowding and thus undermine the role of 
the land in culture. Increased dependence on wage labour accele-
rates the changing consciousness. 
* * * * * * 
Under certain conditions an almost symbiotic relationship could 
be said to exist between the migrant labour system and non-capita-
list social structures and institutions. Mayer's discussion of 
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this issue has been mentioned above. The most important pre-
conditions for the maintenance of this relationship are sufficient 
land, cattle and time to farm them. Also important is the 
ability to retire at a sufficiently early age so that the older 
men could enjoy the fruits of twenty or thirty years' double 
laqour, and play their essential cultural and administrative role 
as elders. 
In certain parts of South and southern Africa the "developmen-
tal cycle of the domestic unit" that conforms to these conditions 
has been maintained to a greater or lesser extent .. Its nature 
and prevalence has been the subject of one of the most lively 
debates South Africa in recent amongst sociologists studying 
times. (45) While conditions for the reproduction of social 
relations resembling those under pre-capitalist modes of production I 
may still exist in parts of southern Africa, they are very rare 
and restricted to isolated rural communities. This emerges from 
the examples already cited, where betterment and different forms 
of resettlement have· seriously altered economic, social and 
political relations. 
There is further evidence, however, that suggests that in 
the Ciskei even areas relatively untouched by palpable external 
intrusions have moved steadily, if more slowly, along the path 
towards the total disintegration of old ideological and social 
structures. The work of De Wet and Bekker on the Amatola Basin 
illustrates this process by example. (46) 
The Amatola Basin, in the northern part of the Middledrift 
magisterial district, though subject to betterment villagisation 
in the 1960s, saw few major direct intrusions from the outside 
since the early sixties. The total population has increased 
very slowly, by not more than 25% between 1962 and 1982. (47) No 
white settlement had occurred in the valley and hardly any modern 
economic structures or infrastructure had developed. Nevertheless 
the gradually worsening land shortage had led to a drastically 
increased dependency on migrant labour as the major source of 
income, to the extent that one third of the area's population of 
6 000 is generally absent. Half the homesteads in Amatola 
derive more than half their monthly income from remittances from 
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distantly employed relatives, even though most families are 
involved in the agricultural economy of the basin to an extent, 
even if they have no rights to land or cattle. The quitrent 
held land is used by the owners themselves or sharecroppers or 
I 
tenants. 
As productivity on the land has declined, power has shifted 
away from elders and landowners to those who earn money and, 
importantly, the young and middle-aged women in the basin whom, 
Bekker and De Wet argue, often effectively head households and 
take major decisions, in addition to farming and running numerous 
voluntary associations. ( 48) The Tribal Authority - the "Gaika 
Mbo" - is, as are similar bodies elsewhere in the Ciskei, linked 
to a Regional Authority which in turn comes under the Ciskei 
legislature. The Tribal Authority is meant "to maintain the 
traditional values of local government by consensus" or, put ~ 
another way, to maintain social control, partly through recourse 
to traditional ideological and political superstructures, or 
their dim shadows. However, the elderly all male group of 
appointed councillors under a chief has "little legitimacy in the 
eyes of Basin residents." ( 49) This has occurred for two reasons 
- firstly, the fact that the Basin, physically and structurally 
isolated as it may be, has become so deeply integrated into and 
dependent on the migrant labour system that existing social 
hierarchies have been overturned. Young and middle aged men 
bring in wealth; their wives run much of what is left of the 
agricultural economy. No longer do the retired men have much 
control; it could be argued that the "development cycle" _has 
been broken or is breaking. In addition the local bodies have 
little autonomy from the Ciskei government and thus almost no 
effective decision-making powers. 
"Councillors are required to carry out directives from 
above in a community they know less and less; sub-headmen 
have few means of articulating villagers' grievances at 
the level of local government." (50) 
* * * * * * 
\ 
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In this section it has been shown that in towns or vi Hages 
products of, or affected by, resettlement, betterment or in-migra-
tion, the old political and administrative structures have lost , 
their substance. Even areas unaffected by direct intervention -
only by the restrictions on land occupation - growing economic 
pressures have whittled away the last vestiges of administration 
and social control along the old lines. And yet, it was in the 
1950s that the state attempted to reactivate the chiefly system, 
in a new form, in a reorganised pattern of political control. 
It is the new chiefs who are examined in the following section. 
6. The New Chiefs. 
When the South African government set about erecting new political 
structures in the bantustans in the 1950s it tried to pick up on 
those elements of past traditions amongst Africans that could 
contribute to the new system of administration. However, the 
plan as a whole overrode the sensitivities of African cultures. 
As a teacher in Bophuthatswana said: 
"A white man once said to me that he cannot tell one 
black face from another. It is just the same with the 
government. They cannot tell one tribal system from 
another. They treat them all as if they' re just the 
same when they introduce these new plans." (51) 
l
Chiefship was a peg on which to hang local administration, without 
too much democracy, and it became the basis for representation at 
legislature level. - It became a new locus of subaltern power. 
Appointment to the position of chief in the Ciskei offers 
the attractions of status and a high salary as chief and member 
of the Ciskei Assembly. Equally important is the fact that it 
offers access ·to economic power in the district over which the 
chief has jurisdiction. Decisions about land transfers, irriga-
tion schemes and the allocation of trading licences, for example, 
entail the authority of the chief concerned. Thus the chiefs 
have been inserted into the patron-client structure of Ciskei 
rule which rests on the state's virtual monopoly over meaningful 
economic resources. Perhaps it should be noted here that not 
only official chiefs but often "commoner" members of the Ciskei 
parliament are incorporated into the state structure in this way. 
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Particularly since the emergence of the one-party state in 1979 -
1981, distinctions between chiefs, M.P.s, bureaucrats and party 
officials, at the higher levels, have become increasingly difficult 
to discern. ( 52) 
Economic and political power is partially proportionate to 
the number of subjects within a chief's domain. This has led to 
some abuses. The most famous of these is the Thornhill affair. 
The excision of Glen Grey and Herschel from the Ciskei in 1976 
led to some restructuring of the Legislative Assembly and local 
government in the northern districts. Jockeying for power, 
chiefs attempting to consolidate their position encouraged thousands 
of people to leave Glen Grey and particularly Herschel and to 
settle in parts of Hewu, having promised their new subjects 
houses, infrastructure and grazing. Instead the unexpectedlylarge 
influx of about 40 000 people arrived to find nothing but tents. 
Before long many became diseased and many died. Karnrnaskraal 
s~milarly was a resettlement camp located where it was partly due 
to the influence of Chief M. Njokweni, then a member of the 
Ciskei Cabinet. Njokweni, it is believed; "had asked that the 
(Woolridge and Alexandria) people should be resettled at Kammaskraal 
so that his business interests could benefit". (53) 
Yet a further example derives from the activities of the 
notorious Se be family. When Lennox Se be was made a chief in 
1976, he encouraged landless families to settle on a farm recently 
added to the Ciskei. The place is called Ndevana. Before long 
it became a vast rural slum, housing well over 40 000 people, few 
of whom could pursue agricultural or pastoral activities. In 
nearby Ilitha the Sebe family run a supply store owned by former 
Ciskei Security and Army 9hief Charles Sebe's wife, and a bottle 
store owned by Lennox Sebe' s wife Virginia. ( 54) The M. P. for 
the Sada area is a Mr Myataza, a local businessman. He appears 
to be one of those "commoner chiefs" in practice; and had encoura-
ged settlement at Sada. (55) The official entrepeneur phenomenon 
is not restricted to the chief or M.P. level of government. In 
Sada in 1981 , for example, amongst the headmen appointed were a 
shopkeeper, recently imj_grated from Paarl and a teacher from 
King Williamstown. (56) 
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Certainly there are superficial resemblances between the 
structure of officialdom in the Ciskei today and the patterns of 
political organisation from the distant past of the Nguni people. 
The strength of a chiefdom was dependent on the number of followers 
a chief had. However, under that system, an essential form of 
sanction over chiefs was the ability of people to move from one 
chiefdom to another, or even to start a new one. That freedom 
of movement no longer exists. The old safeguards against severe 
forms of exploitation no longer exist. Chiefs and headmen are 
appointed from above, and are often without roots in the community 
over which they have jurisdiction. They are not responsible to 
their subjects in any direct way. The ability of the people to 
move between chiefdoms is severely limited by anti squatting 
controls. Thus, once settled, the people have little control 
over their own lives. 
* * * * * * 
In this chapter it has been argued that the old structures which 
provided social and political cohesion and order in the Ciskei 
have been breaking down. The central reasons for this have been 
discussed. The question that remains is what is taking the 
place of old ideologies and social structures. There are two 
ways of establishing this. On the one hand·, surveys such as the 
........ ------
Surplus Peoples Project and the SALDRU project can attempt to 
gauge the consciousness of the people in the region. This is 
not generally successful - attitude surveys or the like are a 
poor guide to changing forms of consciousness. What the surveys 
do indicate, however, is the change, the confusion, the disillusion-





A more adequate guide to changing political consciousness is ":<.. 
the study of the actions of the people. The bus boycott in -------Mdantsane has shown the broad groundswell of anger that exists 
amongst the people of a town like Mdantsane against the Ciskei 
state. The bus company in· Mdantsane is owned by the Ciskei 
Transport Corporation, a state body which took over the company 
after a previous bus boycott following a fare price rise in 1975. 
(57) The 1983 boycott soon escalated into a major confrontation 
between ,commuters, mainly workers on their way to work in East 
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London, and various armed apparatuses of the state. Indeed, 
sustained worker and student organisation in Mdantsane indicate a 
high level of class and political consciousness. (58) 
Even a small town like ·Dimbaza has seen both political 
confrontations with state bodies and conflicts between workers 
and their industrial employers. (This is briefly examined in 
Chapter six). There is no doubt that in the towns in the Ciskei 
high levels of political consciousness exist that transcend the 
traditional limits of bantustan politics. The situation in the 
closer settlements, however, seem far more marked by demoralisa-
tion and fear. (59) 




D 100) F 1 00) (~ x 100) P/A 'Unnatural' A B c D E F G (- x (- x c 1 E 1 A 1 
Total Total Male, Male Female Female 'Total Per- Percentage Percentage Percentage Population 
1970 1980 1970 1980 1970 1980 Increase centage Increase Increase Increase Growth 
Increase Females Total ( 2) (3) 
Males 
HEWU 31 904 74 065 14 021 34 566 1 7 883 39 499 42 161 . 1 46, 5% 120,8% 132, 1 % 8,8 32 421 
KEISKAM-
26 531 38 280 MAHOEK 11 576 1'6 834 14 955 21 466 11 749 
45,4% 43,4% 44,3% 3,7 3 650 
MDANISANE 105 564 178 743 48 11 4 88 014 57 450 90 729 73 1 79 82,9% 57,9% 69,3% 5,4 40 952 
( 4) 
MIDDLE-
36 734 47 926 16 431 21 328 20 303 26 598 11 192 29,8% 31, 0% 30, 5% 2,7 -22 DRIFT 
PEDDIE 30 291 58 725 1 3 335 25 797 16 956 32 928 28 434 93,5% 94,2% 93,9% 6,8 1 9 1 87 
VICTORIA 
26 896 65 616 1 2 21 2 30 335 14 684 35 281 38 720 148,4% 140,3% 144,0% 9,3 30 509 EAST 
ZWELIT-
92 829 166 998 SHA 42 11 4 74 203 50 707 92 795 74 11 7 76,2% 83,0% 79,9% 6,0 45 840 
============================================================================================================================== 
c Total 350 741 630 353 1 57 803 291 077 1 92 938 339 276 279 612 84,5% 75,8% 79,7% 6,0 1 72 537 
I ============================================================================================================================ 
s Urban 1 02 380 228 539 47 949 11 0 743 54 431 11 7 816 126 159 130,0% 11 6 J 5% 123, 2% 8,2 94 804 
K 
E Rural 248 361 401 794 109 854 1 80. 334 138 507 221 460 153 433 64,2% 59,9% 61, 8% 4,9 77 613 
I 
Source: Department of Statistics Evidence to the Quail Commission, 1979; 1980 population census preliminary results, 1 981 . 
\ 
TABLE 5.2. 
MIGRANTS AND COMMUTERS FROM 11JE CISKEI IN R.S.A. 
Year Migrant Workers 
No °/o ( 1) 
1970 52 000 5,4 
1971 52 000 5,3 
1972 52 000 5,2 
1973 52 000 5, 1 
1974 53 000 5' 1 
1975 53 000 5' 1 
1976 53 000 5,0 
1977 54 000 4,9 
1978 54 000 4,9 
1979 54 000 4,7 
1980 56 000 4,6 
1981 60 000 4,5 
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Source: C. C. Mastoroudes, "Die Geraamde Grenspendelaars per 
Nasionale Staat en Tipe Vervoer, 1976 - 1981", unpublished paper, 
Benso, Pretoria, 1982; C.C. Mastoroudes "Die Geraamde Getal 
Trekwerkers vanaf die Nasionale State in die R.S.A. Werksaam, 
1970 - 1981", unpublished paper, Benso, Pretoria, 1982. 
(1)· °/o of total migrants from bantustans. 
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TABLE 5.3. 
EMPLOYMENT IN THE STATE SECTOR IN THE CISKEI 
1973 - 1981 
Year Black White Total 
1973 (a) 8 247 293 8 540 
1974 (a) 11 577 276 11 853 
1975 (a) (March) 13 131 276 13 407 
1975 (b) 12 191 271 12 462 
1976 (b) 12 638 266 12 904 
1977 (b) 12 283 267 12 550 
1978 (b) 12 007 260 12 267 
. 1979 (b) 12 043 254 12 297 
1980 (c) 13 180 250 13 430 
1981 ( c) 14 246 246 14 492 
(a) Derived from Benbo "Black Development in South Africa", 
Pretoria, 1976, Table B 19. 17. 
(b) Derived from Benso "Statistical Survey of Black Development 
1980 11 , Pretoria N/d ( 1981), Table 105. The reduction in 
1975 may be due to the excis"ion of Herschel and Glen Grey. 
(c) Derived from A.A. Ligthelm "The Development of the TBVC 
Countries : A Review", Development Studies Southern Africa, 
Vol. 5 no 1, 1982, Table 43. 
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CHAPTER 6. 
INDUSTRIALISATION AS A FORM OF ECONOMIC INTERVENTION 
IN THE CISKEI. 
As the social, political and economic circumstances of the Ciskei 
have changed, the objectives and forms of economic intervention 
by the State have altered. This is not to suggest a uniform 
correspondence between the political imp era ti ves of the Ciskei 
and its patron in Pretoria, and the economic programmes undertaken. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to detect important shifts and 
developments in economic development policy in the Ciskei and to 
broadly identify phases related to political developments. 
This chapter is primarily concerned to locate and explain 
the nature and implications of industrial development in the 
Ciskei between 1973 and 1981. In so doing, it first examines -------
other economic development schemes, and some of the institutions 
involved in the execution of development policy. This sets the 
scene for a contextualised analysis of industrial development 
policy and practice in the Ciskei. 
I Agricultural Schemes - From Betterment to the Ciskei Marketing 
Board. 
1. Betterment in the Ciskei. 
It was not much more than 30 years ago that the South African 
state first attempted serious intervention in the economy of the 
Ciskei. During the 1940s the first steps were taken with regard 
' to the implementation of betterment in terms of the 1939 proclama-
tion. ( 1) As elsewhere in the Reserves, betterment schemes in 
the Ciskei were intended to rationalise agriculture by removing 
some people from the land, establishing larger land-holdings, 
culling cattle, demarcating land for suitable purposes and reorga-
nising production patterns along "scientific" lines. The state's 
concern was with perceived declining productivity on the land in 
the Reserves and it sought to remedy this through the provision 
of knowledge and technical assistance. The collection of scatte-
red homesteads into villages was justified in terms of the rationa-
lisation of land use, but would, incidentally make administration 
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and control easier. A detailed survey of betterment is unfortu-
nately not yet possible for want of in- depth research though 
superficial surveys are available. (2) 
To illustrate betterment practices in the Ciskei a case 
study will be examined. Those aspects which typify the implemen-
tation of betterment in the Ciskei will be drawn out of the 
study. 
In 1947 the Keiskammahoek "locations" Gxulu, Cata and Einnyameni 
were proclaimed betterment areas. (3) After surveys were conducted, 
the essential features of the plan decided upon were: to treat 
the three locations. as a single unit and to move the families 
already landless and those to be rendered landless by the scheme 
into a single rural township; to abolish the cultivation of 
certain areas in order to prevent soil erosion; to fence off and 
limit grazing areas; to limit the number of farmers and their 
stock; and to establish a small irrigation scheme. (4) 
The most problematic feature of the plan was the intended 
deprivation of a large number of families of their rights to land 
which they l:}.ad been farming. The purpose, as stated, was to 
settle the area with "a stable peasantry, i.e. with a minimum of 
half economic units." (5) An economic unit implied self-sufficiency 
in farming for a family of average size and the irrigated uni ts 
were meant to provide that. The remaining dryland units were to 
supply at least half a family's needs. Those with land rights 
who were moved off the land were to be financially compensated 
and would be able to grow garden crops in the new village. 
Those moved would be selected by the village councils, subject to 
the approval of the Native Commissioner, though it was understood 
that the poorest would be selected. (6) The similarities between 
the measures proposed here and the general proposals of the 
Tomlinson Commission (see chapters one and three) are evident, 
though the agricultural proposals of the Commission were more 
drastic. No half units or garden cultivation was envisaged by 
the Commission. (7) 
During the course of negotiations between betterment officials 
and headmen in the 1950s, and in the process of implementation of 
the scheme in the early 1960s, major modifications were introduced. 
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It was decided that all land holders would retain the right to 
farm some land. Though villagisation was to proceed, instead of 
one large semi-urban township three smaller villages were created, 
one in each location. The irrigation scheme and the restriction 
of grazing areas were retained. 
One of the central reasons for the abandonment of elements 
of the scheme was the strongly expressed opposition of many of 
the people involved, to the scheme. If a headman attempted to 
allow unpopular measures to proceed, he was strongly reproved. 
In one case the opposition to the deprivation of people of their 
rights to farm was expressed by the razing of the Cata headman's 
hut and the killing of three of his pigs. (8) 
J.B. Mer. Daniel has argued that had the betterment schemes 
been carried out as envisaged in the Ciskei, the number of people 
made landless would have been very large. Under circumstances 
where no alternative forms of employment existed the schemes 
would have precipitated social turmoil. (9) 
What remained of the scheme was not so much a betterment 
scheme as a villagisation programme to which a small irrigation 
scheme and fenced grazing were attached. The scheme was still 
resented as only the thirty families on the irrigation scheme 
gained anything in material terms. (10) 
The objectives of the scheme had shifted from an ambitiously 
conceptualised restructuring of agriculture in the area, to a 
project which involved some stabilisation of land and the reloca-
tion of people into villages which provided convenient administra~ 
tive units. Most of the rural villages in the Ciskei today are 
the products of betterment schemes which were undertaken during 
the 1950s and 1960s. Only ten percent of those families allowed 





betterment schemes clearly had relatively little effect on the_jr' 
level or form of agricultural production in the Ciskei. (12) 
2. Model Projects of the 1970s. 
The planning of agricultural land and the implementation of 
modified betterment schemes, or as they came to be known, veld 
rehabilitation schemes, continued into the 1970s. By 1978 about 
79 percent of agricultural land in the Ciskei had been planned in 
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this way. (13) The implementation of planning had been successful 
insofar as stock numbers had fallen, land had been demarcated and 
people had been villagised, but as far as agricultural practices 
th ems elves were concerned, re la ti vely little had changed. As 
the Laker Report stated: 
"This situation has arisen because Ciskeian farmers 
were not prepared to accept rehabili ta ti on plans which 
did not embody the previous system of land use." (14) 
Though, for example, a series of regulations for rotational 
grazing existed, they were not legally enforced. (15) 
In 1975 the planning emphasis of the Ciskei Department of 
Agriculture shifted significantly. Instead of spending its 
resources on wide-scale but shallowly implemented rehabilitation 
schemes it began to focus on specific development projects. (16) 
Amongst those devised, the most important have been the irrigation 
schemes at Tyefu, Shiloh and Keiskammahoek. Perhaps the nature 
of these schemes is most aptly summed up in the fact that expensive 
security fences had to be erected around the Shiloh scheme to 
prevent the poverty stricken people of Sada stealing the crops. 
(17) 
Although it was claimed that the central purpose of these 
schemes was the maximisation of agricultural production in the Cis-
kei, (18) political objectives were clearly incorporated in their 
formulation. As the Secretary for the Department of Agriculture 
in the Ciskei, Gary Godden, M.B.E., wrote in 1978 (with reference 
to the Keiskammahoek scheme): 
"A fundamental policy decision taken before the scheme 
was planned was that it should be a settlement scheme, 
designed to enable selected Ciskeians to earn a reasona-
ble living from intensive irrigation farming." (19) 
Referring to the Tyefu and Keiskammahoek schemes the then 
Deputy Minister of Cooperation and Development, Dr Andries Treurnicht, 
stated, rather more bluntly: 
"There is little doubt that these schemes will make a 
significant impact on agricultural production in the 
Ciskei and at the same time establish a stable group of 
middle class farmers." (20) 
l 
153. 
In order to illustrate the nature of the schemes the Keiskamma-
hoek Irrigation Scheme will be discussed in some detail. 
'Essentially the scheme produces milk through selected settlers 
on tiny leased farms under strictly controlled conditions. The 
900 hectares under irrigation by 1981 consists of a central unit 
run by the project management on which cows not in milk are kept, 
and from which they are leased out when in milk. The "settler" 
farmers lease four hectare farms on which they keep a herd of six 
in-milk cows, and also grow some crops mainly for consumption. 
When the cows run dry, they are exchanged for in-milk cows from 
the central herd. The cows are milked at specified times at one 
of a number of modern milking sheds nearby. The project as a 
whole is run by "high calibre expatriates" and their assistants. 
(21) 
Comprehensive controls are exercised over the settlers who 
have to perform satisfactorily during an initial trial period. 
If the selection board so decides, the leases of the settlers may 
not be renewed. Settlers are, officially, chosen with regard to 
their agricultural experience. The project manager believes 
that people with experience on white farms are most suited. (22) 
The selection board is made up of the Secretary for Agriculture 
and Forestry, or his nominee, a nominee of the President (of the 
Ciskei), the local magistrate, a representative of the settlers 
and the local chief. 
The irrigation system is centrally controlled. The use of 
land is closely specified by the project management who initially 
allocated each plot as follows: 
House and environs o, 1 ha 
Subsistence Crops o, 1 ha 
Cash crops 0,5 ha 
Pasture (including lucerne) 3,3 ha 
Even the pasture allocation was centrally determined: (23) 
Kikuyu 1 . 25 ha 
Lucerne 
Maize or grain (summer) 
Japanese radish & Italian 
rye grass (summer) 




In short, the settlers' productive activities are determined 
by the project management. The only variable factor is the 
degree of effort the farmer and his family put into the work, and 
then again the settlers face the possibility of expulsion if 
production does not achieve a minimum level. The average income 
of a farmer was planned to be, in 1976 terms, R2 200 per annum -
calculated to be subsistence plus three times an average urban 
labourer's wage. 
The scheme involves substantial capital investment estimated 
in 1981 to be R5,6 ~illion. (24) A total of 350 settler families 
were to be accommodated when the scheme was completed - setting 
the capital investment per farmer at approximately R16 000. The 
running costs of the scheme are also high - at R1, 5 million in 
1980/81. (25) 
Nancy Charton has described the relationship between the 
project management and settlers as follows: 
"People who work on these schemes become a kind of employee. 
It is a new form of state capitalism in which you have 
a different kind of wage labour." (26) 
Indeed, there would seem to be every justification for this 
view. The relationship resembles very closely what Jairus 
Banaji has termed disguised wage labour. (27) Not only does the 
settler not have juridical ownership of the land, but neither has 
he possession, in the sense that all his productive activities 
are externally determined. The irrigation system: which switches 
on and off at preset times, independent of the settler's control, 
epitomises his powerlessness. Flexibility lies only in the 
intensity of labour, and even that is limited by the threat of 
expulsion. 
On the other hand, insofar as evidence would suggest that 
the creation of a class of yeoman farmers was clearly an intended 
consequence of the scheme, Charton's statement would require 
revision. The target level of income per settler is sixty times 
the average income earned off the land in the Ciskei. (28) Even 
if the target level has not been achieved, differentiation at the 
level of income and living standards between settlers and most 
surrounding peasants is extremely visible. 
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A further reason to qualify the state capitalism argument is 
the fact that, despite claims made in the plans and policy 
statements, the project, though highly productive, is not profita-
ble. · The recently published Report of the (Swart) Commission of 
Enquiry into the Economic Development of the Republic of Ciskei 
pointed out that the scheme, among others, is "a net drain on 
government resources." (29) 
The Tyefu Project, on the banks of ·the Great Fish River in 
the north-western corner of the Peddie district, is very similar 
to the Keiskammahoek scheme in overall conception. Even the 
plots issued to selected leasehold tenants are, at 4 hectares, 
the same size as those issued to the Keiskammahoek farmers. The 
difference is that, instead of producing milk, the settlers 
produce vegetables and crops such as tobacco and cotton on their 
irrigated plots. As the land used for the scheme was "tribal 
, controlled" the government had to compensate the people moved off 
to make way for the settlers who did not necessarily come from 
the area. Those moved off were provided with quarter-hectare 
irrigated plots as compensation. Similar schemes exist in 
lesser states of development at Shiloh and Zweledinga, both in 
the northern Hewu district. 
The schemes have come in for widespread criticism from 
economists. The most often heard objection to the schemes is 
that they benefit a small minority of farmers whereas the vast 
majority of Ciskeian peasants (in a loose sense) are sub-subsisten-
ce farmers in dryland regions, where no i~rigation is possible. 
Only 3 percent of the Ciskei is potentially irrigable. (30) If 
the poverty of the rural areas of the Ciskei is to be combatted, 
it is argued, attention should be paid to the problems of dryland 
agriculture. (31) And yet a high proportion of the Ciskei Depart-
ment of Agriculture·and Forestry budget has been spent on irriga-
tion projects. (32) 
Schneier has taken the criticism still further by 
arguing that not only has the large investment in Keiskammahoek 
failed to create a substantial number of jobs and thus spread the 
welfare effects of the project, but existing small-scale milk 
producers had "lost access to markets where they previously sold 
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mil.k and amas:i, as certain areas became controlled." ( 33) "Control" 
is framed in terms of health standards, but means little else but 
the monopolisation of markets by the scheme. 
It is thus difficult to understand the purpose of the schemes 
in terms of social welfare or economic growth motivations. 
Neither are the schemes profitable and nor do they benefit more 
than a handful of Ciskei farmers. Possibly they are better 
understood in terms of their political objectives. The bottom 
line is revealed by one of the Ciskei government's advisors. He 
writes: 
" one of the most urgent requirements (of the Ciskei 
government) is to win the support of rural communities. 
Homeland leaders need their support." (34) 
It would appear that the "homeland leaders" in the Ciskei 
were attempting to use the schemes to build up a section of the 
rural community with an interest in maintaining the prevailing 
political system. At the same time the schemes were undoubtedly 
designed as showpieces. The Keiskammahoek and Tyefu . schemes 
cannot fail to impress the superficial observer. 
There were obstacles in the way of the former political 
objective - building up a supportive rural middle class. 
Firstly, in the Keiskammahoek scheme, the paternalism of the 
consultants who drew up the plans and of the project management, 
is counter productive. The planners wrote into the plan this 
note: "Under present circumstances project management must 
necessarily be provided by whites .... " ( 35) The timing of the 
project made it almost inevitable that embittered white ex-Rhode-
sians would occupy several management posts. (36) The manner in 
which the management has exercised controls over the settlers 
indicates a relatively authoritarian form of management not 
conducive to winning allies for the Ciskei government. 
A second obstacle was the need for visible results from the 
project as quickly as possible. It seems likely that this 
heavily drained state resources in the initial period. Thirdly 
it is possible to speculate that the Ciskeian bureaucrats and 
politicians who have been drawn into the schemes as directors of 
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Ciskei Agricultural Services would seek to squeeze the farmers -
' not through paternalism but through contestation of the distribu~ 
tion of surplus value created. There is no evidence for this 
argument at this stage, but it is an hypothesis worth pursuing 
judging by the performance of, in some essential ways, similar 
paras ta tal corporations elsewhere in the third world. ( 37) For 
these reasons, I would argue, the schemes thus far have not 
succeeded in creating a class of supportive yeoman farmers, 
though it is still possible that this will be achieved. They 
have succeeded in creating at least two showpieces - Tyefu and 
Keiskamrnahoek. 
3- The Ciskei Marketing Board. 
The body which acts as marketing agent for the products of the 
scheme~, and all commercially produced agricultural commodities in 
the Ciskei , is the Ciskei Marketing Board ( C. M. B. ) . It is 
briefly examined here as a bantustan state apparatus centrally 
involved in the formulation and execution of agricultural develop-
ment programmes. 
The C.M.B. was created shortly after the appointment of Gary 
Godden as Secretary for Agriculture and Forestry. (38) Established 
in 1977 ,·its objects were stated to be the introduction of "an 
orderly marketing system favouring Ciskei producers" and the 
elimination of "health hazards" in agricultural marketing. Its 
de facto role has been to attempt to completely control and 
monopolise all agricultural markets in the Ciskei. 
Milk, an important example, became a controlled product in 
certain districts in terms of regulations promulgated in 1979, as 
the Keiskammahoek scheme came on stream. Being a controlled 
product, milk could only be sold, in those districts, by licencees 
or by the C.M.B. itself. Licencees had to meet stringent health 
regulations only obtainable through modern dairying methods. 
While this prevented the importation of milk supplied by dairies 
in Queenstown and East London, it also finally buried a few 
existing small scale milk producer cooperatives in the Ciskei. 
Most of the co-ops having been taken over by the Department of 
Agriculture and Forestry, and neglected, had already disintegrated, 
but the remainder were wiped out.by licensing procedures ostensibly 
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meant to promote health standards. (39) In fact, the regulations 
were more likely to promote disease and ill health as controlled 
prices were higher than previous prices and the volume of milk 
(legally) ·marketed fell. ( 40) Malnutrition, especially among 
children arid infants, is the most important cause of ill heal th 
in the Ciskei. (41) 
Another activity of the C.M.B. has been the attempt to 
monopolise the wholesale marketing of fruit and vegetables in the 
Ciskei, particularly in large markets such as Mdantsane. There 
the C.M.B. established a large wholesale market, a stone's throw 
away from the new market on the South African side of the border. 
( 42) At the same time the state banned unlicensed vegetable 
hawkers in the Ciskei. (43) 
Again the measures are understandable as protectionist, 
insofar as they are an attempt to cut down income leakages out of 
the Ciskeian economy. However, the hawkers, banned at the same 
time as the Ciskei National Development Corporation established a 
supermarket in a tripartite arrangement with Frasers, the interna-
tional trading company, and Ciskei investors, were unhappy and 
protested vigorously. (44) Some were offered jobs in the nBw 
supermarket, but on condition that they had Ciskei citizenship 
documents. (45) 
The chief role of the C.M.B. is clearly to control the 
marketing of agricultural commodities in the Ciskei. As can be 
seen, however, it was contributing to the organisation of the 
commercial sector along certain lines whereby the right to trade 
came increasingly to be conferred by the state. This will be 
discussed in more detail in the following section on the Ciskei 
National Development Corporation. 
II 1he Ciskei National Development Corporation. 
One of"a tremendous proliferation of quasi-government institutions", 
as Chief L.L. Sebe put it, (46) the Ciskei National Development 
Corporation came into being in April 1976. Its broad objects 
were set out as follows: 
"To plan, finance, c;oordinate, promote and carry out 
the development of the Ciskei and the population of 
this National State in fields of industry, commerce, 
·nnance and other businesses." (47) 
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Not surprisingly, in view of such a broad mandate, the C.N.D.C. 
has been involved in a wide range of economic activities in the 
Ciskei engaging in wholly owned industrial enterprises, financing 
home loans, running two garages, half owning a bus company, 
running several agricultural schemes and heavily financing private-
ly owned industry, to mention but some of its multifarious schemes. 
Its history begins with the establishment of the Bantu 
Investment Corporation in 1959. The B.I.C. spawned its first 
regionally oriented offspring in the Xhosa Development Corporation 
(X.D.C.) in 1965. The X.D.C. officially served both the Ciskei 
and the Transkei though the latter bantustan received a greater 
deal of attention - because it was the most constitutionally 
advanced bantustan (a model, or trial run) and because the Transkei 
is far bigger than the Ciskei in every way. 
The C.N.D.C. has recently changed its name to the Ciskei Peo-
ples' Development Bank. However, throughout this section I 
will refer to the activities of corporations in the Ciskei as the 
C.N.D.C. 
1. 1he C.N.D.C. and Commerce. 
Up to 1974, by far the most important single· activity of the 
C. N. D. C. was the purchasing of white owned tr:ading concerns in 
the Ciskei and their transfer into the hands of black "Ciskeians" 
through cheap loans. While it had spent R387 726 on C.N.D.C. 
owned enterprises in industrial, commercial and financial spheres, 
and only R99 885 towards "agency" system private industrial 
investment, the C.N.D.C. had spent R1 420 950 on business loans 
"to Xhosa" in the Ciskei by 31 March 1974. (48) The strategy 
adopted during the 1960s and early 1970s matches that applied in 
other bantustans - concentrating on buying out white owned busines-
ses and transferring them to African owners. The second half of 
the process was not always immediate and the C.N.D.C. held on to 
some businesses. By March 31st 1975, 196 loans had been made to 
African businessmen of which 115 went to general dealers. By 
that time R1 751 386 had been lent to African businessmen in the 
Ciskei. ( 49) 
\ 
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Though the emphasis of C.N.D.C. operations shifted away from 
financing African traders towards agency system industrial develop-
ment, (as Table 6.2 indicates), loans to African businessmen 
still increased quite substantially to a cumulative total of 
R7 000 000 by 1982. As table 6. 1 indicates, the number of 
trading licences issued increased from a total of 239 in 1973 to 
774 in 1977/78. Later figures are not obtainable but indications 
suggest that the rate of issuing of business licences slowed down 
quite markedly after the late 1970s. (50) 
Major South African companies have contributed to the develop-
ment of an African business class in the Ciskei through the esta-
blishment of the Ciskei Institute of Management in 1978. (51) 
First set up at the University of Stellenbosch and then transferred 
to the University of Fort Hare, (52) the Institute is in large 
part funded by the Old Mutual and the Stellenbosch Farmers Winery. 
(53) It caters to African businessmen (and women) by holding 
evening classes · on cash planning, basic book-keeping, staff 
control and related topics. Its staff are available to visit 
students at their businesses during the day to advise them on 
specific problems. (54) 
The activities of the C.N.D.C. and related state bodies in 
the sphere of commerce have caused conflict and raised controversy 
in two interrelated areas: the issuing of trading licences and 
the establishment of large scale commercial enterprises solely or 
partly under the auspices of the C.N.D.C. 
The licensing system itself has come in for criticism from 
economists concerned that free enterprise should spread in the 
Ciskei. In his evidence to the Ciskei Commission, Mr Michael 
O'Dowd of the Anglo American Corporation pleaded for the scrapping 
of the licensing system which he claimed retricted trade and 
competition. ( 55) The report of the Commission of Enquiry into 
the Economic Development of the Ciskei (Swart), echoes that 
argument. It calls on the Ciskei government to allow no "restric-
tion on competition". ( 56) In addition it argues that the 
government should: 
"do everything possible to make it feasible for the 
informal sector to operate in a more formal way or 
eliminate barriers to the development of the formal 
sector." (57) 
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What both 0' Dowd and the Swart Commission fail to realise or 
acknowledge is the fact that the licensing system has become an 
essential part of the patronage network of the Ciskei state. 
The ability to allocate trading licences gives the government and 
the C. N. I. P .. more muscle. Nowhere is the patronage structure 
within the state more clearly exhibited than in .the trade licensing 
system. 
In chapter five, it was found that in some cases traders had 
become chiefs and in other cases chiefs had become traders. On 
the one hand the state clearly provides access to economic gain; 
on the other hand, loyalty to the state and the party is rewarded. 
At the same time as establishing loyal allies to the regime, 
the trade licensing system can antagonise those prospective 
traders who lose access to the right to trade. The hawkers who 
were stopped from trading in vegetables in Mdantsane exhibited a 
great deal of anger. Four hundred protested publicly against 
the restrictions imposed on them. (58) Twenty-five women, who 
refused to pay admission of guilt fines as many had done, were 
tried and fined R15 or 30 days for trading at the Mdantsane bus 
terminus without licences. (59) Hawkers had complained bitterly 
that licensed stalls had been allocated to women who were prominent 
supporters of Sebe's C.N.I.P. (60) 
As far as C.N.D.C. activities in the commercial field are 
concerned, these gave rise to serious tensions. In Mdantsane 
particularly, the fledgling commercial bourgeoisie has on several 
occasions been up in arms against unfair competition from the 
C.N.D.C. and associated companies involved in tripartite agreements. 
Two ventures especially inflamed the Mdantsane businessmen. 
Firstly, in 1977, there was the establishment of the Mdantsane 
Cash and Carry wholesale store, managed and partly owned by 
Frasers. Frasers is a large commercial organisation which 
specialises in tying up bantustan markets. As a "tripartite 
agreement", the remainder of the company was owned mainly by the 
C.N.D.C. and by Ciskeian individuals through a public share 
issue. As there were only 5 000 R1 shares, public involvement 
in the company was not spread very wide. It amounted to approxi-
mately 1 percent of the initial investment. (61) A specialist 
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wholesale furniture company followed by similar arrangement two 
years later. (62) Discontent simmered amongst Mdantsane business-
men, reflected in bitter struggles on the Mdantsane Town Council. 
,( 63) 
Early in 1979 conflicts burst into the open with the announce-
ment by the C. N. D. C. that it was to expand its Mdantsane Hotel. 
Members of the Mdantsane Town Council responded angrily saying 
that the "C.N.D.C. is milking people." (64) Mdantsane businessmen, 
well represented on the Council, were clearly upset that the 
C.N.D.C. with its financial clout was sewing up important potential 
business ventures. Mr F. S. Meisenholl, general manager of the 
C.N.D.C. responded sharply saying that the C.N.D.C. aimed to 
"satisfy the needs of the people and not the ambitions of a few 
individuals." (65) Under pressure, the C.N.D.C. issued more 
public shares in several of its commercial enterprises, but made 
no major concessions to the businessmen. 
It would be simplistic to argue that the C.N.D.C. was acting 
as a paternalistic and almost voracious external force against 
the wishes of all members of the Ciskei ruling class. On the 
contrary, there may well be a division amongst even the small 
Ciskei commercial bourgeoisie - between those who have an interest 
in tripartite agreements and those who oppose them. Unfortunately 
it has not been possible to gather adequate evidence on this 
issue, but it would seem likely that senior politicians in the 
Ciskei are able to gain material benefits by obtaining shares or 
possibly kick-backs from tripartite investments. These politi-
cians sit on the boards of directors of the various parastatal 
corporations and would thus have privileged access. Gerry Mare· 
has suggested such a situation in an analysis of Kwazulu. ( 66) 
Since the Ciskei government took official control over the C.N.D.C. 
in 1981 , the opportunity for this type of activity is likely to 
have increased. As the structure and management of the C.N.D.C. 
has not changed, it would seem unlikely that the senior politicians 
are very concerned to alter the nature of its activities. 
2. The C.N.D.C. and Home Loans 
In the early 1970s C.N.D.C. involvement in the home loans market 
was restricted to providing cheap housing finance for white 
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managerial staff working for the C.N.D.C. or in an agency system 
factory. In the latter part of the 1970s, however, the. C.N.D.C. 
focussed its attention on the question of home loans for Africans. 
There were two reasons for this. Firstly, in spite of attempts 
to persuade them otherwise, building societies refused to grant 
loans against property in the Ciskei as they were not satisfied 
that the form of leasehold operative in the bantustan townships 
was equivalent to freehold. Barriers to private land ownership 
in the bantustans had led to the emergence of a form of leasehold 
in the townships which the building societies did . not regard as 
sufficiently secure. (67) It therefore fell to the C.N.D.C., the 
central financial institution in the Ciskei, to finance home 
loaris. 
An additional reason for C. N. D. C. involvement in the home 
loan market was the fact that the institution was paying far more 
direct attention to the cultivation of a middle class in the 
Ciskei. This is reflected in its general activities. It is 
also directly written into the Ciskeian·corporation Act (No 16 of 
1981) which transferred the C.N.D.C. to the Ciskei government. 
One of its objects identified in the Act is: 
"The development of Ciskeian citizens as entrepeneurs 
and thus to create a strong middle class." (68) 
Another object embodied in the Act is': 
"Continuous improvement of the standard of living· of 
the Ciskeian people as a whole in a . free enterprise 
system." ( 69) 
Read together and contrasted with the vaguely stated original 
aims cited above, it is clear that the C.N.D.C. was intended to 
play a more direct role in class formation - not only in the 
productive sphere. 
A home-owner building loan scheme for Mdantsane has been the 
C. N. D. C. 's first major housing ini tia ti ve. In 1979 the first 
home-owner house was completed in Mdantsane. It belonged to a 
school principal who had been assisted through a low interest 
loan from the C. N. D. C. ( 70) . By July 1981 , 2 522 "Ciskeians" had 
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been assisted to buy or build their own homes, mostly in Mdantsane. 
( 71 ) Table 6. 3 shows how the issuing of housing loans by the 
C.N.D.C. escalated dramatically in 1978. In the four-year 
period between 1974 and 1978, the C.N.D.C. had issued 525 loans 
for housing. In the following four-year period, to 1982, the 
C.N.D.C. issued an additional 2 361 housing loans. From 1980 
government employees and officials were granted 100% low interest 
loans on house building or purchasing - the deposit was 100 · 
percent guaranteed. (72) 
3. 1he C.N.D.C. and Industry. 
The involvement of the C.N.D.C. in industrial development in the· 
Ciskei has two major aspects. On the one hand the C.N.D.C. has 
either established or bought out a number of industrial enterprises 
which are wholly owned. On the other hand the C.N.D.C. has been 
centrally instrumental in the establishment of privately owned 
"agency" industrial enterprises in the Ciskei. 
One of the many features the C.N.D.C. has in common with 
other arms of the Department of Cooperation and Development, is 
the fact that it raises a good deal of its revenue through the 
production and sale of liquor. In August 1977 (73) the C.N.D.C. 
erected a sorghum beer brewery in Mdantsane at an initial.cost of. 
R2, 2 million, producing 13 million litres of beer per annum and 
employing 129 people (74) making it the most capital intensive 
plant in the Ciskei. In .subsequent years the factory has expanded I 
rapidly. Connected with the factory are "modern beer outlets in 
the form of recreation centres" (beer-halls) which distribute 
some of the brewery's product. The brewery has no difficulty in 
selling its products as it is protected as the sole producer of 
beer consumed in the Ciskei, under Ciskeian Law. Just as beer-
halls have been important sources of revenue for Administration 
Boards in the urban townships the beer industry, completely 
monopolised by the C.N.D.C., is one of its few profitable activi-
ties. Other wholly owned enterprises are not necessarily as 
profitable. The C.N.D.C. owns a complex of factories in Sada 
employing several hundred pepple - some on a home industry basis. 
This complex makes little profit, ·if any, but cannot be closed 
down. (75) In addition to owning three hotels, two motor vehicle 
\ 
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service stations and one bakery, the C. N. D. C. owns the Ciskei 
Transport Company, which has issued shares to Ciskei citizens. 
( 76) The company owns two bus lines - one that runs between 
Mdantsane and East London and another that runs between Zwelitsha 
and King Williamstown. The companies were bought from private 
firms after a series of bus boycotts in the mid-1970s threatened 
their existence. The boycotts were directed against bus fares 
which are high because of the distance between residential areas 
in the Ciskei and the factories at East London and King Williams-
town. More recently C. T. C. services to and from Cape Town and 
Port Elizabeth were opened. (77) 
It is possible to divide enterprises owned by the C.N.D.C. 
into two broad categories - those which are profitable because of 
the monopoly powers of the Ciskei government, and those which are 
owned for strategic reasons; either because they provide essential 
services such as the garages and the bus companies, or because it 
would be politically unpopular to close them down such as the 
factory complex in Sada. (78) The dividing line between the two 
categories is not always entirely clear (as in the case of the 
garages). 
As Table 6.2 indicates, by 1982 "Industrial Development" was .. 
responsible for approximately half the total cumulative expenditure 
of the C.N.D.C. It stood at R63,6 million out of a total of 
R134, 7 million. In 1974 industrial development had accounted 
for a mere R99 885 as one of the smallest items on the books of 
the C.N.D.C. 
In the early 1970s the C.N.D.C. began to prepare the way for 
industrial investment in the Ciskei. The C.N.D.C. engages in 
four main activities in this respect. Firstly, it invests in 
basic infrastructure at the designated growth· points. This 
involves laying roads, railway sidings, electrical lines and the 
like at the designated growth points. According to its 1982 
Annual Report, the C.N.D.C. had spent a total of R4 431 695 by 
31st March that year. (79) Clearly other governmental agencies 
foot the bill for some aspects of infrastructural developments. 
Secondly, the C.N.D.C. erects buildings according to the 
specifications of investors. 
I 
Both the buildings thus erected 
and the land they stand on are leased to investors at subsidized 
,{/" 
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rates. As buildings and land would normally amount to a major 
part of the cost of investment, this aspect of C.N.D.C. activity 
forms an important incentive to investment. This is clearly 
indicated in Table 6.4. As it shows, in 1979 at about R4,3 
million, the cost of buildings alone amounted to 30% of the total 
value of investment in agency industry (excluding infrastructure). 
Thirdly, the C.N.D.C. provides low interest loans to investors. 
In 1979 over 40% of the cumulative total capital invested in 
agency industry, was loan capital provided by the C.N.D.C. It 
was not possible to establish exactly why this was the case but 
it would appear to be a product of the low interest rates, the 
availability of finance and the lower collateral standards demanded 
by the C.N.D.C., at least in the earlier period. (80) 
The fourth activity of the C.N.D.C. is to provide a range of 
incentives in order to attract industry. Amongst the important 
incentives are: the provision of tax rebates against wages paid, 
up to a certain wage level and rail and harbour rebates. Incen~ 
ti ve levels are not set by the C. N. D. C. , but centrally, by the 
C.E.D. and the Decentralisation Board. 
Additional activities of the C.N.D.C. include advising 
industrialists on labour matters, and stepping in when disputes 
occur. Normally disputes are transferred to the Ministry of the 
Interior. (81) The C.N.D.C. also find markets in South Africa 
and overseas for commodities produced in the Ciskei. (82) 
* * * * * * 
The C.N.D.C. is a complex organisation. It is the only governmen-
tal institution,· indeed the only financial institution involved 
in the financing and stimulation of non-agricultural economic 
development in the Ciskei. As such it is a juggernaut in a land 
of economic dwarfs. Yet it is not independent - it has in the 
past depended on the Corporation for Economic Development to make 
up the difference between its expenditure and its income. By 
1982 the C.N.D.C. had accumulated a R13 million debt to the 
C.E.D. (83) The vast proportion of its 46 million R1 shares were 
held by the S.A. government but were transferred to the Ciskei. 
(84) Now that it is called the Ciskei Peoples' Development Bank, 
it will be dependent on the Development Bank of Southern Africa 
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(the C. E. D. 's successor) , and on the financiers of the Ciskei 
government. Seventy-five percent of the Ciskei finances are 
supplied by the South African government. (85) 
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III The Development of Industry in the Ciskei. 
1. Industrial Development in Fast London ,and the Ciskei. 
It would not. be putting it too strongly to say that ·industrial 
development got off to a late start in the Ciskei. Indeed, at 
a time when in South Africa as a whole, industry had already 
become a much greater sector than mining, the Ciskei had no 
industry to speak of. F.arlier chapters will have indicated why 
this was a general condition in bantustans; they were not well 
located for industry and industrial development. in them was 
blocked by state measures until the late 1960s. 
There were also regional obstacles to the development of 
industry in the Ciskei. Most important amongst them was the 
indu~trial development of Fast London, just off the south-eastern 
edge of the Cisk~i and the region's only natural harbour. Even 
with the Buffalo River mouth and ample supplies of cheap labour 
on its doorstep, Fast London was not an obvious choice for indus-
trial development. The location of money, markets and infrastruc-
ture in the major metropolitan centres of the P.W. V., Durban/Pine- -
town, Cape Town, and even Port Elizabeth, proved strong magnets 
for industrial development. Fast London did not have local 
supplies of raw materials other than food, or cheap power and its 
hinterland, though populous is very poor. (86) 
During the Second World War, nevertheless, like the other 
large towns of South Africa, .Fast London saw rapid industrial 
development. Between 1939/40 and 1945/6 , the value of gross 
output (at current prices) of Fast London's industrial sector 
doubled. More remarkably, it increased by 300% during the 
following four-year period. (87) The sectors most prominent, 
other than construction were food, textiles and chemicals. An 
important factor in Fast London's development then as now was 
the intervention of the state. Already the region had been 
identified as an important site for industriai decentralisation. 
In the late 1940s the Industrial Development Corporation attrac-
ted several major firms to the area. The largest of these was 
the giant Good Hope Textiles factory just outside King Williams-
town. Firms were drawn to the region with the promise of I.D.C. 
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financing and the arrarigement of exemption from wage regulating 
measures embodied in Industrial Council agreements and Wage 
Board determinations. (88) 
When the Border Industries programme was launched in 1960, 
East London was among the first towns to be identified as a 
"growth point". As incentives improved during the 1960s more 
firms were attracted to East London. These measures may or may 
not have attracted industry away from the metropolitan centres. 
What they did do, though, was to ensure that firms in any case 
planning to invest in the region, would probably choose East 
London from amongst al terna ti ve sites. This si tua ti on would 
soon change. 
From the late 1960s and during the early 1970s industrial 
development in East London began to slow down.. After averaging 
a growth rate between 5% and 7% per year between 1945 and 1972, 
the growth rate dropped to below 4% per year between 1972 and 
1976. The slowdown continued into the late 1970s. (89) 
One reason for the slowdown was the impact of booming energy 
costs in the region. Escom' s differential pricing structure 
became increasingly problematic as energy costs soared in the 
1970s. In 1977 electricity cost more in the Border region than 
anywhere else -· an anomaly attributed to excess capacity. The 
cost per kilowatt hour to industry in the region was 2, 77 cents 
as opposed to 1, 95 cents in the Western Cape and 1, 33 cents on 
the Witwatersrand. (90) Also important were the increased trans-
port costs brought about by the fuel crisis. East London was 
badly hit because of its distance from the major markets. (91) 
Bantustan consolidation and moves towards independence also 
,undermined capital's confidence in the region. Consolidation 
meant uncertainty over the future of certain areas and for a 
while there was a fear that East London would be incorporated 
into the Ciskei. The poor track record of the Transkei after 
i~dependence and concern amongst capitalists about taxation 
levels, nationalisation and political instability contributed to 
declining interest in investment in East London. (92) 
Ironica~ly, that investment which did take place in the 
region was increasingly located at growth points in the Transkei 
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(Butterworth and Umtata) and, later, in the Ciskei at Dimbaza. 
B3.ntustan growth points had become subject to higher incentive 
levels than those operative in the border areas. (See Appendix 
A on incentives). The East London municipality invested a good 
deal of money into an industrial growth point at Berlin - between 
East London and King Williamstown and on the Ciskei border - but 
it failed to take off. The reason quite simply, beyond uncer-
tainty about the region as a whole, was the fact that investors 
were getting a far better deal in the bantustans. (93) A further 
reason is the fact that wage levels though low i~ East London, 
are significantly lower in the bantustans. (Wage rates are 
discussed in sub-section 6 below). 
2. The Beginnings of Industrialisation in the Ciskei. 
When the industrialisation programme for the bantustans began in 
the early 1970s, there were just two small factories in· the 
Ciskei, both located in Alice. One was a small pottery factory, 
and the other a building materials producer no doubt based in 
Alice for its proximity to the expanding University of Fort 
Hare. 
When the time came to choose the Ciskei 's main industrial 
growth point, Dimbaza was chosen. In 1969 Cosmas Desmond had 
visited Dimbaza, then .. calTed Mnxesha; in the course of his inves-
tigation into resettlement. Desmond was shocked by what he 
saw, and wrote: 
". . . here was grinding poverty, squalor and hardship 
equal to the worst places I had seen (during a survey 
of resettlement) - I doubt whether I have ever seen 
anything worse than this. It was as bad as any of the 
horror pictures from Biafra." (94) 
Indeed, the combination of Desmond's book and the British I.T~V. 
film "Last Grave at Dimbaza" established Dimbaza as a symbol of the 
worst excesses of resettlement and not without reason. Most of 
the early inhabitants of Dimbaza had been forcibly removed from 
farms and from country towns west of the redrawn Eiselen line 
which demarcates the "coloured labour preference" area. Many 
were elderly or very young and many died during the early years. 
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Those who survived, depended on tiny state provided rations.' 
For housing people had to make do with flimsy temporary structures. 
Since late 1972 the fate of Dimbaza has altered. Not only 
were housing conditions considerably improved with the erection 
of brick houses, small as they are, but Dimbaza was shortly to be 
identified as the first priority industrial growth point for the 
Ciskei. Dimbaza was probably chosen for a combination of reasons 
including a deliberate attempt to counter-propagandise against 
the critics of resettlement. Dimbaza was to become the model 
success for the population and industry relocation.programmes. 
Several additional factors probably contributed to the choice of 
Dimbaza rather than, say, Sada or another equally notorious 
resettlement site. Amongst these were the fact that Dimbaza is 
located on a convenient branch ~ine of the Johannesburg-East 
London railway, not far from the junction. Dimbaza' s relative 
proximity to East London and King Williamstown, sources of important 
services, and residential sites for white managerial and technical 
staff was also important. 
By 1974 the basic infrastructure for Dimbaza 's industrial 
park had been laid down and the C.E.D. and X.D.C. had prepared a 
package of financial incentives. No railway station existed but 
sidings were later built. No services existed, but some could 
be obtained from King Williamstown, about 20 km by road or rail 
to the east. 
The first firm to be established in Dimbaza was the allegedly 
charitable company Zipha Nywerhede, owned partly by the Nederduitse 
Gereformeerde Kerk and partly by the X.D.C. In August 1974 it 
began production (95), employing 50 people in the manufacture of 
spectacle cases. (96) Later it diversified into the production 
of leather gloves and industrial protective clothing, and by 1981 
employed about 200 people.C97)In that year its name was changed to 
Mfesane Enterprises, and it opened a tannery employing about 60 
people. The tannery was partly financed through a R20 000 grant 
from Barclays National Bank and was intended to include disabled 
people among its employees. (98) 
The company, which may be unique as a bantustan corporation/ 
church joint venture, is claimed by its owners to be non-profit 
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making. It was portrayed as an attempt to relieve poverty in 
the Ciskei. (99) This has not meant a particularly generous 
wage policy, though - in 1975 Zipha paid women as little as R4.50 
per week. In that year the minimum wage allowed for metal 
workers in South Africa under the Industrial Council agreement 
was R20.25 per week. ( 100) Perhaps the most significant aspect 
of the project was that it was the first company to be established 
in Dimbaza and it was clearly an attempt to encourage other 
companies to move to Dimbaza. The relationship between the 
N.G.K. and the National Party could lead one to speculate about 
how the decision to invest was made. 
Amongst the other firms established during the initial phase 
in Dimbaza were: Dimbaza Handicrafts, no longer in existence; 
Black Forest Clocks, a branch of an East London based firm, which 
set up a watch assembly factory and is also now defunct; and 
Dimbaza Overalls which manufactures overalls and plastic balls. 
In all, by early 1975, the four firms employed about 150 "Ciskeians" 
and six whites. According to an investigative report in the 
Cape Times in 1975, starting wages stood at between R3. 00 and 
R4. 50 per week for women and between R6. 00 and R7. 00 for men. 
( 101) Total investment amounted to a little over R150 000 of 
which two-thirds was made up of X.D.C. loans and X.D.C. financed 
buildings (see Table 6. 4). Put plainly these enterprises and 
several that followed in the next few years were set up by small-
time opera tors, taking advantage of the incentives and of the 
X.D.C.'s willingness to assist almost anybody who wanted to start 
a factory in the Ciskei. Most important amongst the incentives 
was clearly -the cheap finance - subsidised. loans and new buildings 
at no capital cost and let at low rentals. The attraction of a 
cheap and stable labour force was undoubtedly also important 
though there must have been uncertainly about the future. 
Indeed, uncertainty about the political and economic future 
of the region was undoubtedly one of the main reasons that very 
few investors of any substance entered the Ciskei in the early 
stages of the industrialisation programme. Equally important is 
the fact that investors seeking to take advantage of the newly 
revamped incentives available in bantustans, could obtain similarly 
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structured incentives in more favourably located bantustans. 
Most important rivals to Dimbaza were, and are, Isithebe in 
Kwazulu, which lies roughly halfway between Richards Bay and 
Durban and Babelegi which lies about 50 km north of Pretoria, in 
Bophuthatswana. , Isithebe lies alongside the Tugela basin, 'an 
industrially booming region, and within range of the major urban 
markets of Natal. Babelegi lies merely 50 km from the P. W. V. 
region, probably the largest urban market in Africa. Whereas by 
31st March 1976 a total of ten firms with investments totalling 
R3,5 million, employing 963 people existed in the Ciskei, 70 
firms, employing 8 680 people, with capital investments totalling 
R17 million, were operating in Bophuthatswana. 
between the two. (102) 
3. A new Type of Investment - Dimbaza Foundries. 
Kwazulu lay 
It is often assumed that the type of company that would set up 
industrial production in a bantustan would be 'labour intensive, 
entailing a relatively small capital investment. Perhaps the 
most obvious examples might be' clothing manufacture, hand-woven 
or knitted textiles, electrical goods assembly and.the manufacture 
of simple wood or metal products. For a large part this expecta-
tion would be justified by the type of firms established in 
Dimbaza in its first few years. The most significant exception 
was the establishment of Dimbaza Foundries in March 1977. 
The initial cost of the factory was about R850 000 (103) and 
its initial complement of workers was 65 ('104) resulting in a 
cost per job in terms of capital invested of over R13 000. This 
was nearly three times the value of capital per worker previously 
invested in Dimbaza (see Tables 6.5 - 6.10). The plant was set 
up by three young engineers, one of whom, Mr Neil Rosser, told me 
that the most important reason for the foundry being located in 
Dimbaza was the availability of cheap finance in the form of 
loans and payment of building costs. ( 105) Of the original 
investment of R856 999, only R268 000 was raised by the private 
investors. The buildings put up by the C.N.D.C. cost R372 ·177 
and were rented to the firm at the low rate of about R18 500 per 
year. In addition the C.N.D.C. loaned the firm R216 622 at the 
subsidized interest rate of Z'~ per year. (106) 
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A further reason for its location offered by its technical 
director, Neil Rosser, was the fact that labour in the Ciskei was 
not only cheap, but it was also well educated. ( 107) This is 
frequently cited as a reason for locating in the Ciskei wher~, 
compared with other bantus tans, the literacy rate is relatively 
high as is the proportion of high school educated pe?ple. A 
similar point was made by the manager of Van Leer, (108) a plastics 
plant located in Dimbaza in 1980, who claimed that older educated 
people were unobtainable, whereas young high school educated men 
and women were available due to widespread unemployment and 
expanding educational systems. With its mission influenced 
history, the Ciskei has long had a relatively higher educational 
level than most bantustans. 
Dimbaza Foundries claimed in 1978 to be"··· the only employ-
ers of black apprentice pattern makers and boring-mill operators 
in South Africa." (109) At that time job reservation and racist 
apprenticeship regulations prevented blacks from becoming skilled 
workers or apprentices in the iron and steel industry (and in 
most other industries). By being located in Dimbaza the foundry 
could get round these restrictions and train blacks to do what. 
twenty kilometers away was reserved for whites (and coloureds) 
and jealously guarded by craft unions. Not only did they take 
advantage of these exemptions from South African labour regulations 
but they also, as they were entitled to, paid wages below those 
set down as minimum in the Industrial Council agreement covering 
the iron and steel industry. Rosser admitted to paying 20% 
below "S.E.I.F.S.A. rates" (Steel, Engineering and Iron Federation 
of S.A.) but it is quite possible that, at least for some job 
categories, that they paid still lower rates. (110) Further 
opportunity for cost cutting may have existed as regards conditions 
and hours of work. Though the Ciske.i then was still expected to 
comply with minimum regulations laid down by the South African 
Factories Act, the conscientiousness with which the regulations 
were enforced was difficult to establish. In this respect it 
may be noted, in passing, that the Swart Commission has recommen-
ded for industry in the Ciskei: 
" the removal of negative restrictions other than 
those absolutely essential for public health and safety." 
( 111) 
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Additional reasons explaining the location of the factory 
include the existence of an ISCOR depot at Berlin which is about 
30 km from Dimbaza by rail. 
The foundry was expanded several times in the years following 
its establishement in 1977. In 1981 the plant was purchased by 
Lonrho possibly because of cash flow problems or t~e urgent need 
for capital for expansion. (112) The original management remained 
and supervised a R3 million expansion which doubled the output of 
the plant and expanded the range of products. 
The foundry's products have since its establishinent been 
castings for mining machinery. Originally it supplied the South 
African mining industry, but in recent years exports have expanded 
quite dramatically, no doubt assisted by the 50% rebate to which 
Dimbaza firms are entitled at East London harbour. By 1981, 50% 
of the plant's output was exported to countries including the 
United States of America, Hong Kong, Greece, Bolivia and the 
Federal Republic of Germany. (113) 
4. Large South African Corporations in the Ciskei. 
Though most investments in industry in the Ciskei in the earlier 
period (1974~79) came from small or medium capital the late 1970s 
saw the growing involvement of large South African Corporations. 
An important early example was the establishment of a subsidiary 
of L. T.A. Construction as a tripartite company in the Ciskei in 
1978. (114) In terms of the agreement, L.T.A. Construction 
( Ciskei) was to be partly owned by the South African parent 
company and the C.N.D.C. In addition 6 000 shares of R1 were to 
be sold to Ciskei citizens in multiples of 100. Eighteen months 
later a second, similar, share issue took place. At the errd of 
its first financial year dividends of .1 Oc per share were paid. 
(115) 
L.T.A. is amongst the largest construction companies in 
South Africa and is owned by South Africa's largest private 
industrial company, the Anglo American Corporation. This, the 
I 
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first tripartite agreement in the Ciskei, would soon reap rewards. 
In 1979 L.T.A. Ciskei was awarded three major contracts : additio-
nal buildings for the University of Fort Hare, just outside 
Alice; the extension of the Mdantsane sewerage network; and the 
construction of a shopping centre in Mdantsane. (116) In addition 
to these major projects L.T.A. has been awarded several contracts 
to build factories in the Ciskei. 
L. T .-A.' s entrance into the Ciskei was well timed in view of 
I 
the now commonplace fact that there is a tr_emendous building boom 
in ,bantustans in the years immediately preceding -and following 
the granting of "independence". However, they were not allowed 
to monopolise the fruits of freedom. Murray and Roberts, the 
largest construction company in South Africa, moved in shortly 
afterwards with its own tripartite venture and won the contract 
to build the government complex at the new capital, Bisho. (117) 
Several other major South African companies have investments 
in the Ciskei. Federale Volksbeleggings is represented in the 
form of an electronic appliance assembly plant, initially called 
South African Television Manufacturing Co. and now named Federale 
Electronics. The products assembled include Pioneer Hi Fi 
equipment which originates from Japan, and Telefunken television 
sets - in association with the German company AEG-Telefunken. 
(118) 
Both Anglo American Corporation and De Beers have interests 
in manufacturing in the Ciskei, Anglo through its subsidiary I 
L.I.T.E.T. (119) De Beers have a part interest in a shoe factory 
set up by Taiwanese capital. (120) There may well be other major 
South African companies involved in ventures in the Ciskei. 
Some of those already mentioned were uncovered quite fortuitously. 
5. Foreign Investment in the Ciskei. 
A further development in industrial investment in the Ciskei in 
the late 1970s, as will have been gathered, was the entry of 
foreign capital into the Ciskei. In June 1982 Chief Lennox Sebe 
was quoted as saying that 
"Ten out of the 33 industries already established in 
Dimbaza have foreign interests in them or are owned by 
overseas concerns. " ( 121 ) 
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What this means, precisely, is not clear, but it does correct-
ly reflect the growth of foreign interest in investment in the 
Ciskei. Three forms of foreign interest in the Ciskei can be 
discerned. Firstly, there are foreign companies who license 
production of their products and supply technology, in exchange 
for royal ties of some kind. Secondly, there are foreign firms, 
which often supply the technology, which enter into partnerships 
with local companies. Thirdly, there are wholly owned subsidia-
ries or branches of foreign companies. It is often, however, 
difficult to obtain accurate information about the precise relation-
ship between foreign firms and their Ciskei interests. 
Amongst the earliest of foreign investors was the German 
company Heideman Werke which in 1976 established a bicycle manufac-
turing plant in Dimbaza in association with two South African 
companies. (122) The latter companies later merged and the plant 
which sells bicycles across southern Africa now trades as C. K. 
Hurwitz Cycles. 
Other European capital includes· the very large (R8.8 million) 
woolwashing plant called Southern Combing. ( 123) The plant, 
which is jointly owned by "a European consortium" and O.S. Blenkin-
skop Pty. Ltd. (and the C.N.D.C.), was moved lock, stock and 
barrel from Spain where labour costs were too high and health 
regulations too stringent. ( 124) Van Leer, which makes plastic 
mesh, is a wholly owned subsidiary of a Dutch company. (125) 
Capital from the United States is also present in Dimbaza, 
in a small way so far. The U.S. Optical Company was moved, 
complete from Miami, Florida,· to made spectacle frames in Dimbaza. 
It is officially owned by the C. N. D. C. and the plant's South 
African managers, but American interest seems likely. (126) 
International Stretch Products which makes braided polypropelene 
and macrame products is part American owned. ( 127) Both plants 
were established in 1982. 
Taiwanese capital moved into the Ciskei in the form of three 
companies in 1982. One, Thrustor Manufacturing Industries, 
produces overalls and protective clothing. (128) Ciskei Padlocks 
is a second Taiwanese company ( 129) and Kayo Shoe Manufacturers 
from Taiwan, makes sports shoes in partnership with the Anglo 
American Corporation. (130) 
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Foreign investors moved into the Cisk.ei in the late 1970s 
for a combination of reasons. Firstly, the ground had been 
proven by the earlier small scale investors. They had shown 
that the combination of low wages and incentives offered by the 
development corporations made investment in certain sectors of 
industry a distinct possibility. A second reason for some 
factories, in common with those investing in some border areas, 
is that "dirty" industries have few controls placed over them. 
Southern Combing is an example here. Thirdly, the preferential 
treatment accorded goods manufactured in the Ciskei in South 
Africa made it a good site from which to creep under South 
African tariff barriers~ 
Dimbaza exemplifies this. 
The production of Taiwanese takkies in 
* * * * * * 
As suggested in the text, it is possible to divide investment 
in the Ciskei into two periods. The first period, between 1974 
and 1979 was a period dominated by small scale investment at a 
slow rate. From the late 1970s large local and international 
companies began to invest to an increased extent. It may well 
be possible to talk about a third phase beginning with the announce-
ment of dramatically increased investment incentives for the 
Ciskei in terms of the Regional Development Programme in 1982. 
That will be discussed in the concluding chapter. 
6. Production Patterns and Wage Rates. 
In attempting to establish the nature and reasons behind investment 
in industry in the Ciskei, two related issues call for examination 
- the capital intensity of production processes and the nature 
and cost of labour employed. These issues are explored in this 
section. 
It has already been shown that the plants that were establish-
ed in the Ciskei under the Agency system in its early years, say 
1974 to 1978, were predominantly small scale labour-intensive 
light industrial enterprises, derived from small capital. Quite 
simply, it was a case of ambitious small businessmen at tempting 
to take advantage of cheap loans and rentals, as well as cheap . 
labour. They would very probably not have been able to raise 
I 
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the capital other than by locating in a bantustan and exploiting 
development corporation loans. In Tables 6.5 - 6. 10 it can be 
seen that during this period the capital labour ratio was relative-
· 1y· 1ow in most sectors. The sector which demonstrates this most 
clearly is the Textile Clothing and Leather sector where in 1979 
nine factories existed at a total investment cost of R2 036 225 
(cumulative total at ~urrent prices) of which the C.N.D.C. and 
related bodie~ had contributed R1 122 725, nearly sixty percent. 
A total of 755 people were employed, an average of about 84 
workers per factory. The cost per job, very roughly calculated, 
was about R2 697. As the names of some of the factories indicate 
- Sotho Weavers, Tribal Hand Weavers and Xhosa Weavers, for 
example - industrialised hand weaving was the most common form of 
textile production. In addition to the three factories mentioned, 
Barker Matte and Ranger Carpets also produce hand woven karakul 
rugs as their major activity and Barkor Industries spins rough 
mohair yarn. 
Barkor in Dimbaza employed 180 people in 1981 of whom only 
the manager and one other employee were men. The reasons cited 
by the manager for chasing to employ women were that they were 
"more willing" and formed a stable labour force. ( 131 ) Most were 
unskilled when hired and were trained on the job within a month. 
The weavers worked simple mechanical hand looms, three workers 
per 3 meter by 9 meter loom. They were paid piece rates without 
any specified minimum and could earn, accprding to Mr Day, the 
manager, between R20 and R40 every two weeks. (132) The spinners 
were paid .similar piece rates according to the weight of the yarn 
produced though the supervisors, all black women, were paid 
straight rates (unspecified). 
The amount invested in the enterprise was about R240 000, of 
which the greater proportion was contributed by the C.N.D.C. -
the buildings cost R140 000. Clearly the capital expenditure on 
machinery was very low, approximately R600 per worker. The 
products, mainly karakul woven rugs, but increasingly rough woven 
outer garments, were marketed mainly in South Africa. In spite 
of the low costs of ·production Barkor' s products were not very 
price competitive internationally, according to the manager Mr 
Day. The handmade rug market was very stiff and ·producers in 
I~ 
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the Ciskei had to compete against the products of countries such 
as Mexico and India. Mr Day complained that compliance with the 
Factories Act as regards the provision of toilets, change rooms 
and rest rooms, pushed up costs unnecessarily, in his view. (133) 
Though international competition may be severe, a glance at 
Table 6. 13 indicates the very clear wage bill advantages of 
locating in Dimbaza. Wages in East London, or the Border region, 
were not very high in 1976. In almost every case, as Table 6. 14 
indicates, they were well below the national average. However, 
wages in Dimbaza were still further below East Lontjon levels. 
In the textile industry, for example, the national average for 
African workers was R23.57, in East London it was R15,65, and in 
a typical plant in Dimbaza in 1976 it was R4. 50 per week. In 
the other sectors for which data is available for Dimbaza the 
same pattern is reproduced although the difference is a bit 
smaller in the metal products sector. The latter industrial 
sector is the only one in the Ciskei where more men are employed 
than women (see Table 6. 6) . For this reason and also because 
men are in a better position to market their skills learnt in the 
Ciskei, the gap between wages paid in East London and Dimbaza to 
male operative metal workers is not as large. ( 134) It is the 
women's wages that are so extremely low, for the simple reason 
that women are legally blocked, through the . implementation of 
influx control measures, from marketing their labour outside the 
Ciskei. Men, though severly restricted, have potential opportuni-
ties. It is not surprising, then, to note that while in the -fj 
early stages more men were employed, capitalists soon woke up to 
Ciskeian realities. Thus in the wood products sector in 1977, 
244 African men and 169 African women were employed, in 1979 the 
figures were 212 women to 158 men (Table 6.8). In the food and 
beverage sector 100 African men and 200 women were employed in 
1977 but in 1979 the number of men dropped to 60 while the number 
of women increased to 290 (Table 6. 9). Apart from wage levels, 
employers proffer two reasons why they prefer to employ women: 
firstly, they were a stable work force, (135) clearly they could 
not afford to lose their jobs and were thus, by and large, a 
docile labour force. In addition, they were quite "dextrous"; 
as an electronics factory manager said: 
"The employees are mostly matriculated females. 
Assembling intricate electronical (sic) components, 
some of which are minute, needs the fine delicate touch 
of a woman's fingers, as proven worldwide." (136) 
7. Industrial Relations in the Ciskei. 
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In spite of the very oppressive conditions under which they work 
and live, workers in the Ciskei have, from time to time, openly 
at tempted to resist their exploi ta ti on. However, only a few 
isolated instances of worker action have been recorded. 
To complete a picture of workec resistance would require, in 
addition to accounts of organised worker action, a knowledge and 
understanding of unorganised and informal forms of resistance 
ranging from desertion to industrial sabotage. Unfortunately no 
one has studied informal and unorganised worker resistance in the 
Ciskei and it was beyond the scope of this study. 
Trade Unions, though only officially banned in 198 3, have 
never been allowed to operate in the Ciskei. In many factories 
no form of worker representation exists. A manager of a rug 
making plant in Dimbaza told me in 1981 that when workers had 
grievances they could raise them, individually, either with a 
supervisor or directly with him. He seemed to think it quite 
unsurprising that absolutely no industrial relations structure 
existed within the firm at all. (137) A worker at a Crarna 
Industries (renamed Federale Electronics), the Dimbaza branch of 
East London based S.A.T.V., an electronics assembly plant, explain-
ed that there are no committees at all at her factory. She said 
that although the workload was very heavy, workers were too 
afraid to complain. 
ed people in Dimbaza 
told to leave. (138) 
The workers know that there are many unemploy-
and that if they complain they are simply 
There are recorded instances of industrial unrest in the 
Ciskei, though the record of events is usually not very clear. 
In Dimbaza in 1977 school pupils, presumably partly in response 
to scholar revolts elsewhere in South Africa, took up stones and 
petrol bombs. About 500 left their schools on 26th September 
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1977. First they marched to the Administration Board offices 
which they set alight, incidentally damaging several police 
vehicles. They then entered the factory area of Dimbaza where 
they damaged at least nine factories and called upon workers to 
strike. Unclear reports suggest that in at least one factory, 
the bicycle factory,. workers responded by leaving the factory and 
demanding higher wages and better working conditions. The 
entire workforce was apparently dismissed. Work came to a halt 
at most of the other factories, but it is not clear whether a 
rolling strike had occurred or damage to factories or even the 
sheer fear of employers caused the stoppages. ( 139) Five days 
after the unrest in Dimbaza began the Ciskei Legislative Assembly 
approved Regulation 252, the notorious coverall security law 
which provides for everything from detention without trial to 
banishment. 
In 1979 several bus drivers' strikes were reported in the 
Mdantsane and King Williamstown areas. In one case 55 strikers 
were found guilty of contravening the Riotous Assemblies Act for 
protesting against low wages in Mdantsane. ( 140) In another 
case, .bus drivers in Mdantsane struck because of an increase in 
bus fares. The drivers were receiving the brunt of bus travellers' 
anger and were concerned about their safety. They, too, met 
with harsh responses from their employers, Gompo Bus Co. and the 
security apparatuses of the Ciskei. (141) 
The only major strike involving a trade union occurred in 
Mdantsane in 1980. The Mdantsane Special Organisation is 
effectively the civil engineering and construction branch of 
local government in Mdantsane. The rapid growth of Mdantsane 
meant that in 1980 there were over 2 000 workers building and 
repairing the giant township. A workers' committee was formed 
early that year to convey workers' grievances to their employers. 
Whether Thozamile Gqwetha, founder and first organiser of the 
South African Allied Workers Union (S.A.A.W.U.). in the East 
London region was involved from the start of organisation or was 
drawn in at a later stage, is not clear. However, when workers' 
grievances over wages, working conditions and two dismissals were 
ignored by management and over 1 000 came out on strike, Gqwetha 
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lent his assistance. Worker leaders were detained, but far from 
weakening it this action strengthened the strike and the leaders 
were released. (142) 
S.A.A.W.U. had attempted to open an office in Mdantsane but 
Gqwetha was told by (then) Colonel Charles Sebe "do what you like 
in the Republic and come back here (to the Ciskei) to sleep." 
(143) S.A.A.W.U. had, effectively been banned from the Ciskei 
as, for all intents and purposes, were any other trade union. 
Women from C.N.I.P. had put on an anti-S.A.A.W.U. demonstration -
led by Mrs N. Nene, wife of councillor and trader. Steve Nene, 
accompanied by the wives of other traders and councillors. The 
same night Gqwetha's home was mysteriously stoned and set alight. 
( 144) Thus while it was only officially promulgated in 1983, 
trade unions have never been allowed to operate in the Ciskei. 
The region was left with the anomalous situation of workers who 
lived in Mdantsane but worked in East London being organised by 
militant trade unions (including the General Workers Union and 
the Food and Canning Workers Union as well as S.A.A.W.U.), while 
their neighbours who were employed in Mdantsane were prohibited 
from engaging in any union activity. It would appear that 
employers planning to locate in the Border region would therefore 
be drawn to invest in the Ciskei rather than East London where 
worker militancy has prevailed since 1980. 
In fact, it would appear that firms are moving out of East 
London and into the Ciskei for that reason. Federale Electronics 
started in East London, expanded to Dimbaza, where it has grown 
substantially. The East London plant has remained. the same size 
and may eventually disappear. The case of Western Province 
Preserves is a still more dramatic illustration of this process. 
For many years the company, which processes pineapples, has been 
based in East London. In recent years the Food and Canning 
Workers Union and the African Food and Canning Workers Union 
jointly organised W.P.P. 's workers and made important gains in 
salary and working conditions. Recently the directors decided 
to move the entire plant to a site 20 km away, near Kidd's Beach, 
just within the borders of the Ciskei. (145) 
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In some factories in the Ciskei forms of worker representation 
are allowed or, more accurately, foisted on workers by, employers. 
A worker in the foundry at Dimbaza when interviewed, said: 
"I work as a welder in the factory. I had basic training 
(on the job) for two weeks and after that the supervisor 
taught me. I and some other workers are being sent to 
a trade school in Zwelitsha to learn more about welding. 
At the moment I work with two qualified welders from 
Mdantsane. 
The workers are not happy with their wages and 
working conditions. Late last year ( 1980) the bosses 
started a foreman's committee but the workers said 
'No'. We wanted our own committee. We chose a 
committee in April 1981 and told them to ask the bosses 
for an increase. But before the committee could meet 
with them, the bosses called a meeting of all the 
workers. We were told we were not allowed to have 
meetings inside the factory. An increase would come 
but only in November. Meanwhile if we had any complaints 
we were to go to the chief foreman (a white) who would 
take complaints to management. We had to take these 
complaints as individuals. The bosses would not 
recognise our committee. 
We were afraid of losing our jobs and felt that 
continuing with the committee was too difficult. So 
we dissolved the committee a month later (in May)." 
(146) 
When Southern Combing, a woolworking factory, was established 
in Dimbaza in 1981, Officials from the C.N.D.C. organised the 
'election of a Liaison Committee - known as a Works Council in 
terms of the 1979 South African Industrial Conciliation Amendment 
Act. The essential feature of a Works Council is that it is 
part elected, part appointed by management and chaired by manage-
ment. That is why in the quote above the worker referred to a 
"supervisors committee", for that is effectively what they are. 
In the case of Southern Combing the management was satisfied with 
the job done by the C. N. D. C. "Those elected were well educated 
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and responsible, including the black- personnel manager and the 
wage clerk." ( 147) Apart from the iniquitous structure, the 
negotiating status and rights of such committees was uncertain. 
It would seem, then, that the banning_ of trade unions in the 
Ciskei should by no means just be analysed as a response to a 
political threat. Deliberate attempts are being taken by the 
Ciskei government to prevent workers fighting for improved wages 
and working conditions. This is understood by employers who 
appear to be moving to the Ciskei for that reason. 
8. Changing Occupational Patterns and Class Formation. 
One of the significant provisions of the Agency system was that 
wherever possible African rather than-non-African workers should 
be employed - by inference as white collar technical and managerial 
staff, positions from which they were largely barred in South 
Africa. 
In many cases firms needed little encouragement to train 
black workers for posts reserved for others in South Africa by 
statute or by the protectionist policies of white and coloured 
trade unions. The clearest case is the employment of blacks as 
artisans and mechanics, occupations from which they were generally 
barred. The alacrity with which firms like Dimbaza Foundries 
trained black welders can be explained in terms of those workers' 
inability to command higher wages· in the Ciskei or attain such 
jobs outside the Ciskei. With the current erosion of job reserva-
tion in South Africa, experienced welders or artisans of other 
kinds may be able to market their skills outside the Ciskei, but 
this is discouraged by the influx control policies of the South 
African state and the craft unionism that remains amongst certain 
artisan categories of work. 
In addition to black artisans, Africans occupy a re la ti vely 
wide range of supervisory posts. in factories in the Ciskei. In 
many factories it is only the chief supervisor or, chief foreman 
who is not a black Ciskeian. In some cases black artisans are 
employed at the executive level of management, the personnel 
manager mentioned above being a typical example. Less typical, 
perhaps, is the case of Elizabeth Mtose. A matriculated woman, 
she had worked as a bookkeeper in a legal firm in East London 
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before moving to Tribal Handweavers in Dimbaza where she worked 
as a general secretary and telephonist/receptionist. After four 
years she had been promoted to a managerial position and made a 
director of the company. (148) 
Black technicians and technologists have also emerged as an 
upwardly mobile grouping within· industry in the Ciskei. At 
Ciskei Paints, for example, a woman B.Sc. graduate of Fort Hare 
occupies the post of paint technologist. (149) Such appointments 
are attractive to management as the cost of hiring a trained 
white or coloured technologist would be relatively high, not only 
because of the salaries they could command in South Africa, but 
because very high additional incentives would be required to 
persuade qualified personnel to live in King Williamstown and 
work in Dimbaza. 
Clearly the policy of the development corporations and the 
Ciskei government to encourage the employment of blacks as skilled 
and managerial staff is politically motivated. One of the main 
theses of this dissertation is that since the late 1960s an 
accelerating initiative to build a Ciskeian middle class as a 
support base for the rulers has pervaded all levels of policy in 
the C:i,.skei. This I will argue in more detail . below. What 
should be established at this stage is the extent to which a 
Ciskeian new middle class has been created in the industrial 
sector. 
In absolute terms the new middle class in industry is likely 
to be very small. In Table 6. 15 an analysis of the occupational 
breakdown of "Xhosa" in the Ciskei in 1970 is compared with that 
obtained by the 1980 census. The figures presented indicate 
very substantial changes in the economic activities of Ciskei 
residents. 
Before they are examined two problems concerning the use of 
the data must be noted. Firstly, the 1970 figures include the 
Herschel and Glen Grey districts which were excised from the 
Ciskei in 1976. The main effect of the inclusion of these 
districts is that the figures for those employed in agricultural 
production in 1970 is artificially boosted. A second factor 
that accounts for a quite substantial distortion is the development 
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of Mdantsane during the 1970s. This means that many people 
falling in the categories professional and technical workers, 
clerical, sales, production and transport workers will have moved 
from East London townships to Mdantsane, inflating the increase 
in those categories. In addition, it must be noted, that these 
occupational categories are very broad and ill-defined and should 
only be used as broad guides of trends. 
All these qualifications notwithstanding, the changes between 
1970 and 1980 reflected in the occupation figures are quite 
marked. Those falling under the category of farm or forestry 
worker have decreased from a total of 57 820 to 12 360. Part of 
this drop can be accounted for in the excision of Herschel and 
Glen Grey, but certainly not the entire fall. 
At the same time all other categories have increased sharply, 
with the exception of administrative and managerial workers.· 
Categories such as production workers, sales worker, professional 
and technical worker and service workers have all more or less 
doubled. The number of clerical and related workers resident in 
the Ciskei has -.almost quadrupled, from. 1 800 to 7 040. 
" Much of the increase can be explained by two factors. 
Firstly, there is the transference of people from East London to 
Mdantsane. Secondly, there is the very substantial expansion of 
the state sector that occurred during the 1970s which would 
account for a good part of the increase of clerical and professio-
nal (teachers) workers. However, it is possible to narrow down 
the analysis a little further. 
Most people employed in King Williamstown and East London, 
and a large proportion of those employed in the state sector live 
in two districts of the Ciskei - the districts of Mdantsane' and 
Zwelitsha. It is possible to separate these two districts out 
of the analysis. This is done in Table 6. 16 which refers only 
I 
to the districts of Hewu, Keiskarnmahoek, Middledrift (in which 
Dimbaza falls), Peddie and Victoria East, known collectively as 
Statistical Region 70 in the 1980 census. Table 6. 16 exhibits 
the same broad trends that are indicated in Table 6. 15, suggesting 
that it has not only been the creation of Mdantsane and the 
expansion of state structures in Zwelitsha, that have altered 
occupation patterns in the Ciskei. 
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It is not possible to arrive at any analysis of substance on 
the basis of the census material presented. Some very broad 
generalisations about the changing social division of labour are 
perhaps possible. Firstly, the rural sector has rapidly fallen 
away in importance in terms of the employment of labour. Secondly, 
the proportion of Ciskei residents employed in industry, commerce 
and the service sector, including the state, has risen very 
rapidly. Within these sectors the sizes of both the working 
class and the new middle class have grown significantly. Thirdly, 
it is noticeable that a substantial proportion of those employed ~/< 
at the upper end of the spectrum are women. More than half 
those classified as professional, technical and related workers 
are women, probably made up largely of nurses and teachers. 
Curiously, this is reflected in the enrolment figures at the Fort 
Cox Agricultural College. Formerly an exclusive male preserve, 
now a large proportion of students at Fort Cox are women. (150) 
This reflects a general trend in the Ciskei - that women, who X 
have a much smaller choice of employment opportunities do not 
have to leave school to work as do young men who support their 
families. 
Industrial development within the Ciskei is not the central\ 
cause of the changing division of labour. If there is a central 
factor it is the expansion of the state sector. The basis of 
the change, within the Ciskei, is the collapse of the rural 
sector as a means of sustaining a significant proportion of the 
population. By the end of 1981, 6 024 Ciskeians were employed 
in the industrial sector within the Ciskei. ( 151) This amounts 
to less than one percent of the de facto population of the Ciskei. 
Though its effects on class formation are still relatively small, 
they are significant insofar as internal industrialisation has f 
facilitated the development of an internal working class (as 
opposed to migrant or commuter) and a very small new peti t 
bourgeoisie located in industry. 
* * * * * * 
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This chapter has attempted to present an account of the 
development of industry in the Ciskei between 1974 and 1981 in 
the context of the application of state economic policy in the 
Ciskei. 
First it looked at agricultural programmes since the Second 
World War and argued that, in the 1970s, policy shifted towards a 
focus on special agricultural projects. These projects were 
designed as showpieces in an attempt to impress both the interna-
tional community and the internal population of the Ciskei. In 
this sense it was an attempt to give credence to a ?evelopmentalist 
image the state in the Ciskei was attempting to cultivate. At 
the same time it was designed to build up a class of yeoman 
farmers on the land. The circumstances within which the strategy 
was formulated and implemented was riddled with contradictions, 
however, and the programme has thusfar met with little success as 
regards Sebe's expressed desire for a cadre of middle class 
farmers. 
The C.N.D.C., too, shifted gear in the 1970s. Previously 
it had been almost exclusively concerned with the creation of 
"Ban tu traders" in the Ciskei. In the 1970s its at tent ion was 
focussed upon creating the conditions for industrial development. 
In addition it catered to the urban middle class through its home 
loan scheme. 
Indus trial development began slowly, in Dimbaza, with the 
establishment of a small, charity funded spectacle frame factory. 
It would be an exaggeration to claim that since 197 4 it has 
changed the face of the Ciskei. But, with the entry of large 
South African corporations and foreign investors into manufacturing 
in the Ciskei in the late 1970s, the beginning of a new era has 
been clearly marked. A few trappings of pre-capitalist rural, 
social and ideological relations remain in the Ciskei, but by 
vigorously promoting industrialisation (along with home ownership 
and capitalist farming) the ruling class. has acknowledged that 
the terrain of class struggle in the Ciskei has shifted. I 
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TABLE 6. 1. 
NUMBER AND TYPE OF BUSINESS LICENCES ISSUED IN TI-IE CISKEI. 
1973 ( 1 ) 1977/8 (2) 
Retail and Allied Total 209 722 
(General Dealers) ( 125) (302) 
Catering and Accommodation 15 42 
Transport 9 ? 
Personal Services 3 3 
Recreational and Cultural Services 2 
Light Manufacturing Industries 5 
Professional Services 3 
Total 239 774 
Sources: 1972 derived from Benbo Ciskei Economic Revue (sic) 
1975. Table 7.6.1; 1977178 from Benso, Statistical 
Survey of Black Development 1980, Table 83. 
( 1 ) These figures exclude Herschel and Glen Grey and are 
therefore comparable though some categories have changed, 
accounting for some of the blank spaces. 
(2) Figures quoted in the Daily Dispatch (26/7/79) in 1979 are 
lower than these - I have no idea why, though they were 
probably out of date as these figures were officially 
released in 1980. 
TABLE 6.2. 
CUMULATIVE C.N.D.C. EXPENDITURE BY 31/3/82. 
(R'OOO 000) 
Industrial Development (Agency) * 
C.N.D.C. Projects 
Infrastructure 
Business Loans (to African businessmen) * 

















Sources: Ciskei National Development Corporation, Annual Report, 
1982. The figures are extracted from two tables 
within the report. Those marked with an asterisk are 
marginally higher than indicated in the unnumbered 




CUMULATIVE C.N.D.C. EXPENDITURE ON HOUSING LOANS. 
Year Number of Loans Total Value (R) 
1974 50 189 215 
1975 67 259 545 
1976 91 406 955 
1977 114 615 727 
1978 575 1 679 473 
1979 052 2 874 513 
1980 590 4 594 443 
1981 2 299 8 063 543 
1982 2 936 12 763 223 
Sources: For 197 4 to 1981 - derived from the C. N. D. C. Annual 
Report 1981, p 27. For 1982 derived from the C.N.D.C. 
Annual Report, p 14. 
TABLE 6.4 
PRIVATE AND C.N.D.C. INVESTMENT IN "AGENCY" INDUSTRY ( 1) 
. 
rr, 1974 - 1981 CUMULATIVE. 
°' ,--
Year ( 1 ) ( 2) (3) (4.) (5) (6) 
Private Buildings Loans and Sub Total Total Private Inv. (4) 
Investment Share Purchases State Exp. C.N.D.C. Inv. ( 1) 
1974 51 600 78 275 21 610 99 885 151 485 0,52 
1975 199 100 301 531 185 877 487 408 686 516 0,41 
1976 
1977 2 659 300 2 655 677 1 026 431 3 682 108 6 341 400 0,72 
1978 3 949 000 3 384 316 2 203 037 5 587 353 9 536 353 0,71 
1979 4 084 000 4 296 769 6 029 376 10 326 145 14 410 145 0,40 
1980 5 894 762 11 987 879 17 882 641 o,49 
1981 10 782 952 21 841 642 32 624 594 0,49 
Sources: Benso data, unpublished 
(1) Excluding expenditure on infrastructure. 
TABLE 6.5 
INDUSTRY, INVE:s'IMENT AND EMPLOYMENT IN DIMBAZA BY" AGENCY SYSTEM 1974 - 1981 
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
( 1 ) TEXTILE, CLOTHING AND LEATHER 
Factories No: 2 2 3 6 7 9 11 14 
( 2) Private Investment 31 000 49 300 156 600 637 300 784 700 913 500 1 090 063 2 992 791 
( 3) XDC/CNDC Investment, shares, 
loans and buildings 72 678 91 209 215 500 490 534 865 651 1 122 725 1 564 715 7 142 242 
(4) Total Investment 103 678 140 509 372 100 127 834 650 351 2 036 225 2 654 778 10 135 033 
(5) Employment: whites 2 2 7 6 13 16 18 21 
(6) Employment: 'Black' male 15 22 32 
(7) Employment: 'Black' female 391 486 706 
(8) Employment: 'Black' total 60 51 155 406 508 738 964 143 
(9) Total (inc. 'Other') 62 53 162 412 521 755 (1) 982 164 
(10) Capital/Labour ratio 
(current prices) (4) + (9) 672.23 2 651 . 11 2 296.91 2 737.46 3 167.66 2 696.99 2 703.44 8 707.07 
(1) One 'other' 
Source: 6.5 - 6. 10, Benso Unpublished Data. 
TABLE 6.6 
INDUSTRY, INVF.s1MENT AND EMPLOYMENT IN DIMBAZA BY AGENCY SYSTEM 1974 - 1981 
·1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
( 1 ) FABRICATED METAL PRODUCTS 
MACHINERY & EQUIPMENT 
Factories No: 2 3 6 6 7 
(2) Private Investment 10 000 58 200 38 600 53 600 399 800 1 331 300 967 651 2 092 117 
( 3) XDC/CNDC Investment, shares, 
loans and buildings 6 305 109 420 87 800 82 840 627 558 5 355 063 6 218 457 6 957 065 
(4) Total Investment 16 305 167 620 126 400 136 400 3 027 358 6 686 363 8 186 108 8 049 182 
( 1 ) (2) 
( 5) Employment Whites 2 3 3 19 25 39 52 
(6) Employment 'Black' male 146 152 
(7) Employment 'Black' female 15 52 46 
(8) Employment 'Black' total 15 65 30 15 198 198 362 533 
(9) Total (incl. 'Other') 16 67 33 18 217 227(3) 401 605 
( 10) Capital/Labour ratio 
(current prices) (4) + (9) 019.06 2 501. 79 3 830.30 7 599.77 13 950.96 29 455.34 20 414.23 13 304.43 
. 
( 1 ) 228 000 CNDC share capital 
( 2) 1 562 000 ditto 
( 3) 4 'Others' 
'° TABLE 6. 7 
°' 
INDUSTRY, INVES1MENT AND EMPLOYMENT IN DIMBAZA BY AGENCY SYSTEM 1974-1981 
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
( 1 ) CHEMICALS & CHEMICAL PETRO-
LEUM, COAL, RUBBER & PLASTIC 
Factories No: N 2 -3 
(2) Private Investment 25 000 65 000 75 000 75 000 0 678 306 758 306 
( 3) XDC/CNDC Investment, shares 
E loans and buildings 76 792 139 700 146 149 146 149 658 140 088 298 
( 4) Total Investment 101 792 204 700 22] 149 221 149 N 336 446 1 846 604 
(5) Employment: White 2 2 3 
T 11 16 
(6) Employment: 'Black' male 22 3 
R 82 111 
(7) Employment: 'Black' female 18 
y 
( 8) Employment: 'Black' total 17 20 22 21 
(9) Total (incl. 'Other') 18 22 24 24 93 127 
( 10) Capital/Labour ratio 
(current prices) (4) + (9) 5655.11 9 304.55 9 214.54 9 214.54 14 370.00 14 540. 19 
S:; TABLE 6.8 
..--
INDUSTRY, INVESTMENT AND EMPLOYMENT IN SECTORS NOT CONFINED TO DIMBAZA. 
AGENCY BASIS 
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
( 1 ) WOOD & WOOD PRODUCTS 
Factories No: 3 3 4 2 3 4 4 
(2) Private Investment 50 000 362 000 641 000 365 000 392 000 729 742 725 217 
( 3) XDC/CNDC Investment 172 814 415 400 646 394 520 727 679 301 233 347 1 301 142 
( 4) Total Investment 222 814 777 400 287 394 885 727 072 001 963 089 2 026 359 
(5) Employment: White 7 12 9 9 14 16 20 
(6) Employment: 'Black' male n.a. n.a. 244 138 158 
(7) Employment: 'Black' female n.a. n.a. 169 159 212 
(8) Employment: 'Black' total 179 374 413 297 370 433 566 
(9) Total (incl. 'Other') 186 386 422 317(1) . 402(2) 449 586 
( 10) Capital/Labour ratio 
(current prices) (4) + (9) 197.92 2 013.99 3 050.70 2 714.09 2 666.67 4 372. 14 3 457.95 
( 1) 11 'Others' 
( 2) 18 ' Others ' 
. TABLE 6.9 
co 
°' 
INDUSTRY, INVES1MENT AND EMPLOYMENT IN SECTORS NOT CONFINED TO DIMBAZA. 
AGENCY BASIS 
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
( 1 ) FOOD, BEVERAGES AND 
TOBACCO 
Factories No: 1 ( 0 in D) 2 
( 2) Private Investment 559 000 969 000 970 000 970 000 1 395 900 4 181 421 
( 3) XDC/CNDC Investment t 450 000 653 884 709 094 668 646 2 026 377 5 064 926 
(4) Total Investment 2 009 000 2 622 884 2 699 094 2 638 646 3 422 277 9 246 347 
(5) Employment: White 18 14 20 21 30 49 
(6) Employment: 'Black' male 100 50 10 
(7) Employment: 'Black' female 200 300 290 
(8) Employment: 'Black' total 321 300 350 350 356 656 
(9) Total (incl. 'Other') 339 314 370 374( 1) 386 705 
( 10) Capital/Labour ratio 
(current prices) (4) + (9) ·5 926.25 8 353. 13 7 294.85 7 055.20 8 866.00 13 115.38 
(1) 3 'others' 
_J 
m TABLE 6. 10 
°' 
INDUSTRY, INVES'IMENT AND EMPLOYMENT IN CISKEI, SECTORS NOT CONFINED TO DIMBAZA 
AGENCY BASIS 
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
( 1 ) NON-METALLIC MINERAL 
PRODUCTS (not coal or oil) 
Factories No: 1 1 
(2) Private Investment 10 600 16 600 15 800 15 400 15 500 15 500 15 900 15 900 
(3) XDC/CNDC Investment 20 902 37 181 57 800 89 800 135 664 165 885 187 324 187 324 
(4) Total Investment 31 502 53 781 73 600 105 200 151 164 181 385 203 224 203 224 
(5) Employment: White 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 
(6) Employment: 'Black' male 4 6 7 
(7) Employment: 'Black' female 15 19 32 
(8) Employment: 'Black' total 10 12 19 19 25 39 34 28 
( 9) Total Employment 12 13 21 21 27 41 36 28 
( 10) Capital/Labour ratio 
(current prices) (4) (9) 2 625. 17 4 137.00 3 504.76 5 009.52 5 598.67 4 424.02 5 645. 11 7 258.00 
TABLE 6. 11 ' 
Capital investment and employment in all enterprises established according to the agency system 
. 




Enterprises Capital Investment ( R) Employment 
• 
Industrialists CNDC Total White Black Other Total 
1 . DIMBAZA 22 3 671 977 9 256 322 12 928 299 77 1 504 2 1 583 
Manufacturing 
Textile, Wearing apparel 
and leather 11 090 063 564 715 2 654 778 1 8 964 982 
Wood and wood products 2 216 257 715 491 931 748 6 79 2 87 
Paper and paper products, 
printing & publishing 17 200 99 519 11 6 71 9 3 1 7 20 
Chemicals and chemical, 
petroleum, coal, rubber 2 678 306 658 140 1 336 446 11 82 93 
and plastic products 
Basic metal industries 5 596 000 1 534 068 2 130 068 1 5 148 163 
Fabricated metal products, 
machinery & equipment 5 074 1 51 4 684 389 5 758 540 24 214 238 
2. OTHER 4 925 285 2 731 557 4 656 842 32 744 25 811 
Manufacturing 
Food, beverages, tobacco 395 900 2 026 377 3 422 277 30 356 4 390 
Wood and wood products 2 513 485 517 856 031 341 1 0 354 21 385 
Non-metallic mineral pro-
ducts 1 5 900 187 324 203 224 2 34 36 
TOTAL 26 5 597 262 11 987 879 1 7 585 1 41 11 9 2 248 27 2 394 
Source: BEN SO 'The Republic of Ciskei', 1981 , op. cit., Table 1 7 .1. 
------ __J 
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TABLE 6. 12 
INDUSTRIES IN THE CISKEI 1981 
NAME 
ASSOCIATED LEA T!-IER 
PRODUCTS (PTY) LTD 
BARKOR INDUSTRIES 
(PTY) LTD 
BARKOR MATTE (PTY) 
LTD 
CAT CLOTHS AND TEA 
TOWELS (PTY) LTD 
CISKEI ADVERTISING 
CISKEI METAL INDUS-
TRIES (PTY) LTD 
CISKEI PAINTS (PTY) 
LTD 
CISKEI SAW MILLS 
(PTY) LTD 
CISKEI STRUCTURES AND 

















PROCASE (PTY) LTD 
PROVIDENT ELECTRICAL 
RANGER CARPETS (PTY) 
LTD 























TYPE OF INDUSTRY 
Splitting of Leather 
Hand Spinning of Mohair 
Hand Weaving of Carpets 
Interior·Decor Items 
Tea Towels with local motif 
Advertising 
Ground Flat Stock Steel for 
Tool Making Industry 
Paints 
Saw Milling 
Structural Steel, Conveyor 
Systems and Agricultural 
Equipment 





Yellow and Black Wood 
Furniture 





Hand Woven Carpets 
Upholstered Lounge Suites 
NAME 
SOTHO WEAVERS (PTY) 
LTD 
SOUTHERN COMBING 
COMPANY (PTY) LTD 
S A TELEVISION MANU-
FACTURING CO (PTY) LTD 
TINION STEEL (PTY) LTD 
TRIBAL HAND WEAVERS 
(PTY) LTD 
UNATHI TIMBER PRODUCTS 
(PTY) LTD 
VAN LEER (SA) (PTY) LTD 
WEMBLEY BALLS (PTY) LTD 
WERCO KERAMIEK (PTY) 
LTD 
XHOSA WEAVERS (PTY) LTD 
ZANDLA MANUFACTURERS 
(PTY) LTD 
ZIPHA NYWERHEDE (PTY) 
LTD 















Source: C.N.D.C. photostat, 1981 
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TYPE OF INDUSTRY 
Hand Woven Carpets 
Wool Washing and Combing 
Pre-Production parts for 




Netlon (Plastic Mesh) 
Plastic Balls 
Ceramics 
Hand Woven Carpets 
Toys and Crochet Products 
Leather Safety Products 
TABLE 6. 13 
AVERAGE WF.EKLY WAGES FOR BLACK WORKERS, 1976. 
DIMBAZA 
Protective Clothing Factory R5. 10 
Carpet Factory R4.50 
Fabricated metal factory ! B20.00 
Foundry R16.33 
Bicycle Factory (labourers) R7.50 
Paint Factory (1) 
(Female labourers) R3.50(2) 






(Male labourers) R6.00 Chemical Workers 









(2) Of a total work force of 24 in 1978, 18 were women (Benso 
unpublished records). 
Sources : (a) Dimbaza: Confidential Memo from F Meisenholl, 
C.N.D.C. General Manager, to Sir Arthur Snelling, 
member of the Ciskei Commission, dated 19/12/78, C.C.E. 
(b) East LondGn: 1976 Census of Manufacturing (Regional) 
Report No 10-21-33. The statistical region 06 is 
wider than East London but this is not significant for 




TABLE 6. 14 
AVERAGE WAGES OF AFRICANS BY MANUFACTURING SECTOR, 
EAST LONDON AREA (06), CAPE TOWN AREA ( 01) , DURBAN AREA (07), SOUTII AFRICA, 1976 (1) 
Wages : R per week 
(06) ( 01 ) (07) S.A. 
Food 20, 14 25, 19 25,30 25,49 
Beverages 25,44 30, 10 30,96 30,08 
Textiles 15,65 20,86 21,48 23,57 
Clothing 10,63 20,91 15,36 19,04 
Wood 9,42 17,89 12,25 20, 17 
Furniture 21,50 23,05 27,59 27' 17 
Printing.and publishing 32,48 32,83 35,98 41, 70 
Chemicals, coal, rubber and plastics 23,63 22,28 33,50 34,22 (2) 
Non-metallic mineral products 
(brings, cement, etc) 16,88 24,08 28,70 25,83 
Metal products 27' 15 28,71 32,02 32,93 
Machinery 23,81 32,25 32,98 35, 11 
Electrical machinery 24,52 36,63 27,55 36,70 
All manufacturing 18,85 26,27 26,31 29' 16 
Sources: Figures for regions 06, 01 and 07 from Census of Manufacturing, 1976, Principal Statistics on a 
Regional Basis, Department of Statistics, Report No. 10-21-33. 
Figures for South Africa from Delia Hendrie, Employment and Earnings Statistics for the South African 
Manufacturing Sector 1970 - 79, Saldru Working Papers 37 and 38, 1981. 
Notes (1) Region 06 has been used rather than the smaller region 0602 because the information available 
for the bigger region is more complete (see Note to Table 2). Region 01 includes the magisterial 
districts of the Cape, Wynberg, Simonstown, Bellville, Goodwood, Wellington, Paarl, Stellenbosch, 
Somerset West, Strand and Kuilsri ver. Region 07 includes the magisterial districts of Durban, 
Pinetown, Inanda, Lower Tugela, Pietermaritzburg, Camperdown, Richmond, Ixopo, New Hanover, Lions 
River, Umvoti and Kranskop. 
(2) Does not include rubber and plastic products. 
TABLE 6. 15 
OCCUPATIONS OF "XHOSA" IN THE CISKEI 1970 & 1980 
Principal Occupation 
Groups 








Production & Transport 
Worker-Labourer 
Farm & Forestry Worker 
Total 
No 
Total 4 600 
Male 880 













Total 800 1,4 
Male 420 1, 1 
Female 380 0,3 
Total 2 360 1,8 
Male 900 1, 1 
Female 460 0,4 
Total 11 040 8,3 
Male 2 460 1,8 
Female 8 580 6.5 
Total 26 940 20,2 
Male 23 440 17,6 
Female 3 500 
Total 57 820 
Male 38 460 



















































Sources: ( 1) C. T. Verwey 11 The Economic Ac ti vi ty and Level of 
Education of the Xhosa with Special Reference to the 
Ciskei, 1970", · unpublished paper, Research Unit for 
Education System Planning, University of the Orange 
Free State, 1979; (2) Department of Statistics, 1980 
Population Census Estimates, unpublished. 
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TABLE 6. 16 
EMPLOYMENT BY OCCUPATION IN THE NORTHERN AND WESTERN DISTRICTS 
OF THE CISKEI 1970 AND 1980 
Professional, Technical & related worker 
Administrative & Managerial worker 
Clerical & related Worker 
Sales Worker 
Service Worker 
Production & Transport 
Worker-Labourer 
Farm and Forestry Worker 




















Sources: C.T. Verwey, 1979 (see Table 6. 15) and Department of 
Statistics, 1980 Sample Census - Region 1301, unpublished. 
( 1) Magisterial Districts of Hewu, Keiskammahoek, Middledrift, ' 
Peddie and Victoria East. 
( 2) Sta tis ti cal region 70 which is equivalent to the 1980 
versions of the districts listed in footnote (1). 
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Interview, Dimbaza resident, June 1981. 
Daily Dispatch 27, 28 & 29/9177. 
workers referred to the subject of the 
but none were forthcoming about them. 
Daily Dispatch,3/8/79. 
Daily Dispatch, 4/12/79. 
(142) Daily Dispatch, 17, 18 & 19/4/80. 
(143) Daily Dispatch,22/2/80. 
(144) Daily Dispatch,24/3/80. 
Both employers and 
strikes in interviews, 
( 145) Interview, Jan Theron, General Secretary Food & Canning 
Workers Union and the African Food & Canning Workers 








Interview, Worker at Dimbaza Foundries, Dimbaza, June, 
1981. 
Interview, Mr Ron Hough, 1981. 
Indwe No 10, 1980. 
Interview, Mr Barry Botha, Managing Director, Ciskei 
Paints, Dimbaza, 1981. 
Interview, Mr Frans Jacobs. 
Letter to the author from Mr John van Breda, Public Relations 
Officer, C.N.D.C., 3/11/81. 
EPILOGUE 
"A factory, opened in the Ciskei six months ago with Taiwanese 
backing, making jeans for export, is already so successful that 
its production line will be doubled. 
"The firm, China Garments, started production at Dimbaza 
with 150 workers. 
"The number has now grown to 520 and a spokesman for the 
company, Mr James Nsu said: 'We expect this figure . to rise 
above 800 when the expanded operation goes into full production.' 
"'Our growth here has been nothing short of spectacular. r 
We have found the labour here to be extremely versatile, cost 
effective.and easy to train.' 
"The company makes high quality jeans which are mainly 
exported to overseas markets." (The Argus 6/4/84). 
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* * * * * * 
"A record number of new applications for industrial establishment 
in the Republic of Ciskei was approved by thE;! Board of the 
Ciskei Peoples'Development Bank at its latest meeting. 
"A total of 11 new applications, representing an investment 
of R25, 1 million and 2 364 new jobs for the Ciskeians, were 
approved at the meeting, together w~th four expansions to existing 
factories. 
"No less than three of the new applications originate from 
Israel, bringing the total number of Israeli factories already 
approved for establishment in the Ciskei to five, with more 
potential establishments presently under investigation." (The 
Argus 17/4/84). 
* * * * * * 
The issue of bantustan industrialisation in general, and industrial 
development in the Ciskei in particular, has assumed greater 
importance since my research began in late 1980. When I set out, 
the most obvious question to·ask was why industrial decentralisa-
tion, to the bantustans in particular, had failed by such a 
great margin to reach its stated goals. This thesis has argued 
that, although that might have been the most obvious question, 
it was not the only important question (perhaps not the most 
useful question) to use as a starting point for analysis. 
Today it is not even the most obvious question. 
An examination of contemporary developments would, instead, 
provoke an inquiry into the ability of the current re la ti vely 
rapid rate of industrial growth in the bantustans, especially in 
the Ciskei, to sustain itself. Flowing from that, fundamental 
political issues present themselves. Firstly, what does 
industrialisation hold for struggles within the bantustans? 
The internal working class is. growing and developing a particular 
character. Other classes and strata associated with capitalist 
development are also expanding. New forms of struggle are on 
the agenda, prefigured by strike waves in Isithebe (in Kwazulu) 
and Dimbaza in the 1970s, and by a series of bus boycotts, also 
most prevalent in Kwazulu and the Ciskei. 
The second question concerns the political implications of 
growing foreign investment in the bantustans. Will some form 
of foreign diplomatic recognition follow the investments of 
companies based in those countries? These questions mark a new 
phase in industrial decentralisation in South Africa. 
The thesis takes the detailed a.nalysis of industrial invest-
ment in the Ciskei up to the end of 198.1, glancing at investments 
in early 1982. But it would not be out of place to venture 
speculative arguments concerning the reasons behind the emergence 
of a new phase. 
The introduction of a new structure and level of incentives 
as from April 1982, has without doubt been very important. 
These are briefly discussed . in Appendix A. In terms of the 
regional development strategy, the South African government 
presented a restructured, coordinated.decentralisation of industry 
programrn~. The strategy involves a general boosting of decentra-
lisation initiatives and a carefully determined regional priority 
structure. Political and economic questions are taken into 
consideration. Region D, which includes the Ciskei, was given 
the highest priority and thus the highest level of incentives. 
Within Region D, which includes, as well, the eastern Cape and 
the southern Transkei, the Ciskei itself was situated at the top 
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of a hierarchy of incentive packages. According to a government 
report the following three criteria guided the priority structure. 
" - The need for employment creation as measured by the 
present rate of unemployment, the absolute number of 
unemployed and the future need for employment .... 
" The need for a higher standard of living .... 
" The potential of a development region to satisfy 
its own employment needs in the future through economic 
growth." (1) 
Clearly the Economic Planning Branch of the Office of the 
Prime Minister regards the Ciskei as meeting all those criteria. 
In an interview, a senior planner said that the Ciskei I East 
London region was regarded as South Africa's potentially most 
serious "brandpunt". Urgent measures were needed, he said, in 
1981, and would be applied. (2) 
A cS;;~ factor which has promoted industrial development 
in the bantustans is, it_ is ventured, a growing differential 
between wages paid in the bantustans and. those paid in the 
manufacturing centres. It has not yet been possible to gather 
concrete evidence .. to document this growing wage gap, and the 
argument must be classified as speculative. However, this 
speculation is based on some information. A recent Sardru 
survey has convincingly argued that real minimum wages for 
African labourers in a range of industries has significantly 
risen over the past eleven years. (3) Amongst the reasons for 
this is increased worker militancy, translated into the growth 
of a union movement directed at black workers. 
In the bantustans, trade unions are generally not able to 
operate freely. In the Ciskei no trade union organisation has 
been allowed at all. The only union that has attempted to 
organise in the Ciskei, S. A. A. W. U. , was banned officially in 
September 1983. (4) 
r· ----..... 
A \t~;· set of reasons for investment in the bantustans 
should be sought in international economic relations. Growing 
foreign investment in the Ciskei, and other bantustans, must be 
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explained. One reason for increased foreign investment is 
increased confidence in southern Africa as an investment prospect, 
consequent on the internal reforms of the South African government 
and its foreign policy successes in southern Africa. Another 
is that, as South Africa's economy and markets expand, investing 
in the Ciskei as a means of creeping under South Africa's tariff 
protection against the import of consumer goods grows, becomes 
increasingly attractive. Other reasons might be sought within 
the economies of the investing countries themselves. 
* * * * * * 
As bantustan industrialisation enters a new phase it becomes 
easier to conceptualise the phases that mark its early history. 
In the 1960s decentralisation policy was directed towards the 
relocation of industry towards the bantustans to assist the 
programme of reversing the rural exodus. Policy was marked by , 
a fear of urban concentration in the metropolitan centres, which 
could politically destabilise capitalist 8outh Africa. It was, 
in many ways, an extended reaction to the popular struggles in 
the towns that continued from the early 1940s to the early 
1960s. 
In the 1970s attention shifted to the political priorities 
of the bantustans themselves. Forms of development within the 
bantustans were designed to strengthen the newly formulated 
political structures, intended to maintain order. The social 
and political problems stemming from the demographic crisis 
created by influx contror and resettlement, had begun to make 
themselves felt. 
By the 1980s it became clear that the political structures 
in the bantustans were facing massive social problems, particular-
ly unemployment and poverty, and strengthening political 
structures alone would not maintain order. At the same time 
the bantustans were becoming increasingly attractive investment 
propositions. Thus emerged the regional development strategy. 
These phases are matched by shifts in power between state 
apparatuses. The Department of Cooperation and Development, 
largely responsible for the implementation of bantustan industria-
lisation in the 1970s has been downgraded. The new strategy 
was formulated by planners in the Office of the Prime Minister. 
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The chief financing body of the new programme, the Development 
Bank which replaces the Corporation for Economic Development, 
stands outside the Department of Cooperation and Development. 
* * * * * * 
It remains merely to repeat assertions made earlier in this 
epilogue. The development of industry in the bantustans is an 
increasingly important phenomenon in South Africa's political 
economy. Its implications for internal forms of class struggle 
are becoming increasingly clear. So, too, are the international 
implications of growing foreign investment in the bantustans. 
Further investigation is urgently required so that those concerned 
with the development of democracy in South Africa may be guided 
to action. 
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FOOTNOTF.S - EPILffiUE 
(1) Working Group for Economic Affairs, Industrial Development 
Proposals - An element of a coordinated regional development 
strategy for Southern Africa, Economic Planning Branch, 
Office of the Prime Minister, 1981. 
(2) Interview, Dr J.S. Visagie, Director, Physical Planning 
Branch, Office of the Prime Minister, Fort Hare, Ma.rch 
1981. 
(3) See Budlender et al, Industrial Council Wage Rates, Saldru, 
University of Cape Town, 1984. 
( 4) Nicholas Haysom, Ruling with the Whip, Centre for Applied 
Legal Studies, University of the Witwatersrand, 1983. 
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APPENDIX A STRUCTURF.s AND CONTENT OF INCENTIVF.s 
Since the institution of an industrial decentralisation programme 
in 1960 the provision of various forms of financial incentives 
have played a central role. A study of the changing structure 
and content of these incentives should form a central part of an 
analysis of decentralisation and bantustan industrialisation. 
The complexities of the incentives structure, however, made 
analysis very difficult. Central difficulties include: 1) the 
fact that' incentives programmes include a large number of elements 
- between 10 and 15 of varying importance; 2) · the problems 
encountered in trying to compare changing incentives over. time 
when not only the levels alter but the very nature of the incenti-
ves might change; 3) the difficulties presented by the wide 
variety of packages for different regions and growth points 
within them. 
Ideally one might wish to construct a table which indicates 
changes in incentives over time and draw conclusions from changing 
emphases demonstrated. This is, however, impossible. Even if 
one focussed on one region or growth point the changing form of 
incentives packages over time makes quantitative comparison 
impossible. 
Certain broad trends are evident. 
of incentives is possible: 
A rough periodisa ti on 
1) 1960 - 1964. This period saw the application of 
the first incentives. These were directed at 
certain border areas only and were insubstantial. 
Industrial decentralisation took place extremely 
slowly during this period. 
2) 1964 -. 1968. Industria~ decentralisation remained 
restricted to the border areas during this period 
but incentives were significantly raised in 1964. 
During this period popular decentralisation 
growth points such as Hammarsdale and Rosslyn 
grew rapidly. 
3) 1968 - 1973. From 1968 bantustan growth points 
were identified in the Transkei, Kwazulu and 
Bophuthatswana~ The agency system now allowed 
"white" investments in the bantustans. Incentives 
were elevated all round but were marginally 
higher in the bantustans. Incentives were 
restructured to encourage capital intensive as 
well as labour intensive industries; the latter 
had been the chief target until ·1968. 
4) 1973 - 1982. During this period incentives were 
steadily incremented in the bantustans, with an 
emphasis on those bantustans headed for independen-
ce. In the border areas little change occurred. 
5) 1982 The incentives packages were substantial-
ly restructured in terms of the Regional Develop-
ment strategy. Most importantly increased 
incentives to employment and training were offered, 
differentiation between regions was increased 
with bantustan growth points remaining most 
favoured. In addition electricity tariffs were 
equalised throughout the country and transport 
subsidies were increased, both p~omoting develop-
ment at more poorly located sites within bantustans. 
In addition, decentration points nearer. existlng 
metropolitan regions, introduced during the 
previous period, were elevated in importance. 
Below examples of incentives structures in 1973 and 




TABLE 7. 1 
INCENTIVES FOR DECENTRALISATION TO 
KING WILLIAMSTOWN AND UMfATA JUNE 1973 (1) 
King Williamstown 
1. Loans available & interest rates 
(1) Land and factory buildings 
(2) Plant and current assets 
(3) Housing for white key 
personnel 
2. Provision of leased buildings 
and rentals 
(1) Factory buildings - % of cost 
(2) Housing for white key 
personnel - % ~f cost 
3. Income Tax concession (for 2 years) 
on 
(1) Wages for total/additional Bantu/ 
Coloured labour 
(2) Book value of manufacturing 
plant 
4. Cash grant for moving costs - from 
PWV only. 
5. Railage rebates (selectively on 
goods made in the area). 
6. Rebate on Harbour dues 
(East London only) 
7. Price preference on purchases by: 
(1) Bantu Authorities 
(2) Other Central and State 















No ( 2) 











Note: In many cases the stated subsidies apply for five years after 
which a more modest subsidy applies, 
( 1 ) Source: H. R. P.A. Katzenberg "The Policy and Programme for the 
Decentralisation of Industry in South Africa", Finance and Trade 
Review, Vol. 10 no 4, 1973, p 166. 
(2) As industrialists may not own land or buildings in bantustans 
they receive subsidised rents rather than low interest loans for 
these items. 
(3) Umtata incentives applied unofficially in Dimbaza from 1974. 
TABLE 7.2 
INCENTIVES FOR DECENTRALISATION TO 
KING WILLIAMSTOWN ETC. AND DIMBAZA ETC. - APRIL 
(1) Rental and Interest Subsidy 
( 10 years) (% of a "market 
related" interest rate 
(2) Housing subsidy (% of interest 
rate) 
(3) Employment incentives 
(1) % of total wage bill (cash 
grant) 
(2) Maximum amount per worker 
(R per month) 
(4) Training grant 
(5) Rail rebate % 
(6) Re-location allowance 
(7) Price preference on state tenders 
(8) Electricity subsidy 
(9) Harbour rebate - E'.ast London to 






























(1) Source: Information Newsletter The Promotion of Industrial Develop-
ment issued with South African Digest 2/4/82, Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Information, Pretoria. 
Where comparisons are possible between the 1973 incentives lists,it 
is clear that the tendency has been to increase levels generally, in the 
E'.astern Cape in this case, and to increase differentiation between the 
growth points inside and outside the bantustans. (Note that in 1973 
there were no official growth points in the Ciskei but similar rates 
would have been offered in Dimbaza as in the Transkei). 
Tax concessions for wages have been converted into cash grants and 
have increased to potentially 95% of the entire wage bill, though the, 
in any case rather small, concession on capital investment has disappea-
red. Training grants have been introduced, as has a hefty- electricity 
subsidy to bring energy costs in line with those in the eastern Transvaal, 
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the lowest in the country. The rail rebate has trebled and the 
harbour rebate for goods shipped out of East London to any other 




The Evidence Collected by the Ciskei (Quail) Commission. 
This is housed, very roughly sorted, at the Corey Library, 
Rhodes University, on restricted access. It contains what 
appears to be the entire record of the proceedings including 
oral and written evidence and correspondence. Permission to 
consult the records is obtained from the Chairperson of the 
Commission, Professor George Quail. 
embargo until 1983. 
The material was under 
Bureau for Economic Research re Black Development (BENSO). ' 
Economic and Demographic statistics for all the "non-independent" 
bantustans is recorded at BENSO. Their files may be consulted, 
with permission. 
held, too. 
Records for some "independent" bantustans are 
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